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The IMS (Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore) Growth Triangle, formerly known as the 
Singapore–Johor–Riau Growth Triangle (SIJORI), officially commenced in 1989. It has 
brought about significant socio–economic changes to the Riau Islands in Indonesia. Due to the 
joint development between the Indonesia and Singapore government, a huge amount of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flew into the islands, especially Batam Island. A large number of 
employment was also created in industrial estates. Indonesians from other parts such as the 
Java and Sumatra Island migrated there for business and the official population in Batam 
reached one million. Thus, it attracted researchers’ interest in the 1990s, particularly as a target 
of FDI. As the industrial estates in the IMS-GT faced competition from industrial estates in 
other parts of Indonesia and other countries since around the late 1990s, it became less popular 
in the literature. Instead, other related topics such as the negative effects of the projects 
appeared in the 2000s.  
     This thesis examines the IMS-GT and its impact on the international and domestic ferry 
transportation in the Riau Islands especially since the late 1980s. Although sea routes still 
dominate transportation in this area, there is a lack of academic research on it. Analyzing them 
as an intermediary of people’s crossings offers a new perspective to the studies of both the 
IMS-GT and the sea transportation in Indonesia.  
The finding of this thesis is that the ferry network and the number of trips in the Riau 
Islands are not necessarily in an upward trend. In the 1990s, the network has steadily expanded 
due to the implementation of the IMS-GT for both international and domestic routes. However, 
they were affected by external factors such as the deteriorating business environment, rising 
fuel prices, and competition with other growth areas for investment since around the beginning 
of the 2000s. In addition, the competition with airline companies dealt a severe blow at the 
domestic routes especially the long–distance ones. Therefore, the domestic ferry operators 
focus on the middle– and short–distance routes. Some operators left the market, while others 
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occasionally collaborated in various ways to weather the storm.  
Through these experiences, Riau Islands has begun to function as the hub of the ferry 
transportation and thus facilitated an extensive ferry network to other islands in Indonesia and 
to neighboring ports of Singapore and Malaysia.  
As for contributions to the existing literature, this research showed a different 
perspective of the IMS-GT in the Riau Islands relating to ferry transportation. It also 
investigated sea transportation for a particular region, while its literature in Indonesia primarily 
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On a sunny day, we can see the Riau Islands1 clearly from the NUS Central 
Library as the distance between Singapore and Riau Islands is just 20km. The 
beginning of the 1970s saw Batam Island reach a population of approximately 6,000. 
In 2010, the “official” population reached as many as one million2. Due to the “SIJORI 
Growth Triangle (GT)” program initiated in 19893, the Riau’s landscape has changed 
significantly. More than 20 years have passed since the implementation of the GT 
program. Considering the hustle and bustle of Riau Islands, especially Batam Island, it 
is hard to imagine that the islands were once small fishing villages in the beginning of 
the 1970s. Due to this rapid development of the island, the GT program is generally 







                                                  
1 The Riau Islands comprise of Batam, Bintan, Karimun and their neighboring islands. Both “the 
Riau Islands” and “the Riau Archipelago” are used in the literature. In this paper, “the Riau Islands” 
is adopted, except in section 2.1.3 where “the Riau Islands Province” is discussed. 
2 Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority (BIFZA)’s website (accessed in February 2014). It should 
be noted that there are many “unofficial” residents. However, as there are no other data on the 
population, the “official” number is used in this paper.  
3 SIJORI Growth Triangle stands for Singapore–Johor–Riau Growth Triangle. Having been 
successful, it has spread to other parts of Indonesia and Malaysia, and is now known as 




Fig 1.1: Map of the Riau Islands, Singapore and the Johor State 
 
Source: Google Map (Labels prepared by the author) 
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Ferry is the only means of transportation for passengers to reach the Riau Islands 
from Singapore and the Johor State in Malaysia (see Fig 1.1). The Riau Islands, 
comprising more than 800 islands, necessitate the use of ferries for business, holiday, 
homecomings and so on. Sea routes still dominate transportation in this area, although 
air routes are becoming more popular. Riau Islands function as the hub of sea 
transportation for distant and neighboring islands in Indonesia and neighboring 
countries. However, there is a lack of academic research on the ferry transportation in 
Riau Islands. It is usually perceived as simply an intermediary and does not apparently 
attract much interest as a subject of academic research.  
This research offers a different perspective of the Riau Islands by making ferry 
transportation the research subject. By analyzing the correlation between the ferry 
transportation and the Growth Triangle, this research investigates how public sea 
traffic in this area has been facilitated by the ferry operators, and how the network has 
changed over the years. It argues that the progress of GT projects has promoted an 
extensive ferry network, and at the same time the evolution of the network has 
certainly played an important role in the regional development of the Riau Islands.  
In particular this research focuses on the system of ferry companies for 
passengers, which services Riau Islands in Indonesia, including (1) international and 
(2) domestic routes. These include regular service lines in Riau Islands. International 
routes include the Riau Islands–Singapore routes and the Riau Islands–Johor State 
routes. The sea routes between Singapore and the Johor State are excluded in this 
research because the road transportation between them plays a greater role. The 
domestic routes are categorized into three types: (1) long, (2) middle, and (3) short 
distances. In this research, long- and middle- distances are defined in terms of a fixed 
route with a fixed price and timetable. The long-distance routes refer to routes between 
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Riau Islands and distant islands such as Sumatra. The middle-distance routes are routes 
within Riau Islands. On the other hand, a short-distance route is defined as a fixed 
route with a fixed price but without a timetable. This research focuses on (1) long– and 
(2) middle–distance routes.  
As for deliverables, this research will contribute to a study of both the Growth 
Triangle (GT) and public sea transportation in Indonesia. The literature on GT since 
the 2000s seems to be less compared to the 1990s when the region enjoyed an 
investment boom. More than 20 years have passed since, but the GT as a foreign direct 
investment destination has not attracted researchers’ attention recently. In addition, 
ASEAN has adopted “ASEAN Connectivity” in 2010 to enhance physical, institutional 
and people-to-people connectivity. Transport and transport agreements in ASEAN are 
included here4. Tracing the trajectory of ferry transportation in the Riau Islands thus far 
might contribute to the understanding of challenges other regions might face. At the 
conclusion of chapters III to V, changes in the networks are illustrated with “network 
figures” for a clearer understanding of the overall patterns and trends. 
 
1.2 Background, Research Questions and Hypothesis 
     In this section, certain basic information is presented in order to facilitate the 
setting of research questions on ferry transportation in Riau Islands. Due to data 
limitations, I mainly focus on Batam Island based on available economic indicators 
such as the number of foreign visitors to Riau Islands, regional Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in Batam, the population in Batam and Bintan, and cumulative 
investment to Batam. These indicators are discussed as follows.  
Firstly, the number of foreign visitor arrivals to Riau Islands represents the 
                                                  
4 ASEAN Secretariat, Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p.2. 
(ASEAN Secretariat’s website, accessed in March 2014) 
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number of ferry passengers. Fig 1.2 shows that the number of foreign visitor arrivals in 
Batam had been increasing as a whole until the late 1990s, but it became volatile since. 
In 2012, it reached 1.2 million, which was less than that of 1999. This trend also 
applies to the other two ports: Tanjung Pinang in Bintan and Tanjung Balai in Karimun. 
The number of foreign tourists kept on increasing until the late 1990s but decreased 
thereafter. The number of foreign tourists in 2011 was less than half of the peak period. 
The exception was in Bintan Resort Area, located at the northern area in Bintan. The 
number of foreign tourists reached its peak in 2001, but it remained relatively stable 
since. Thus, the trend in the total number of foreign visitors essentially follows the one 
in Batam as it accounted for more than half of the total number. The difference was 
that the total number of foreign visitors was relatively stable at the beginning of 2000s.  
 
Fig 1.2: Number of Foreign Visitors to the Riau Islands 
 
*Statistics for Bintan Resort are available from 1995. The statistics for Tanjung Balai and Tanjung 
Pinang before 1995 were fragmentary. 
Sources: Statistics Indonesia’s website (Accessed in April 2014),  
Kepulauan Riau in Figures (various years), Riau in Figures (various years),  
and Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA),   




Table 1.1 shows the number of foreign visitors as drawn in Fig 1.1. When 
divided into two periods, 1989-1998 and 1999-2012, the former recorded a rapid 
increase in the average annual percentage change, while the latter a slower growth. For 
example, the number of foreign visitors in Batam registered a high average annual 
expansion of 33.6% during the 1989-1998 period, but it posted only a 1.2% increase 
during the 1999-2012 period. A minus sign (▼), indicating a negative growth rate, was 
frequently observed in every port around Riau islands since 2000.  
 
Table 1.1: Number of Foreign Visitors to the Riau Islands: (million and %) 







1989 0.36 --- 0.36 ---       
1990 0.58 61.1 0.58 61.1       
1991 0.61 5.1 0.61 5.1       
1992 0.65 6.5 0.65 6.5       
1993 0.68 5.0 0.68 5.0       
1994 0.89 31.0 0.89 31.0       
1995 1.17 31.5 0.94 5.1 0.11 --- 0.09 --- 0.04 --- 
1996 1.38 18.3 1.02 9.4 0.13 19.6 0.11 18.3 0.12 249.9 
1997 1.60 15.2 1.12 9.3 0.14 6.8 0.17 54.2 0.17 38.1 
1998 1.85 15.6 1.17 4.8 0.19 43.7 0.23 32.4 0.25 47.0 
1999 1.91 3.3 1.25 6.4 0.18 ▼9.5 0.27 20.8 0.21 ▼17.1 
2000 1.89 ▼0.7 1.13 ▼9.2 0.19 5.6 0.26 ▼6.7 0.32 52.7 
2001 1.97 3.8 1.15 1.0 0.21 12.4 0.26 2.6 0.35 9.7 
2002 1.89 ▼4.0 1.10 ▼3.9 0.20 ▼5.1 0.25 ▼5.5 0.34 ▼2.8 
2003 1.94 3.1 1.29 16.7 0.17 ▼12.7 0.22 ▼11.1 0.26 ▼21.8 
2004 2.22 14.4 1.53 18.8 0.18 1.6 0.23 5.4 0.29 9.0 
2005 1.65 ▼26.0 1.02 ▼32.9 0.14 ▼18.6 0.21 ▼11.4 0.27 ▼5.7 
2006 1.61 ▼2.4 1.01 ▼1.2 0.13 ▼9.6 0.17 ▼18.9 0.30 9.1 
2007 1.66 3.3 1.08 6.4 0.12 ▼7.9 0.15 ▼8.9 0.31 4.5 
2008 1.64 ▼1.3 1.06 ▼1.5 0.12 3.3 0.14 ▼10.6 0.32 2.3 
2009 1.45 ▼11.3 0.95 ▼10.4 0.10 ▼17.0 0.10 ▼25.4 0.30 ▼6.3 
2010 1.52 4.7 1.00 5.9 0.10 ▼4.4 0.10 ▼0.7 0.31 6.0 
2011 1.71 12.4 1.16 15.3 0.11 8.4 0.10 3.5 0.34 7.5 
2012 1.77 3.4 1.22 5.0 0.10 ▼2.3 0.11 3.0 0.34 ▼0.2 
Average 
1989-1998 
0.74 37.6 0.61 33.6 0.14 23.4 0.15 35.0 0.14 111.7 
Average 
1999-2012 
1.77 0.2 1.14 1.2 0.15 4.0 0.18 4.6 0.30 3.3 
Average 
1989-2012 
1.26 18.2 0.88 16.8 0.15 0.8 0.18 2.4 0.27 22.4 
* % change compared to the previous year               Source: see Fig 1.2 
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Secondly, an analysis of the IMS (Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore)-GT scheme 
is based on the following logic: if the IMS-GT is successful, Batam GDP rises, and 
transportation links increase proportionately, which is being measured by passenger 
traffic carried by ferries from Singapore to Riau Islands. Due to the incessant flow of 
FDI, Batam GDP generally kept on increasing in these twenty years: from 0.08 trillion 
rupiah in 1988 to 13.01 trillion rupiah in 1998, and to 47.30 trillion rupiah in 2010. 




Fig 1.3: Regional GDP in Batam (current price, trillion rupiah) 
 
Source: BIDA (1998: 57) and Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority 












The third point is related to the population in Batam and Bintan. It is predicted 
that transportation links increase proportionately as population increases. As the only 
means of transportation from Singapore and Johor State to Riau Islands is ferry, an 
increase in population contributes to an increase in the number of international ferry 
passengers. In the domestic routes, the number of passengers is also expected to 
increase for various reasons such as migration, business and homecoming due to an 
increase in population, although air routes also need to be considered. For more than 
20 years, the population in Batam has been increasing constantly. It increased by 
approximately ten times from 0.11 million in 1990 to 1.06 million in 2010, while the 
population in Bintan increased steadily by approximately two times from 0.16 million 
in 1990 to 0.33 million in 2010 (see Fig 1.4)5. In 1990, the population in Bintan Island 
exceeded that of Batam, but in 2010, it was the other way around. 
 
Fig 1.4: Population in Batam and Bintan 
 
Source: BIFZA’s website (Accessed in June 2014), Riau Islands in Figures (various years) and  
Lyons, Lenore and Michele Ford, “Where Internal and International Migration Intersect: 
Mobility and the Formation of Multi-Ethnic Communities in the Riau Islands Transit Zone”, 
International Journal of Multicultural Studies, Vol.9, No.2, 2007, pp.240-242. 
                                                  
5 Bintan in 2010 is different from Bintan in 2000 and 1990 due to the decentralization (see section 2.1.3 
for details). However, Lyons and Ford (2007) recompiled statistics according to the new local 
government boundaries. The number in 2010 also followed them. 
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The fourth point concerns the cumulative investment in Batam. There are three 
investment categories: domestic, foreign and government investment (see Fig 1.5). 
Although the increase in domestic investment since the mid-2000s is slow, the amount 
of foreign and government investments generally expanded annually in these twenty 
years. In particular, foreign investment increased steadily from the 2000s. During these 
20 years, Batam attracted various types of investment almost constantly.  
 
Fig 1.5: Cumulative Investment in Batam (Million US$) 
 
Source: BIDA (1998: 58-60) and BIFZA’s website (Accessed in December 2013) 
 
 
Having discussed the four economic indicators such as the rise in regional GDP, 
population and cumulative investment, but a declining trend in foreign visitors, I put 
forth the following research questions.  
How have the ferry network and number of ferry trips in Riau Islands changed in 
the past 20 years? Considering the number of foreign visitors to Batam, did the 
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international ferry network in Riau Islands stop expanding in the 2000s? Or did it 
expand following the strong growth of Batam’s regional GDP? Did ferry companies 
make adjustments by changing the number of ferry trips? In addition, are there any 
differences between domestic and international networks? The ferry networks and the 
number of ferry trips are selected as indicators because they clearly illustrate the 
changes in ferry transportation over the years.  
As for the correlation between the ferry transportation in the Riau Islands and 
regional GDP, “in the development literature, transportation is usually considered 
indispensible for economic growth. This idea is treated as an axiom: more efficient 
transportation modes and networks lead to higher economic growth6”. Therefore, it is 
argued that there is a correlation between the number of foreign visitors and regional 
economic development.  
However, even though Batam’s regional GDP kept on rising in the 2000s and 
transportation modes apparently became more efficient, the number of foreign visitors 
became volatile with an overall declining trend as observed in Fig 1.2 and Table 1.1. 
Kumar and Siddique claimed, “the effect of inconsistent policy measures at all levels 
of the bureaucracy is certainly seen vividly in the tourism data (from 2004 to 2009). 
Tourist arrivals have declined and also shown high variability. Visa requirements, fees 
and other bureaucratic processes that have been implemented at different times have 
acted as impediments to tourist arrivals. This has also been partly affected by security 
concerns in the region.” 7  In addition to political factors, this research tries to 
investigate other factors relating to ferry transportation.  
Considering the points above with data analysis, the hypotheses are as follows:  
                                                  
6 Marks, Daan, Accounting for Services: The Economic Development of the Indonesian Service Sector, 
ca. 1900-2000, Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2009, p.92. 
7 Kumar, Sree and Sharon Siddique, Batam- Whose Hinterland: The Influence of Politics on 
Development, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2013, p.13. 
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(i) For international ferry routes, the network and the number of ferry trips had 
expanded until around 2000 following the success of the Growth Triangle project. 
However, subsequently, they mostly maintained their networks by adjusting the 
number of ferry trips with a slightly declining trend due to the fluctuating number of 
visitors to the Riau Islands albeit with a corresponding increase in Batam’s regional 
GDP, population and investment.  
(ii) For domestic ferry routes, both the network and the number of ferry trips of 
the long− and middle−distance operators expanded since the beginning of the GT 
projects due to an increase in Batam’s regional GDP, population in Batam and Bintan, 
and investment. 
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
This research consists of both literature survey and fieldwork. Literature survey 
relies on both primary and secondary research. Readings include books, journal 
articles, newspapers, statistics and official reports published by relevant government 
agencies in Indonesia and Singapore, by regional and international organizations like 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(UNESCAP), and publications by research institutes such as the Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies (ISEAS). National, regional and related Indonesian organizations’ 
statistics were obtained from books and websites such as Statistics Indonesia, Statistics 
of Kepulauan Riau, Statistics of Batam City, and Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority 
(BIFZA). Statistics on Singapore include relevant data from the websites of the 
Department of Statistics, Singapore Tourism Board, and other agencies. Data and 
literature collections include traffic data, ferry companies data, government policies 
and specialized analyses in English and Indonesian. 
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Fieldwork was conducted in three sites: Singapore, Jakarta, the Riau Islands in 
Indonesia and the Johor State in Malaysia from July 2013 until November 2013. As for 
research interviews, interviewees included officials and employees from government, 
related organizations and ferry companies. In addition, I also visited libraries and 
statistical offices to collect relevant data and statistics. In Singapore, I conducted 
interviews with several ferry companies and collected information from NUS and 
ISEAS libraries during the period of two months from end-July 2013. In Jakarta, I 
visited the National Library of Indonesia, the headquarters of Statistics Indonesia, the 
headquarters of shipping companies and the Ministry of Transportation during the first 
week of November 2013. In the Riau Islands, the fieldwork involved data collection 
and interviews with ferry companies. Visits to libraries and branches of Statistics 
Indonesia were also carried out to collect statistics and related information for almost 
two months from mid-September to first week of November 2013. As several ferry 
operators in Indonesia do not have websites, I visited them on site. In the Johor State, I 
conducted a fieldwork in a smaller scale compared to the one in Singapore and the 
Riau Islands. For example, I visited almost all ports in Johor State and asked several 
questions with staff there in a casual manner. As these ports are near from Singapore, I 
made a day trip there. Interview questions were related to the development of the ferry 
network in parallel with their development, the reason for passengers increase or 
decrease, their relationships with the government, the impact of external factors such 
as the Asian Financial Crisis and the political instability in Indonesia, future plans, and 
so on.  
     During the fieldwork, I accumulated a variety of experiences. In Singapore, 
almost half of my requests for an interview were declined. However, I fortunately 
came across an industrial magazine which deals with the ferry transportation in the 
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world. It occasionally features the ferry industry in Singapore. In addition to the 
fieldwork, they played a big role in this research. In the Riau Islands, the interviews 
were the main source to obtain information as the number of documents was limited. I 
mainly conducted the interviews with employees from ferry companies. I tried to 
approach the interviewees who were middle management class with at least one-year 
working experience there. In some cases, I asked a ticket seller at a port because the 
person had the longest working experience there. One of the challenges was to trace 
the history of operators who have already left the market. In that case, employees from 
other operators and newspaper articles supplemented it when possible. These 
fieldworks, which have never been done before, are one of the contributions of this 
thesis. 
This thesis applies methodological and analytical tools from the disciplines of 
economics and geography for two reasons. Firstly, the Department of Southeast Asian 
Studies where I conducted this research encourages multi-disciplinary approach. 
Secondly, transport studies are multidisciplinary in character9. Transportation analysis 
requires various disciplines. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter I describes the introduction, background, research questions, hypothesis, 
research methodology and structure of the thesis. 
     Chapter II reviews the literature on the effects and challenges of the 
Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) and how it has changed in 
the past twenty years. It also reviews the literature on ferry transportation in Indonesia.  
Chapters III and IV investigate the international ferry transportation in the Riau 
                                                  
9 Hoyle, Brian and Richard Knowles, “Transport Geography: An Introduction”, in Brian Hoyle and 
Richard Knowles (eds.), Modern Transport Geography, 2nd rev, New York: Wiley, 1998, p.5. 
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Islands, particularly focusing on the Riau Islands–Singapore routes and Riau Islands– 
Johor State routes. Chapter III discusses the overall picture of the international ferry 
transportation in terms of its trends and patterns since the 1980s.  
Chapter IV discusses the contributory factors for the trends and patterns 
analyzed in chapter III from various perspectives, using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods. These factors include the role of the Singapore, Indonesian and 
Malaysian governments, the role of international regulation in the ferry transportation, 
the impact of the IMS-GT and external factors affecting the ferry industry. Three ferry 
operators are also discussed as case studies.  
Chapter V investigates the domestic ferry transportation in the Riau Islands 
using the same set of analyses as employed in chapter IV. These include its trends and 
patterns since the 1990s, the role of the Indonesian government in the ferry 
transportation, the impact of the IMS-GT and external factors affecting the ferry 
industry. Two state-owned enterprises are also discussed as case studies.  














LITERATURE SURVEY ON  
INDONESIA–MALAYSIA–SINGAPORE GROWTH TRIANGLE 
(IMS-GT) AND THE FERRY TRANSPORTATION  
IN THE RIAU ISLANDS 
 
     This chapter surveys the literature on the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore 
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT, sections 2.1-2.3) and ferry transportation in Riau Islands 
(section 2.4). The survey on the IMS-GT includes its historical background, each 
country’s motivation (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore), its development, progress 
and challenges. In addition, the IMS-GT is analyzed in light of the role of four factors: 
economic complementarity, geographical proximity, government’s support and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Subsequently, the literature on the IMS-GT and ferry 
transportation is discussed. Finally, based on the analysis of the literature, a conclusion 













Fig 2.1: Map of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle 
 




2.1 The Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) 
2.1.1 Historical Background 
The official legal definition of IMS-GT is an area which includes eight provinces 
(Bengkulu, Jambi, Lampung, Riau, Riau Islands, South Sumatra, West Kalimantan and 
West Sumatra) in Indonesia, four states (Johor, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) 
in Malaysia, and Singapore (see Fig 2.1). However, a common and loose definition 
refers to just an area of Riau Islands in Indonesia, Johor State in Malaysia and 
Singapore. The whole area is 25.8 thousand square kilometers with a population of 9.8 
million in 2010 (see section 2.1.3). Various names have been used to denote this 
Growth Triangle: JSR (coined by Dr. Habibie, the former Indonesian Minister of State 
for Research and Technology), the Johor–Singapore–Riau Growth Triangle (popular in 
Singapore), Nusa Tiga (used by the former Johor Chief Minister Tan Sri Muhyiddin 
Mohamed Yassin)10, and SIJORI Growth Triangle (the first two letters of the three 
words: Singapore, Johor and Riau). 
This Growth Triangle was proposed in 1989 by Goh Chok Tong, then Deputy 
Prime Minister of Singapore, and it was the first GT in Southeast Asia. Following this, 
official statements of support were released in June 1990 by the then Indonesian 
President, Soeharto, and the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad. The 
GT idea took shape two months later when the then Singaporean Prime Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew and Soeharto signed an economic agreement to develop the Riau Islands, 
especially Batam and Bintan11. As part of the agreement, Singapore also benefited 
from Indonesia by signing a fifty-year water agreement in June 1991. 
                                                  
10 Naidu, G, “Johor- Singapore- Riau Growth Triangle: Progress and Prospects” in Myo Thant, Min 
Tang and Hiroshi Kakazu (eds.), Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic 
Cooperation, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1998, p.232. 
11 Juliastuti, Anna R, Growth Triangles in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study of the Johor- 
Singapore- Riau Growth Triangle and the Indonesian- Malaysia- Thailand Growth Triangle. 
Unpublished Master’s Thesis, The Department of Southeast Asian Studies, National University of 
Singapore, 1998, p.28. 
18 
 
This Growth Triangle idea did not appear out of a vacuum. In fact, the idea was 
mooted in the 1970s, by the then Indonesian Minister of State for Research and 
Technology, B. J. Habibie, who was responsible for the development of Batam. He 
first discussed the concept of interlinked development of the area with the then 
Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew in 1979. He proposed that, like balloons, 
Singapore and other economies of the area could only continue to expand without 
bursting by being linked to each other. He further proposed an arrangement similar to 
those that link the Benelux countries, with free entry and exit of people, goods, and 
services12. Theoretically, his idea seems to be similar to the Subregional Economic 
Zones (SREZs), one of the various forms of economic integration and cooperative 
groupings in the Asia-Pacific region (Chia and Lee, 1993: 226-229). In retrospect, 
Habibie’s development plan was way in advance of his time.  
As originally envisaged, the zone was to cover only Batam, Johor and Singapore. 
However, under an Indonesian presidential decree issued in July 1990, the entire Riau 
Islands officially became part of the SIJORI-GT, with subsequent development plans 
for the triangle including Batam, Bintan and Singkep (Naidu, 1998: 233). In the latter 
half of 1994, the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore government formalized the 
SIJORI-GT by signing a formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the GT. 
The governments agreed that a private sector umbrella body would be created to 
coordinate business activities within the SIJORI-GT which has also been officially 
renamed the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT)13. This was 
the formal formation of the IMS-GT. 
                                                  
12 Chia, Siow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuan, “Subregional Economic Zones: A New Motive Force in 
Asia-Pacific Development” in C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland (eds.), Pacific Dynamism and 
the International Economic System, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993, 
p.240. 
13 Thant, Myo, “Overview”, in Myo Thant and Min Tang (eds.), Indonesia- Malaysia- Thailand 
Growth Triangle: Theory to Practice, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1996, p.7. 
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     In short, Indonesian motivation for economic cooperation with Singapore 
brought about the beginning of this GT formation. The idea was proposed 
approximately ten years before its formal formation, and the area of growth triangle 
has since expanded over the years. 
 
2.1.2 Motivation of Each Country 
     In this section, each country’s motivation is reviewed in order to understand the 
foundation of IMS-GT. 
     In Singapore, the overall cost of doing business had risen sharply as a result of 
two-and-a-half decades of rapid economic growth. The constraints of limited labor and 
land had resulted in sharp increases in the cost of labor and property. Although the 
recession from 1985 to 1986 slowed down the rate of cost increases, there had once 
again been an acceleration since then. These were exemplified by the increase of 
nominal average earnings, property prices, foreign worker levy and so on. As a result, 
firms had to decide whether to upgrade their activities in Singapore, re-distribute their 
labor intensive operations elsewhere, or do both14. 
     Singapore’s need for water was also an important consideration vis-à-vis the 
relationship between Singapore and Malaysia. It bought 546 million liters of water a 
day from Johor under an agreement signed in 1962 with Malaysia. An agreement 
signed on 24 November 1990 entitles Singapore to increase its water purchase from 
Johor, but it had to pay S$201.9 million for the land on which to build a dam15. 
Singapore needed to diversify its water resources. This was Singapore’s other 
motivation for the formation of IMS-GT. 
                                                  
14 Kumar, Sree and Lee Tsao Yuan, “A Singapore Perspective” in Lee Tsao Yuan (ed.), Growth 
Triangle: The Johor- Singapore- Riau Experience, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1991, pp.4-7. 
15 Far Eastern Economic Review, “Search for a Hinterland”, Jan 3, 1991, p.34. 
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     In Malaysia, the Johor State had distinct ambitions for its economic development 
at the time of the GT formation. It aimed to overtake Penang and Selangor State as the 
most industrialized state in Malaysia in the next ten years. They thought economic 
links with Singapore and the Riau Islands would enhance this plan, and Johor State 
officials said prospects had never been better for their development16. At that time, the 
Johor State was the third most industrialized state in Malaysia, typically accounting for 
about 10-15 per cent of Malaysian’s GDP. Approved investments in Johor suffered a 
decline in 1985-86 due to recession. However, the Malaysian government has adopted 
a liberalization policy since then. As a result, investments in Johor increased six-fold 
from RM440 million in 1986 to RM2.7 billion in 198917. For Johor State, the 
motivation to be part of the GT was economic development. 
For Indonesia, its motivation lay in its policy to develop Batam, a small fishing 
village with a population of six thousand at the beginning of the 1970s. It was PT. 
Pertamina, a state-owned oil and gas enterprise, which changed the island from a 
fishing village to a town. Pertamina established its base in Batam in 1966. 
Subsequently, it was designated as a logistic and operational base for oil and gas 
industries engaged in exploration and exploitation by Presidential Decree No.65 in 
1970. With this decree, Pertamina started to develop Batam. In 1973, the Batam 
Investment Development Authority (BIDA) was established as the central 
government-level agency overseeing the development of the island, and the whole of 
Batam was to be developed into an industrial area with Presidential Decree No.41 in 
1973. However, due to Pertamina’s financial crisis18, its role as an oil base was reduced. 
In addition, it was forced to withdraw its development plans because of its 
                                                  
16 Far Eastern Economic Review, “Johor Plays the Angles”, Jan 3, 1991, p.36. 
17 Ng, Chee Yuen and Wong Poh Kam, “The Growth Triangle: A Market Drive Response?” Asia 
Club Papers, No.2, 1991, p.139. 
18 PT. Pertamina almost went bankrupt due to a large amount of debt in May 1975. 
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deteriorating financial state. Instead, the Indonesian government took over the 
development, and Batam was transformed into an industrial zone since the late 1970s. 
There were also policy changes related to accounting and shipping in 1984 and 
1985 which led to the evolvement of Batam as a logistics base by forcing foreign oil 
contractors and related entities to use the island as a base instead of Singapore. A 
related national policy of utilization of domestically produced goods also followed. 
Consequently, there was an inflow of domestic and foreign investments. However, 
falling oil prices and the slump in the oil business reduced the viability of Batam.  
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, it was B.J. Habibie who brought up the joint 
development plan in Batam. By the late 1980s, Singapore also became interested in 
Batam as a possible extension of its manufacturing hinterland. The meeting between 
the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the then President Suharto in 1989 
heralded the merging of Indonesia–Singapore interests and agenda for the joint 
development of Batam. The breakthrough which catalyzed Singapore’s interest in 
reaching an agreement to develop the Batam hinterland was Presidential Decree No.53 
in 1989, whereby industrial estates could be leased and managed by private companies. 
The 1990 bilateral agreement called for the establishment of Batamindo, a Singapore 
Jurong-style industrial estate (Kumar and Siddique, 2013: 42-43).  
Considering the three countries’ motivations, it was Indonesia that initiated the 
project, and their initial target was Singapore. Singapore apparently joined the project 
because the time was right. Subsequently, Malaysia, especially the Johor State, 






2.1.3 Development, Progress and Challenges 
     Development and Progress 
The framework and the area of IMS-GT have expanded since 1989. In 1994, 
trilateral agreements were formally signed and the name Indonesia–Malaysia– 
Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) was adopted. The first Ministerial Meeting was 
held in March 1996, and the geographic area of the IMS-GT was expanded to include 
three additional states in Malaysia (Melaka, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) and one 
province in Indonesia (West Sumatra). At the second Ministerial Meeting held in 
mid-1997 in Johor Bahru, Indonesia proposed that five more provinces be included in 
the IMS-GT (Bengkulu, Jambi, Lampung, South Sumatra, and West Kalimantan)19. 
The area expanded to include not only a part of the Malay Peninsula but also a part of 
Sumatra and Kalimantan Island.   
Singapore’s role was actually as a prime mover which activated the development 
in its hinterlands. A lot of Singaporean companies and multinational corporations 
(MNCs) operating in Singapore relocated their land- and labor-intensive industries to 
the Johor State and Riau Islands. Besides, the IMS-GT can also be seen as a launching 
pad for Singapore’s internationalization strategy. The redistribution of industrial and 
services activities to Johor and Riau gave local entrepreneurs the opportunity to 
understand different business and cultural norms prevalent within the region (Juliastuti, 
1999: 38). Chia and Lee (1993: 245) concluded on the survey by the Singapore 
Manufacturers’ Association of its members in 1992 as follows: “Although biases in 
responses may be expected, the survey results do point to significant relocation of 
labor-intensive activities offshore”. These labor-intensive industries had relocated 
outside Singapore. 
                                                  
19 Thant, Myo, “Overview” in Myo Thant, Min Tang and Hiroshi Kakazu (eds.), Growth Triangles 




In Malaysia, it is difficult to determine the effect of the IMS-GT on Johor’s 
economic growth because the relations between Singapore and Johor have been 
established before the GT agreement (Juliastuti: 1999, 48). However, as mentioned in 
section 2.1.2, the inflow of FDI increased in the late 1980s due to policy changes.  
 
Table 2.1: Selected Indicators of the IMS-GT in 1990 
 Johor Singapore Riau Islands Total 
Area (sq km) 18,914 639 3,300* 22,853 






Per capita GDP ($) 3,594 12,940 500** 
(1988) 
 
GDP at current price 
($ million) 




Source: Chia and Lee, 1993: 239. 
* Includes only Batam, Bintan, Bulan, Singkep, Rempang, and Galang Island 
** Batam only 
 
Table 2.2: Selected Indicators of the IMS-GT in 2010 
 Johor Singapore Riau Islands Total 
Area (sq km) 19,210 712 5,829(i) 25,751 
Population (million) 3.2 5.1 1.5(i) 9.8 
(approx.) 
Per capita GDP ($) 6,631 45,640 4,692(ii)  
GDP at current price 
($ million) 
22,300 231,700 7,900(ii) 261,900 
(approx.) 
Sources: Department of Singapore Statistics’ website (accessed in April 2013), 
       Data calculated from Kepulauan Riau in Figures (2011) and  
Department of Statistics, Malaysia’s website (accessed in April 2013). 
i: Includes only Batam City, Tanjung Pinang City, Karimun Regency and Bintan Regency. 
ii: Riau Islands Province only 
 
Three points for comparison need to be discussed here: regional GDP, Johor’s 
economic position in the Malaysian economy, and tourism flows. Firstly, compared to 
the level in 1990, GDP and GDP per capita in Johor increased five times ($22,300 
million) and nearly two times ($6,631) respectively in 2010 (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
Moreover, GDP growth in Johor State recorded 9.3 percent, exceeding the entire area 
of GDP growth (7.2%) in 2010. Secondly, Johor occupies the third largest share of 
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national GDP (9.5%), following Selangor (23.0%) and Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala 
Lumpur (15.2%). Johor was placed third in the manufacturing sector, contributing 
12.3% of total manufacturing output. In terms of regional GDP, the ambition of the 
Johor State to become the most industrialized state has not been realized yet. However, 
it plays an important role in the Malaysian economy. 
Thirdly, tourism flows are also large and increasing between Singapore and 
Johor (Juliastuti, 1999: 48-50). 3.78 million tourists stayed at least overnight and 16.72 
million foreign day-trippers visited Johor State in 201120. Although the breakdown of 
these 3.78 million tourists is not available, nearly 20 million foreigners visited Johor 
State in 2011. On the other hand, Riau Islands received 1.7 million foreign tourists in 
2011. Thus, Johor State received at least ten times the number of foreign tourists to 
Riau Islands. One can see the greater potential in the Johor State, and thus one can 
understand the strong relationship between Singapore and Johor. 
Recently, the Iskandar Project in the Johor State has attracted much public 
attention. The project began in 2005 when the Federal Government asked Khazanah 
Nasional Berhad to conduct a feasibility study for the development of a special 
economic zone in South Johor. Subsequently, the Iskandar Development Region was 
officially launched in 2006. There are five flagship zones in the area21. Its target is 
obviously residents and tourists from Singapore. New residential areas are being 
developed and other facilities such as Puteri Harbour and Lego Land have already 
opened in Nusa Jaya, one of the newly developed areas. The federal government is 
heavily involved in this project similar to the role of the Indonesian government in the 
IMS-GT.  
                                                  
20 New Straits Times, “JOHOREANS, Flash Your Best Smiles. Brush up on Your Direction-giving 
Skills Because There May Be More Tourists and Visitors Trying to Find Their Way around Our 
State,” May 11, 2012. (Digital Source) 
21 Khazanah Nasional Berhad, Iskandar Regional Project Authority & Iskandar Development 
Region: Information Pack, Feb 23, 2007, p.3. (Digital Source) 
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In Indonesia, the landscape of Riau Islands has changed significantly. Batam, 
Bintan and Karimun Islands (BBK) are now discussed consecutively. The population 
in Batam (0.99 million) increased significantly, forming more than half of the total 
population in Riau Islands Province (1.76 million) in 2011. It is followed by Bintan 
(0.20 million in Tanjung Pinang City and 0.15 million in Bintan Regency) and 
Karimun Regency with the population of 0.22 million (Kepulauan Riau in Figures: 
2012). As discussed in section 1.2, the population in Bintan (0.16 million) exceeded 
the population in Batam (0.11 million) in 1990, but in 2011, Batam’s population far 
exceeded that of Bintan. From this, one can understand Batam’s rapid development 
since the 1990s. 
In terms of investments, total cumulative investment to Batam until 2011 was 
$14.74 billion, broken down as follows: government investment $2.99 billion (20%), 
foreign investment $6.02 billion (41%) and domestic investment $5.73 billion (39%). 
The largest industry is electronic and computer-related components and parts 
manufacturing, mainly due to abundant cheap labor supply. In 2007, the three largest 
manufacturing firms by sector were electronics (30%), minerals and metals (19%) and 
plastics (14%)22. Batam has attracted more than 1,400 foreign enterprises and 10,000 
small and medium enterprises in total, and they are providing employment for more 
than 330,000 of the local workforce in 2012. There are 22 industrial estates in the 
island23. Compared to the 1990 level, regional GDP ($7,900 million) and GDP per 
capita ($4,692) also increased significantly in Riau Islands, mainly driven by Batam 
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
     Bintan has accumulated a total (realized) of foreign investment of about $8.3 
                                                  
22 Wong, Poh Kam and Ng Kwan Kee, Batam, Bintan and Karimun- Past History and Current 
Development towards Being a SEZ, National University of Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, August 2009, p.16. (Digital Source) 
23 BIFZA’s website (accessed in July 2014) 
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billion by 2005, with the industrial sector contributing 91%, followed by the tourism 
sector at 8%. About 10% of the Lobam Industry Zone (Bintan Industrial Estate) is 
dedicated to 14 garment companies and 18 electronics companies, through economic 
collaborations between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The total investment in 
Lobam reached approximately $74 million, providing 13,558 jobs to 13,313 
Indonesians and 245 foreigners. The northern coastal part is an area exclusively for 
tourists. Seven hotels, two resorts and two international golf courses serve the growing 
tourist population (Wong and Ng, 2009: 17). Compared to Batam, the employment of 
locals by these industries is relatively small, but the IMS-GT brought about significant 
changes in some areas in Bintan.  
In Karimun, the leading industry with the highest contribution to its economic 
growth is the agriculture sector, accounting for a 33% share in 2006. The trading, hotel 
and restaurant sectors contributed 26% to the economic growth in Karimun. The 
shipyard industry in Karimun has been thriving with six companies currently providing 
ship repair and ship building services (Wong and Ng, 2009: 18). It was developed due 
to the projects of the IMS-GT (see section 2.2). Sea sand business also plays an 
important role in Karimun. As of 2001, 70-80% of exported sea sands in Riau Province 
were from Karimun and Batam. They were exported to Singapore for reclamation24. 
Since the agriculture sector is a leading industry on the island, the IMS-GT did not 
contribute significantly to Karimun’s economy.  
In order to attract more foreign investment, several policies were implemented 
since the 2000s in order to strengthen the economic relationship between Singapore 
and the Riau Islands. Firstly, the formation of the USA–Singapore Free Trade 
                                                  
24 Fukao, Yasuo, “The Structure of Local Politics at the Era of Post-Soeharto: A Case Study of 
Separation Movement for the Riau Islands Province” in Matsui Kazuhisa (ed.), Decentralization in 
Indonesia, Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, 
2003, p.99. (In Japanese) 
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Agreement (FTA) was an important event for the Riau Islands. With the push for the 
establishment of more FTAs, Singapore has included the Integrated Sourcing Initiative 
(ISI) clause into its FTAs to benefit the BBK region. This ISI clause was included in 
the USA–Singapore FTA which came into effect in January 2004. By including the ISI 
into the FTA, 266 types of IT and medical-related products produced in offshore 
production bases such as Batam, can be treated as having originated from Singapore. 
Hence, these products were eligible for tariff-free importation into U.S. (Wong and Ng, 
2009: 13). As a result, an additional 25 Singaporean companies set up factories in 
Batam in 2003, attracted by tariff advantages in the soon-to-be-launched 
USA-Singapore FTA25.  
Secondly, changes in the status of the economic zone are discussed. In January 
2009, Batam, Bintan and Karimun Islands were made a Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and 
given Port Zone status with operations beginning April 2009. FTZ is defined as “an 
area within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia which is exempted from 
import duties, sales tax, value-added tax, tax on luxury goods and any customs 
duties”26. Subsequently, in September 2009, the Indonesian House of Representatives 
finally approved the Law on Special Economic Zones (SEZs). The approval was the 
follow-up to the signing of the Indonesia–Singapore framework agreement in 2006 
which sought economic cooperation to transform Batam–Bintan–Karimun (BBK) 
islands into SEZs and draw additional investments from Singapore (Wulandari, 2012: 
15). However, according to Kumar and Siddique (2013: 54), the former Minister of 
Commerce Mari Pangestu admitted that this plan received only lukewarm response 
from international investors and there had been little job creation. Following the status 
change, Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority (BIFZA) was established in place of 
                                                  
25 Wulandari, Sri, Batam Free Trade Zone, Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Research Centre, 2012, p.14. 
(Digital Source) 
26 Riau Islands FTZ’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
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BIDA in 2009. Simultaneously, similar FTZ zone management bodies were established 
in Bintan and Karimun and these three bodies are under the umbrella of the FTZ 
management body, chaired by the governor of Riau Islands Province.  
     Moreover, political power was decentralized, and the BBK and the Riau Islands 
underwent changes after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998. In the city and 
regency level, Batam was promoted to city status from the Riau Islands Regency in 
1999 (see Fig 2.2). Karimun and Natuna were also granted independent regency status. 
Subsequently, Tanjung Pinang was promoted to a city from the Riau Islands Regency 
in 2001. In 2002, the Riau Islands Regency was legally split off as a separate province 
from the Riau Province27. As a result of several newly-established local governments, 












                                                  
27  Due to stagnation of the legal procedure, Riau Islands Province became practically an 
independent province in 2004. Fukao (2003) discussed the historical confrontation between the 
land and islands part in Riau Province as one of the reasons for the formation of Riau Islands 
Province. See also related laws such as Law No.25 in 2002 for the formation of Riau Islands 
Province, Law No.53 in 1999 for the formation of Batam City, Karimun and Natuna Regency, and 
Law No.5 in 2001 for the formation of Tanjung Pinang City.  
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Fig 2.2: Map of Newly-established Local Governments in the Riau Islands since 1998 
 
Source: Google Map (Labels prepared by the author) 
30 
 
     Challenges 
However, the IMS-GT faces several challenges. The first challenge is the ethnic 
exclusivity of the jointly developed projects in Riau and, to a lesser extent, in Johor. 
Most of the joint development efforts by the private sector in both Riau and Johor are 
being led by ethnic Chinese businesses with their counterparts from Singapore. This 
has raised questions relating to the sharing of the economic pie with other 
communities–particularly the pribumis in Indonesia and the bumiputras in Malaysia28. 
Secondly, from a political perspective, a case in point is the Malaysian 
Government’s view of the close relationship between Johor and Singapore. While 
Singapore is a sovereign state, Johor is a part of the Federation of Malaysia, and any 
development in Johor has to be seen within the context of overall Malaysian 
development. Johor’s aggressive drive for its industrial growth to match that of 
Singapore has therefore been viewed with some dismay by the federal government 
(Kumar, 1998: 220). In recent years though, the federal government is heavily 
involved in the Iskandar Project.  
The Indonesian government was heavily involved in the projects in the Riau 
Islands from the onset. The central government and BIDA cooperated closely to 
implement various projects in the island. During the Soeharto era, B.J. Habibie served 
as the BIDA’s head from 1978 to 1998 and this tie-up worked well to implement 
central government’s policies. The current challenge is decentralization which affects 
the decision making process in Riau Islands. For example, there exists bickering 
between BIFZA and the Batam municipal government concerning the overlapping of 
administrative authority (Wong and Ng, 2009: 11). 
Thirdly, trilateral cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore was 
                                                  
28 Kumar, Sree,”Johor- Singapore- Riau Growth Triangle: A Model of Subregional Cooperation,” 
in Myo Thant, Min Tang and Hiroshi Kakazu (eds.), Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to 
Regional Economic Cooperation, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1998, p.220.  
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brisk in the 1990s. However, it is difficult to see evidence of trilateral cooperation 
since the 2000s. Wulandari (2012: 6) acknowledged the importance of the IMS-GT as 
a concept of regional development, but it was not sustained for long, as Malaysia tried 
to improve her electronic industry to compete with Singapore. In addition, Johor State 
has paid more attention to the Iskandar Malaysia Project since the 2000s. On the other 
hand, Riau Islands are more interested in FTZ and SEZs. Indonesia and Malaysia pay 
more attention to their bilateral relationship with Singapore. The framework still exists, 
but the concept of “IMS-GT” that required trilateral relationship might have become a 
thing of the past. 
 
2.2 Role of Economic Complementarity, Geographical Proximity, Government’s 
Support and FDI 
     I refer to four concepts related to the IMS-GT in this part: economic 
complementarity, geographical proximity, government’s support and FDI, which are 
claimed as the factors of GT’s success. Juliastuti (1999) argued for the role of the first 
three factors. In addition, Thant and Tang (1996) argued that GT was the outcome of 
two forces. One was a desire for regional economic cooperation among Asian 
countries, and the other was the large inflows of FDI. The role of FDI is discussed here 
due to its importance in the IMS-GT. 
     Economic complementarity: In the IMS-GT, comparative advantage is an 
important concept. In this GT, Singapore has elements such as skilled labor, capital and 
advanced technology, while Batam has unskilled/low-skilled labor, basic technology 
and natural resources (see Fig 2.3). Johor has comparative advantage such as land, 









Source: Debrah, Yaw A., Ian McGovern and Pawan Budhwar, “Complementarity or Competition:  
The Development of Human Resources in Southeast Asian Growth Triangle: Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore”, International Journal of Human Resource Management,  




Table 2.3: Factor Costs in Johor, Singapore and Batam in 1989 ($) 
 Johor  Singapore Batam 
Land (per sq m) 4.08 4.25 2.30 
Labor (per month) 
  Low-skilled 150 350 90 
  Semiskilled 220 420 140 
  Skilled 400 600 200 
Sources: Mann, Richard I, Batam: Step by Step Guide for Investors, Toronto: Gateway Books, 
1990,p.50 and Ahmad, Mubariq, Apr 23-24, 1992, “Economic Cooperation in the Southern 
Growth Triangle: An Indonesian Perspective” paper presented at the Conference on 
Regional Cooperation and Growth Triangles in ASEAN, organized by the National 














-access to world markets 
-advanced physical infrastructure 
-advanced commercial infrastructure 






-basic physical infrastructure 
-basic commercial infrastructure 
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Table 2.3 shows the factor costs in Johor, Singapore and Batam in 1989, when 
the concept of GT was introduced. Comparative advantages arising from differences in 
factor endowments were complementary rather than competitive within three countries. 
In 1989, low-skilled labor cost $90 a month in Batam, $150 in Johor, and $350 in 
Singapore. Singapore, with its developed infrastructure and skill base, was attractive to 
multinational corporations (MNCs) for their capital-intensive and high technology 
operations, while labor-intensive and spatially driven operations were attracted to 
Johor or Batam (Kumar, 1998: 192-194). This structure still remains today judging 
from these extensive industrial estates in Batam.  
     However, it is frequently pointed out that Johor–Riau Islands links are weak. 
Planned and actual investment flows from Indonesia to Johor are minimal. The same 
situation holds for trade linkages. In addition, entrepreneurs in Johor and Malaysia are 
not as ready for the regionalization of their activities. It is unlikely that investment and 
trade linkages between Johor and Riau will develop in the near future, due, for 
example, to their lack of complementarity (Thant, 1998: 9)29.  
     Geographical proximity: One of the key determinants in the success of the 
IMS-GT is the close proximity of Singapore, the Johor State, and Riau Islands to one 
another [see, for example, Chia and Lee (1993), Kakazu (1995) and Thant et al. 
(1998)]. Johor State and Singapore are linked by two causeways. More than ten ferry 
routes connect between the Riau Islands and Singapore, and between the Riau Islands 
and Johor State. Several of these routes take less than an hour (see Chapter III for 
further discussion). Consequently, close proximity of the three participants is a key 
factor in facilitating industrial redistribution, contributing to low travel and 
transportation costs, easy monitoring and control of production, speedy transshipment 
                                                  
29 This book was published in 1998, but this perspective still holds true in 2014. 
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of intermediate and final goods, and reduction of transaction and information costs 
(Naidu, 1998: 237). 
     Government’s support: In the IMS-GT, each government strongly supports the 
development projects. The formation of this triangle would not have occurred had it 
not been for policy shifts on the part of Indonesia and Malaysia. Of particular 
importance was the move toward investment liberalization by both countries, which 
led to the growth of economic linkages with (and investment flows from) Singapore. In 
Batam, policies such as the relaxation of foreign equity ownership and the realization 
of investment applications processing were carried out. In Malaysia, the Investment 
Coordination Act had proved to be an impediment to both domestic and foreign private 
investment by the mid-1980s. Since 1986, however, the government has formulated a 
more liberal policy framework (Naidu, 1998: 237-239). Therefore, cooperation among 
three countries advanced in the 1990s with trilateral agreements in 1994 and 
ministerial meetings in 1996 and 1997 (see section 2.1.3 in detail).  
     Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): In the IMS-GT, substantial investment was 
implemented since the 1990s. The case of Riau Islands is discussed here. 
Singapore–Indonesian investment cooperation in Riau Islands has centered on four 
flagship projects: Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Bintan Industrial Estate (BIE), 
Bintan Beach International Resort (BBIR) and Karimun Marine and Industrial 
Complex (KMIC)30. These projects contributed significantly to attract FDI. Firstly, 
even though BIP was the first to be developed, it was the eighth industrial estate to be 
authorized by BIDA. It is a $400 million Singapore–Indonesia joint venture owned by 
PT. Batamindo Investment Corporation. Two Singapore government–linked 
corporations held 40% of the entire share and Indonesian partners held the rest. This is 
                                                  
30 Peachey, Karen, Martin Perry and Carl Grundy-Warr, The Riau Islands and Economic 
Cooperation in the Singapore-Indonesian Border Zone, Durham, England: International 
Boundaries Research Unit, 1998, p.16. 
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an industrial park for mainly export-oriented manufacturers and 70 MNC manufactures 
are creating jobs for 60,000 workers in the park31. Secondly, BIE opened mainly for 
electronics and garment manufacturing in 1994. It provides more than 13,000 jobs (see 
section 2.1.3). Thirdly, BBIR, opened in 1994, was developed by PT. Bintan Resort 
Corporation. It was the holding company for a consortium of investors which includes 
Indonesia’s Salim Group and several corporations in Singapore32. More than 0.3 
million international tourists visit the area annually. Fourthly, KMIC as well as PT. 
Karimun Sembawang Shipyard, officiated in 1997, is an integrated industrial facility 
constructed at an estimated cost of S$90 million for marine and engineering activities. 
It is especially suited to businesses in the ship repair and shipbuilding, engineering and 
fabrication works, and maritime and logistics sectors33.  
 
2.3 Summary: The Growth Triangle Perspectives 
Since the late 1980s, the literature on IMS-GT mainly focused on this area as a 
target of FDI [For example, Lee (1991), Thant, Tang and Kakazu (1998), and Ng and 
Wong (1991)]. The IMS-GT was frequently regarded as a success model of GT in the 
literature. Researchers’ opinions on its success differ slightly, but they mainly agree on 
three points: economic complementarity, geographical proximity and the government’s 
role. As the industrial estates in the IMS-GT faced competition with industrial estates 
in other parts of Indonesia and other regions since around the late 1990s, it became less 
popular in the literature. Consequently, the literature about the IMS-GT seems to have 
decreased since the 2000s.  
     Instead, other related literature appeared in the 2000s. In economic development 
literature, economists and consultants shifted their interest to other topics such as the 
                                                  
31 Sembcorp Industries’ website (accessed in February 2014) 
32 BBIR is currently operated by PT. Bintan Resort Cakrawala under Gallant Venture Ltd.  
33 Sembcorp Industries’ and Sembawang Shipyard’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
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effects of Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Batam, Bintan and Karimun Island [see, 
for example, Wong and Ng (2009), and Toh and Ng (2009)]. Batam’s political and 
economic dilemma between Singapore and Indonesia was also investigated [Kumar 
and Siddique (2013)]. When comparing the BBK Islands, the literature on IMS-GT is 
mostly concentrated in Batam as it attracted the most FDI. On the other hand, other 
scholars such as sociologists paid attention to the negative effects that the IMS-GT 
brought about. Chou and Wee (2002) criticized the IMS-GT from a perspective of 
ethnic minority in Riau Islands. Wulandari (2012) investigated the plight of workers 
and the labor movement in Batam. Workers, ordinary people and women in Riau 
Islands, who travel between Singapore and Indonesia, also attracted researchers’ 
interest as the unintentional impacts of the IMS-GT [see, for example, Ford and Lyons 
(2006) and Lyons and Ford (2007)]. 
     Among the literature above, there is little research on the ferry transportation. 
While air transportation in Singapore and cross–border transport links between 
Singapore and the Johor State were well-researched [see, for example, Chin (2001) and 
Barter (2006)], research on the ferry transportation is less popular. If any, it usually 
ends up with a description in several sentences to explain how the Riau Islands are 
near from Singapore. The number of foreign tourists to the Riau Islands by ferry is 
occasionally discussed to demonstrate their popularity as a tourist area. However, 
further research is required because the Riau Islands apparently function as the hub for 
distant and neighboring islands in Indonesia and neighboring countries, similar to 
Singapore’s Changi Airport which functions as the regional hub of international air 
transportation. Therefore, my research on the IMS-GT has changed to focus on the 




2.4 A Perspective on the Sea Transportation in the Riau Islands 
As this research focuses on the Riau Islands, the literature review on sea 
transportation covers mainly Indonesia and to a lesser extent, Singapore. Indonesia, 
with more than 17,000 islands, has the most number of islands in the world. For this 
reason, “as an island nation, Indonesia is heavily dependent upon shipping for its 
internal communications. The efficiency of interisland shipping is therefore a vital 
matter34.”  
The literature on sea transportation primarily focuses on national matters, not 
regional ones. Departemen Perhubungan (=Department of Transportation, 2007) 
covered the background on public transportation in Indonesia. It offered basic 
information on inland waterways, ferry and sea transport. When sea transportation is 
discussed, the necessity to develop inter-island shipping, particularly for remote 
islands, is frequently stressed. For example, UNESCAP (1999) suggested improvement 
in transport services for poverty alleviation [see also Hoyle, Leinbach, Smith and 
Spencer (1998)]. Dick (1987 and 2008) researched the changes of the related laws and 
the regulations in Indonesia. For instance, Dick (2008) dealt with the key economic 
regulations in the new Law 2008/17 on Shipping and judged their potential impact. 
State-owned enterprises are also investigated in the national context [Pusat Pengkajian 
dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Kawasan Asia Pasifik dan Afrika (=Centre of Policy 
Analysis and Development for Asia-Pacific and African Regions, 2011) for PT. ASDP 
Ferry Indonesia and Rutz and Coull (1996) for PT. PELNI]. Although the literature 
above is not directly related to the Riau Islands, there are several perspectives that also 
hold true relating to the ferry transportation in the Riau Islands.  
Industrial magazines, newspaper articles and operators’ annual reports are also 
                                                  
34 Dick, Howard, “Interisland Shipping: Progress, Problems and Prospects”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, Vol.21, No.2, 1985, p.95. 
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useful in this research. Fast Ferry International features the fast ferry industries in 
Singapore approximately every five years, mainly focusing on operators in Singapore. 
Bandar Media, an Indonesian journal, covers maritime topics in Indonesia. Though 
fragmentary, newspaper articles such as The Business Times (Singapore) and The 
Jakarta Post (Indonesia) also occasionally shed light on the subject. The annual reports 
of ferry operators and their parent companies reported on the ferry market and their 
challenges (see, for example, Sembawang Maritime Limited and Penguin Boat 
International Limited annual reports). As they mainly report their bright sides, we need 
to critically review them. 
Two articles are used as models for this research: Rutz and Coull (1996) and 
Colombijn (1996). Ruth and Coull examined the development of inter-island and 
passenger shipping, focusing on the improvements in the transport system since 1981. 
Although they studied the whole area of Indonesia as well as long–distance passenger 
shipping and geography, his methodology is adopted here because he investigated how 
the ferry network in Indonesia expanded since 1950s. Information which he utilized 
such as history, ship type, trunk and feeder routes, and the development of routes are 
also useful for this research. I also adopt Colombijn’s methodology because he 
analyzed how the transport network has developed in West Sumatra from pre-colonial 
times to today, focusing on political factors. Even though his researched area and 




     The Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) is an area which 
includes eight provinces in Indonesia, four states in Malaysia and Singapore. The idea 
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of the Growth Triangle was proposed in Singapore in 1989. Subsequently, official 
statements of support were released by the three political leaders in their respective 
countries in 1990. It was Indonesia that proposed the GT idea approximately ten years 
earlier before its formal formation. They initiated the project and their initial target was 
Singapore. Singapore apparently joined the project because the time was right. 
Subsequently, Malaysia, especially Johor State, followed suit. The area of the growth 
triangle has expanded over the years. 
     Each country joined the IMS-GT because of their respective motivations. For 
Singapore, an increase in the overall cost of doing business and its need for water were 
imminent issues. For Malaysia, the Johor State had distinct ambitions for its economic 
development. For Indonesia, its motivation lay in its policy to develop Batam.  
     The role of and trajectory in each country was also different. In Singapore, its 
role was actually as a prime mover which activated the development in its hinterlands. 
Singaporean and multinational corporations benefited from the IMS-GT by relocating 
their land- and labor-intensive industries to the Johor State and the Riau Islands. In 
Malaysia, it is difficult to determine the effect of the IMS-GT on Johor’s economic 
growth because of the established relationship between Singapore and Johor. The 
Iskandar Project in the Johor State has also recently attracted public attention.  
     In Indonesia, the landscape of the Riau Islands has changed significantly. Due to 
the massive inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign as well as small and 
medium enterprises were providing employment for more than 330,000 workers in 
2012. Twenty-two industrial estates had been established. FDI flowed into Bintan 
Island mainly to Bintan Industrial Estate and Bintan Beach International Resort. FDI in 
Karimun was limited. Since the 2000s, several policies such as the inclusion of the 
Integrated Sourcing Initiative (ISI) clause into the USA–Singapore Free Trade 
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Agreement (FTA) and the grant of the Free Trade Zone status in Batam, Bintan and 
Karimun (BBK) Islands were implemented.  
However, the IMS-GT faces several challenges such as ethnic exclusivity, the 
relationship between the central and local governments in Malaysia and Indonesia, and 
weakening trilateral cooperation among Singapore, the Riau Islands and Johor State.  
The role of the four concepts related to the IMS-GT was discussed next. Firstly, 
the economic complementarity in the IMS-GT remains the same. Singapore, Johor 
State and Riau Islands complement each other, excepting the weak relationship 
between the Johor State and the Riau islands. Secondly, geographical proximity 
contributed significantly to the success of the IMS-GT. Thirdly, the three governments 
strongly support the development projects in the IMS-GT. Fourthly, substantial 
investment was implemented in the IMS-GT since the 1990s. In the Riau Islands, 
Singapore–Indonesian investment cooperation has centered on four flagship projects.  
     In the literature, the IMS-GT attracted researchers’ attention in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s. In the 2000s, researchers shifted their interests from trilateral 
relationship to the bilateral relationship between Singapore and the Riau Islands. 
Among them, little is discussed with the ferry transportation as the subject. On the 
other hand, as seen from the literature on sea transportation in Indonesia, literature 
directly related to ferry transportation in the Riau Islands is also limited because it 
primarily discusses national matters and remote islands especially in the eastern part of 
Indonesia. Thus, articles from industrial magazines and newspapers shed more light on 
the overall picture.  
The literature survey revealed that the literature directly related to this research 
is limited. However, several lessons and the background of this research can be learnt 
from this literature. This research tries to adopt an integrated approach of the two 
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THE PICTURE: TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF  
THE INTERNATIONAL FERRY TRANSPORTATION  
IN THE RIAU ISLANDS 
 
     This chapter investigates the international ferry transportation in the Riau Islands, 
especially Batam, Bintan and Karimun Islands, in terms of its trends and patterns 
divided into four periods: the 1980s and before, the 1990s, the 2000s, and the current 
situation. The Riau Islands–Singapore routes are investigated in these four periods, 
while the Riau Islands–Johor State routes are analyzed for the period since the 1990s 
because most of the ports in Johor State opened then. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
     This section focuses on the international routes and ports in Singapore, the Riau 
Islands (Indonesia) and the Johor State (Malaysia). In total, eight ports in Singapore 
and the Johor State serve ferry routes to ten ports in the Riau Islands. In Singapore, 
there are two international passenger ports that connect Singapore with the Riau 
Islands: Harbour Front (S1) and Tanah Merah (S2) [see Fig 3.1]. There are six 
international passenger ports that connect the Johor State with the Riau Islands: 
Stulang Laut (J1), Pasir Gudang (J4), Kukup (J3), Puteri Harbour (J6, see Fig 3.2), 
Tanjung Pengelih (J5) and Tanjung Belungkor (J2). In the Riau Islands, there are ten 
international ports in three islands: five ports in Batam, four ports in Bintan and one 





Fig 3.1: International Ports in the Johor State (6), Singapore (2) and the Riau Islands (10) 
 




     In the Riau Islands, the ports in Batam are: Batam Centre (R4), Sekupang (R1), 
Harbour Bay (R5), Teluk Senimba/Waterfront (R3) and Nongsapura (Nongsa, R2, see 
Fig 3.3). The first three ports cater to all visitors and the last two ports are mainly for 
resort tourists. Batam Centre is located in the area where BIFZA and the Batam 
Municipal Office are located. Sekupang is located at the northern tip of Batam. 
Harbour Bay is located near the city area, Nagoya. Both Waterfront and Nongsa are 
located in the resort area. The former is situated in the northeast of the island and the 
latter is in the south of Sekupang.  
 
Fig 3.2: Puteri Harbour Port in the Johor State (J6) 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
Fig 3.3: Nongsapura Port in Batam (R2) 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
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     The ports in Bintan are: Tanjung Pinang (R6), which is for all visitors, Bandar 
Bentan Terani (BBT, R7) and Bintan Lagoon (R9), that are mainly for resort tourists, 
and Lobam (R8), which is exclusively for business travelers. Tanjung Pinang, situated 
in the south of the island, is the provincial capital in the Riau Islands Province. BBT 
and Bintan Lagoon are situated in a resort area which covers the north of Bintan. 
Lobam exists inside the Bintan Industrial Estate in the northwest of the island. The port 
in Karimun is Tanjung Balai, located in the southeast of the island.  
     There is an extensive ferry network in the region. Eight companies, mostly 
headquartered in Singapore, operate the international ferry routes between Singapore 
and the Riau Islands with more than 100 daily return trips. Fast ferries with 150-300 
seats each ply along these routes (see Fig 3.4). On the other hand, more than ten 
operators, mostly headquartered in Indonesia, ply between the Riau Islands and Johor 
State. There are more than 30 daily return trips along these routes. Fast ferries with 
50-150 seats each ply along these routes (see Fig 3.5). In total, there are more than 130 
daily return trips for both routes.  
 
 
Fig 3.4: A Ferry between the Riau Islands and Singapore 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
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Fig 3.5: A Ferry between the Riau Islands and the Johor State 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
     Using these ferries, the distribution of foreign tourists’ arrivals in 2012 is as 
follows: Batam (1.22 million), the Bintan resort area (0.34 million) and Tanjung 
Pinang (0.10 million) in Bintan, and Tanjung Balai (0.11 million) in Karimun 
[Statistics Indonesia’s website, accessed in March 2014]. On the other hand, 
Indonesians returned to Indonesia via Batam (0.87 million), Tanjung Balai (0.13 
million) and Tanjung Pinang (0.09 million) in 2010 (Riau Islands in Figures: 2011 and 
Batam Port Corporation: Author’s collection). Batam is the biggest entry point for both 
foreigners and Indonesians. 
Based on information collected and interviews during my fieldwork, Figures 3.6, 
3.7 (between the Riau Islands and Singapore) and 3.8 (between the Riau Islands and 
Johor State) were drawn to determine the changes in the international ferry network in 
Riau Islands. The periods in each figure were selected to understand the general trends 
in each decade. Therefore, they indicate neither the peak nor bottom period. In the next 




Fig 3.6: The international ferry network in 1980 and 1993 
 
Source: Khoo (1980), Fast Ferry International, Chan (1996) 
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Fig 3.7: The International Ferry Network in 2001 and 2014 
 
Source: Fast Ferry International, Each operator’s website (accessed in April 2014) 
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Fig 3.8: The International Ferry Network in 1993, 2001 and 2014 
 




3.2 The 1980s and Before 
     Throughout the colonial period and up to the 1960s, individuals crossed the 
Singapore Straits regularly with little regard for the markers of territorial sovereignty 
or jurisdiction. It was only with the Confrontation in 1963, when Indonesia’s northern 
periphery was a key site of skirmishes between Indonesia and Malaysia that territorial 
markers were put in place. Thus the Confrontation was pivotal in reimaging and 
reconstructing the borders in the strait35. As a result, the “cross-border” ferry operation 
apparently started only after the borders were reconstructed.  
     The first port which started its international operation in Batam was Sekupang in 
197336. Thereafter, the network expanded gradually. Judging from Khoo’s description 
(1980), it is estimated that the ferry network in the region was small in the beginning 
of the 1980s. There were five main international landing points in Rhio [Riau] Islands 
then. Ferries from these points called at Finger Pier in Singapore. The route to and 
from Tanjung Pinang was the busiest (more than 70 persons per day) due to the larger 
size of the population there37. Considering these points, Fig 3.6.a was drawn. Although 
the number of ferry trips was not stated, one can imagine a small number of trips in 
consideration of the passenger number. Even for the busiest route, the number of the 




                                                  
35 Lyons, Lenore and Michele Ford, “Fluid Boundaries: Modernity, Nation and Identity in the Riau 
Islands”, in Robert Cribb and Michele Ford (eds.), Indonesia beyond the Water’s Edge: Managing 
an Archipelagic State, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, p.225. The 
Confrontation was a conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, caused by 
Indonesia’s opposition to the creation of Malaysia. 
36 Bandar Media, “Pelabuhan Feri Internasional Sekupang Batam Masih Prospek”, Oct 2013, 
pp.8-10. 
37 Khoo, Ai Lin, Passenger Shipping in Singapore, Unpublished Honors Thesis, The Department 
of Geography, National University of Singapore, 1981, pp.56-57. The next biggest route was the 
route to and from Batam which served more than 40 persons per day. 
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Fig 3.6.a: The Network between the Riau Islands and Singapore in 1980 
 
Source: Fig 3.6 (p.47) 
 
     At that time, it took longer to reach Riau Islands from Singapore: four to five 
hours to Tanjung Balai and two and half to three hours to Tanjung Pinang. But the 
journey to Batam was about 40 minutes to an hour. Indonesian passenger ferries were 
all Indonesian owned and many had been operating for 20 years. Since then, many new 
ferries have entered the service and on the average, the latecomers have been operating 
for approximately five years. The maximum carrying capacity of the ferries ranged 
from 70 to 110 passengers and a few of them were fully air-conditioned (Khoo, 1981: 
60-61). There were apparently only Indonesian operators, and the crafts were relatively 
small. 
     As for passengers, the percentage of non-Indonesian passengers travelling 
between Singapore and Batam was the highest (60%) among the four major routes. 
This pattern was the result of the industrial development that was taking place there. 
On the other hand, the bulk of the passengers were Indonesians for the routes to 
Tanjung Pinang (70%), Sambu Island (80%) and Tanjung Balai (84%) in March 1979 
(Khoo, 1981: 68-70)38. Although one might observe some signs of development in 
                                                  
38 In March 1979, out of 1,475 visitors to Batam, Indonesians accounted for 40%, while 
Singaporeans and Malaysians formed 22% and 19% respectively. The total passenger numbers to 
Tanjung Pinang, Sambu Island and Tanjung Balai was 2,178, 665 and 526 respectively. 
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Batam, it had not started on a full scale yet back then. As a result, the volume of the 
passengers was still small, and the number of the passengers to Tanjung Pinang 
exceeded the one to Batam. 
     Subsequently, in the late 1980s, the ferry transportation saw an increase in the 
number of trips even before the signing of the official agreement between Singapore 
and Indonesia in 1989. The rise of tourism had an impact on the ferry transportation 
network. As Fast Ferry International (May 1989) reported, Batam was made duty-free 
and consequently a minor explosion of tourism occurred in 1988. It also reported five 
ferry operators that plied three routes between Singapore and Riau Islands (See Table 
3.1). In total, there were 21 daily return trips to Batam and six trips to Bintan (three 
trips via Batam)39. At that time, the framework of the IMS-GT was not even proposed 
yet. However, the Singapore–Batam routes saw an increase in the number of ferry trips 
because of the increasing number of tourists from Singapore.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Ferry Operators and Their Number of Trips in 1989 (daily return trips) 
 Sekupang Batu Ampar Tanjung Pinang 
Yang Passenger Ferry 
Service Pte Ltd 
5  5 to 6 (3 via Batam) 
PT. Bintan Baruna Sakti 5   
Tai Tong Shipping 5   
IGSA Transport  3  
Inasco Enterprise 3   
Total 18 3 5 to 6 
Source: Fast Ferry International, “Tourism Boosts Fast Ferry Traffic in Singapore”, May 1989, 




                                                  
39 As this magazine sometimes does not include small Indonesian operators, the number of return 
trips here is estimated at a minimum. 
53 
 
3.3. The 1990s 
The Riau Islands–Singapore Routes 
     The beginning of the 1990s saw a significant increase in the number of ferry 
trips between Singapore and Riau Islands due to the proposed Growth Triangle (GT) 
programs and ensuing agreements. Fast Ferry International (Sep 1993) investigated 
five ferry companies that operated the routes between Singapore and Riau Islands (See 
Table 3.2). In total, there were at least 62 return crossings on the Singapore–Sekupang 
route, two on the Singapore–Batu Ampar route and two on the Singapore–Tanjung 
Pinang route40. In addition, three operators were operating at least 15 ferries in the 




Table 3.2: Ferry Operators and Their Number of Trips in 1993 (daily return trips) 
 Sekupang Batu Ampar Tg. Pinang 
Auto Batam Ferry Service 22  1 
Seaflyte Ferry Services 24  1 
Indo Falcon 12   
Sing- Batam Ferries 4   
J & N Cruises  2  
Total 62 2 2 






                                                  
40 As this magazine sometimes does not include small Indonesian operators, the number of return 
trips is estimated at a minimum.  
41 Chan, Hwee Leng, The Lust Resort: Sex Tourism in Indonesia, Case Study: Tanjung Balai 
Karimun, Riau, Unpublished Honors Thesis, Department of Southeast Asian Studies Programme, 
National University of Singapore, 1996, p.26. Although the number of daily ferry trips is not 
available, it is estimated to be less than ten in consideration of the statistics. 
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Considering the 1993 situation, Fig 3.6.b was drawn. Compared with the 1980 
situation (Fig 3.6.a), the Singapore–Batam routes had become busier because of the 
increasing number of tourists from Singapore. The number of ferry trips in the 
Singapore–Sekupang route in 1993 especially increased to more than 60 (Fig 3.6.b). 
This can be confirmed as an increasing trend as reported in other articles from Fast 
Ferry International. In order to cater to an increasing number of passengers, the 
function of Finger Pier was relocated to World Trade Centre. The Singapore–Tanjung 
Pinang route had seen only a small increase in the number of ferry trips. In addition, it 
is speculated that the route to and from Pulau Sambu was abolished because of a 
decline in demand. As it only takes ten minutes from Sekupang by speedboat to reach 
there, the operators apparently felt that a direct trip was unnecessary.  
 
Fig 3.6.b: The Network between the Riau Islands and Singapore in 1993 
 
Source: Fig 3.6 (p.47) 
 
     The annual reports of Sembawang Maritime Limited (SML) also provided 
information on the international ferry transportation in the 1990s. SML expanded its 
activities rapidly in a short period. The company was a subsidiary of Sembawang 
Corporation Limited, a government-linked corporation in Singapore. SML had started 
the ferry business in 1994 when it purchased a 70% stake in Kalpin Tours, which 
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operated the Auto Batam Ferry Service. Subsequently, it purchased Star Ferry Services 
through Kalpin Tours in 199542. At that time, SML held a 20% stake in Bintan Resort 
Ferries, which was subsequently increased to 30% in 1996. Consequently, SML had 
almost 60% market share of the Singapore–Riau Islands routes in 1995. However, 
various factors such as keen fare competitions started to dampen its profitability. In 
addition, the business condition worsened due to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 
and it recorded a 17% drop in passenger volume compared to the previous year43. 
Therefore, as the management in the new company perceived the ferry business as 
non-core business, they finally sold it to Penguin Boat International Limited in 199944. 
SML apparently entered the ferry business because they predicted an increase in the 
number of passengers due to the start of the IMS-GT. Despite the big market share in 
the mid-1990s, their business lasted just five years.  
     The 1990s saw a rapid expansion in the international ferry network in this area: 
the opening of new ports and establishment of new ferry operators. The new ports in 
Riau Islands opened one after another. In addition, as the number of passengers 
increased, several ferry operators were set up to meet the demand. However, the Asian 






                                                  
42 The Business Times, “Sembawang Maritime Buys Star Ferry Services”, May 17, 1995 (Digital 
Source). Star Ferry Services was providing services between Singapore and Riau Islands with one 
vessel.  
43 Sembawang Maritime Limited, Annual Report 1995 and 1996. Sembawang Marine & Logistics 
Limited, Annual Report 1997 and 1998. 
44 SembCorp Logistics, Annual Report 1999. SML experienced a merger with one company. 
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The Riau Islands–Johor State Routes 
     At the beginning of the 1990s, the network between Riau Islands and Johor State 
was limited. It is estimated that there was only a route between Batu Ampar and 
Stulang Laut in 1993 (see Fig 3.8.a). PT. Pintas Samudra (Pintas) and PT. Bahtera 
Empat Wisesa Shipping have been operating this route since around 1990. At that time, 
Pintas operated two daily trips with two ferries45. 
 
Fig 3.8.a: The Network between  
the Riau Islands and Johor State in 1993 
 
Source: Fig 3.8 (p.49) 
 
     Thereafter, several routes were established one after another due to the opening 
of new ports in Johor State in the 1990s. For example, the Batu Ampar–Pasir Gudang 
and the Tanjung Pinang–Pasir Gudang route opened in 1996 due to the opening of 
Pasir Gudang Port46. The Batu Ampar–Tanjung Belungkor and Tanjung Balai–Kukup 
routes also opened in the 1990s47.  
 
 
                                                  
45 Interview at PT. Pintas Samudra in October 2013 
46 Brief interview at BP Sejahtera Amin Sdn Bhd in February 2014 
47 Judging from Johor Port Authority website (accessed in March 2014) 
57 
 
3.4. The 2000s 
The Riau Islands–Singapore Routes 
     In 2001, according to Fast Ferry International (Mar 2001), Penguin Ferry 
Service (Penguin) became Singapore’s largest operator due to the acquisition of the 
ferry business from SembCorp Logistics. It also reported four operators: Seaflyte Ferry 
Services (Seaflyte), Bintan Resort Ferries (BRF), Waterfront City Resort and Berlian 
Ferries (see Table 3.3). Penguin and Seaflyte were two big operators with more than 30 
daily return trips in 2001. In total, the Riau Islands routes scheduled a total of up to 
114 return services a day. It increased to 160 trips when the services operated by 
Indonesian-based monohulls were included48.  
 









BBT Lobam Tg. 
Balai 
Penguin 20 to 23 18   2  2 6 
Seaflyte 20 6 6  3   3 
BRF      5 to 8   
Waterfront    10     
Berlian     3 to 4    
Total 40 to 43 24 6 10 8 to 9 5 to 8 2 9 
Source: Fast Ferry International, “Penguin Ferry Service Becomes Singapore’s Largest Operator”,  
Mar 2001, pp.24-26. 
 
     Considering the 2001 situation, Fig 3.7.a was drawn. When compared with the 
1993 situation (in Fig 3.6.b), an expansion of the ferry network and an increase in the 
number of ferry trips can be observed. Other articles from Fast Ferry International 
confirmed this generally increasing trend. In Singapore, Tanah Merah Ferry Terminal 
opened in order to cater to an increasing number of passengers (see 4.1.1 in detail). In 
                                                  
48 In addition to the five operators, other operator such as PT. Lautan Tata Laut and PT. Gembira 
Tanjung Batu existed in 2001.  
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the Riau Islands, Bandar Bentan Terani and Lobam opened in Bintan following the 
implementation of the IMS-GT flagship projects in 1994. In Batam, ports such as 
Nongsa and Teluk Senimba opened since the mid-1990s as resort areas for foreigners. 
It is speculated that operators started the Harbour Front–Tanjung Batu route for tourists 
with particular purposes (see section 4.2.1). In addition, the number of daily return 
trips from Singapore to Batu Ampar, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai increased to 
more than ten.  
 
 
Fig 3.7.a: The Network between the Riau Islands and Singapore in 2001 
 
Source: Fig 3.7 (p.48) 
 
 
The annual reports of Penguin Boat International Limited (Penguin) can shed 
more light on the patterns and trends in 2000s. Penguin’s ferry business in the Riau 
Islands began in 1993 when its founder bought the 25% stake of Indo Falcon49. 
Subsequently, Penguin became one of the biggest ferry operators in the area since it 
bought the ferry business from SembCorp Logistics in 1999. At that time, their 
business prediction was very optimistic due to several reasons such as the improved 
political and economic climate in Indonesia, and the encouragement of the Batam 
                                                  
49 Penguin, Prospectus dated 6 October 1997 
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Authority in foreign investment. Its market share was between 30% and 35% in the 
Singapore–Batam routes then. This increased year by year, reaching 48% in 2001. 
Subsequently, they expanded the network by introducing a route from Singapore to 
Tanjung Batu in 2001, a route between Dumai (Sumatra Island) and Muar (Malaysia) 
in 2002, routes from Singapore to Waterfront in 2003 and Nongsa in 200450.  
However, most of these services were short-lived. The routes between Muar and 
Dumai as well as from Singapore to Tanjung Batu and Nongsa were abolished in 2003, 
2004 and 2005 respectively due to low load factors. The first three ports were areas 
which are distant from the center of the IMS-GT program. In addition, several factors 
such as the September 11, 2001 attacks, the outbreak of SARS in 2003 and the intense 
competition in the ferry industry since the 2000s had a negative impact on its business. 
Under these circumstances, one of the countermeasures that Penguin took was the 
code-sharing agreements with competitors in 2004. They included a bilateral and a 
tripartite agreement for a few routes51.  
Since the mid-2000s, Penguin’s focus on its ferry business began to change. For 
instance, they stressed “Penguin is more than just a ferry operator” in its Annual 
Report 2005. Subsequently, its Annual Report 2007 stated that “the retail ferry 
business is no longer a main feature of our group”. Ferry ticketing accounted for only 
14% of its total revenue in 2008, compared to over 50% at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Penguin gradually shifted its core business from ferry business to shipbuilding and 
chartering business. Finally, they concluded that the ferry business was “loss-making”, 
and sold it to SIF Group Pte Ltd (SIF) in 2011 to focus on more profitable and core 
industrial activities52. The market share of Penguin as of December 2010 was still high. 
                                                  
50 Penguin, Annual Report 1999, 2001 to 2004 and Prospectus dated 15 September 2000 
51 Penguin, Annual Report 2001 to 2005 
52 Penguin, Annual Report 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011. The company name was changed from 
Penguin Boat International Limited to Penguin International Limited in 2008. 
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For example, it was 40 to 50% of the Harbour Front–Batam Centre route53.  
When Penguin bought its ferry business, they were optimistic about the future of 
the IMS-GT despite the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. Therefore, they 
expanded their activities until the mid-2000s. However, their perception towards the 
ferry business began to change due to adverse business environments. Consequently, 
they let it go off in spite of having a big market share.  
Since the 2000s, the international ferry network in the area saw a different 
business environment compared to the 1990s: the opening and the relocation of ports, 
and the establishment and the closure of ferry operators. New ports such as Harbour 
Bay and Bintan Lagoon opened, and the function of Batu Ampar was relocated to 
Batam Centre because it was inside the cargo port. Several operators such as PT. 
Lautan Tata Laut and PT. Gembira Tanjung Batu stopped their operations54. Penguin 
expanded its ferry business at the beginning of the 2000s, but finally sold it to SIF in 
2011.  
 
The Riau Islands–Johor State Routes 
     As a result of the establishment of new routes, the network between Riau Islands 
and Johor State expanded significantly in 2001 (see Fig 3.8.b). Compared with the 
1993 situation (Fig 3.8.a), several ports in Johor such as Tanjung Belungkor and 
Kukup opened in order to attract residents and tourists from Singapore. The ferry 
operators started routes to and from the Riau Islands thereafter. In addition, the number 
of ferry trips in the Batu Ampar–Stulang Laut and Tanjung Balai–Kukup routes 
                                                  
53 Competition Commission Singapore, “Proposed Acquisition by SIF Group Pte Ltd and Penguin 
Ferry Services Pte Ltd”, 20 Apr, 2011 (Digital source). Its market share in the other routes was 35 
to 45% in the Harbour Front–Sekupang route and 30 to 40% in the Tanah Merah–Tanjung Pinang 
route. The article also pointed out familial affiliations between SIF and Pacific Ferry, but it was 
unlikely that coordinated effects would arise according to them. 
54 Interview at PT. International Golden Shipping in March 2014 
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increased to more than ten. However, the picture since the 2000s differed in each route. 




Fig 3.8.b: The Network between the Riau Islands and Johor State in 2001 
 
Source: Fig 3.8 (p.49) 
 
 
From Stulang Laut, there were two destinations: Batu Ampar and Tanjung 
Pinang. To Batu Ampar, PT. Pintas Samudra operated six daily trips in approximately 
2003. During that time, the passenger number was increasing year by year, and the 
company became well-known not only to Indonesians but also to Malaysians55. The 
route to Tanjung Pinang started in the 1990s56. There were six daily ferry trips in 2001, 
but the frequency has been reduced thereafter57. 
     In the Kukup–Tanjung Balai route, considering the number of Malaysians who 
entered Indonesia via Tanjung Balai (more than 100,000 in 2000 compared to 65,000 
                                                  
55 Interview at PT. Pintas Samudra in October 2013 
56 Brief Interview at PT. Bahtera Empat Wisesa Shipping in Tanjung Pinang in October 2013. The 
interviewee stated that the opening of the route was more than fifteen years ago.  
57 The Straits Times, “Hundreds Hit by Ferry Crackdown”, Jul 20, 2001 (Digital source). Ferry 
operators were not mentioned. 
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in 2012), the number of ferry trips in this route was estimated to be more than ten in 
2001. It apparently decreased thereafter (see section 4.2 in detail).  
 
3.5. The Current Situation 
The Riau Islands–Singapore Routes 
     In the Riau Islands–Singapore routes, there are more than 100 daily return trips, 
operated by eight companies as of April 2014: Batam Fast Ferry Pte Ltd (Batam Fast), 
Berlian Ferries Pte Ltd (Berlian), Bintan Resort Ferries Pte Ltd (BRF), Indo Falcon 
Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd (Indo Falcon), Mozaic Hotels and Resorts Pte Ltd (Mozaic), 
Pacific Ferry Pte Ltd (Pacific), Prima Ferries Pte Ltd (Prima) and SINDO Ferry Pte 
Ltd (SINDO). Mozaic, Pacific and Prima started their operations since the 2010s. 
     Ferries to Bintan and Nongsapura (Nongsa) in Batam depart from Tanah Merah 
in eastern Singapore. Tanah Merah is the departure point for four destinations: Bandar 
Bentan Terani (BBT), Bintan Lagoon, Lobam, Nongsa and Tanjung Pinang (see Fig 
3.1). The routes to and from the first three destinations are operated by one operator, 
BBT (5 to 7 daily return trips), and Lobam (1 to 2 trips on weekdays) by BRF, and 
Bintan Lagoon (2 trips) by Mozaic (see Table 3.4 for other operators to Nongsa and 
Tanjung Pinang). 
     Ferries to Batam (except Nongsa) and Karimun depart from Harbour Front in 
southern Singapore. Harbour Front serves five destinations: Batam Centre, Harbour 
Bay, Sekupang, Tanjung Balai and Waterfront. More than two operators ply the first 
four routes. SINDO is the only regular operator to Waterfront via Sekupang (1 to 3 
trips) [see Table 3.4 for other ports where more than two operators serve]. Among them, 




















Batam Fast 12 4 9 6 to 9   31 to 34 
Berlian 15  1 4 2 to 3  22 to 23 
Indo Falcon    4 2 2 8 
Pacific   8 to 9    8 to 9 
Prima  12     12 
SINDO 12  7  2 to 4 2 23 to 25 
Total 39 16 25 to 29 14 to 17 6 to 9 4 104 to 114 
Source: Each operator’s website (accessed in April 2014) 
 
Fig 3.7.b: The Network between the Riau Islands and Singapore in 2014 
 
Source: Fig 3.7 (p.48) 
 
     Fig 3.7.b was drawn based on the current situation. When comparing the 2001 
situation with the 2014 situation in Fig 3.7, there are new ports such as Batam Centre, 
Harbour Bay and Bintan Lagoon. World Trade Centre was renamed Harbour Front. 
The function of Batu Ampar was transferred to Batam Centre which became the 
busiest port in Batam, surpassing Sekupang. However, several routes such as the 
Harbour Front–Tanjung Balai route faced a decline in the number of ferry trips. 
Besides, a few routes such as the Harbour Front–Tanjung Batu route were abolished. 
Thus, the network barely remained the same. Regarding the number of ferry trips, it 
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decreased significantly from 160 in 2001 to 125 (maximum) in 2014. The peak period 
was apparently the beginning of the 2000s but not exactly 2001, based on the articles 
from Fast Ferry International, annual reports and statistics. Operators such as 
Waterfront, PT. Lautan Tata Laut, and PT. Gembira Tanjung Batu left the market due to 
the harsh business environment (further discussed in 4.2.1). In any case, the era of 
network expansion has gone, and the business environment is different for each route. 
 
Table 3.5: The Change of Entry Points for Foreigners and Indonesians [million of 
persons, (numbers in parentheses refer to percent share to total)] 
 Foreigners Indonesians 
Port name 2000 2012 2000 2012 
Batu Ampar => 
Batam Centre 
0.43 (33) 0.50 (43) 0.35 (63) 0.63 (57) 
Harbour Bay - 0.31 (26) - 0.28 (25) 
Sekupang 0.68 (52) 0.24 (21) 0.14 (25) 0.19 (17) 
Nongsa 0.07 (5) 0.08 (7) 0.01 (2) 0.01 (1) 
Waterfront 0.13 (10) 0.04 (3) 0.06 (11) 0.001 (0) 
Total 1.30 (100) 1.17 (100) 0.57 (100) 1.12 (100) 
Source: Batam Port Corporation (Author’s collection) 
 
Analyzing the breakdown of passengers to Batam in each port since 2000 would 
shed more light on the trends and patterns of the ferry networks. In 2000, Sekupang 
(0.68 million) attracted the most foreign tourists, followed by Batu Ampar, Waterfront 
and Nongsa (see Table 3.5). Subsequently, tourist entry points have changed 
significantly. In 2012, Batam Center (0.50 million) attracted the most foreigners, 
followed by Harbour Bay, Sekupang, Nongsa and Waterfront. The opening of new 
ports such as Batam Centre (its port function was relocated from Batu Ampar in 2003) 
and Harbour Bay (opened in 2006) affected the network and the number of ferry trips 
in Batam, and these ports became major entry points for foreigners. In contrast to these 
ports, the number of passengers to Sekupang decreased significantly. Its percent share 
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to the total number of foreign passengers decreased from 52% in 2001 to 28% in 2012. 
As a result, the number of ferry trips to Batam Centre and Harbour Bay increased in 
2014 compared to 2001, while the one to Sekupang decreased (see Fig 3.7).  
Entry ports in Batam for Indonesians have also changed. In 2000, Batu Ampar 
(0.35 million) attracted the most Indonesians, followed by Sekupang, Waterfront and 
Nongsa (see Table 3.5). Subsequently, Indonesian passengers also shifted to new ports 
following the trend of foreign tourists. In 2012, Batam Centre (0.63 million) attracted 
the most Indonesian passengers, followed by Harbour Bay and Sekupang. Nongsa and 
Waterfront attracted few Indonesians because these are resort areas mainly for 
foreigners. Due to the increase in the number of Indonesian passengers from 0.56 
million to 1.12 million, Batam Centre benefited from this growth, while Sekupang 
experienced only a slight increase. Except for the ports in the resort areas, a major 
difference between foreign and Indonesian passengers was not seen.  
     Since the 2000s, the IMS-GT has lost momentum compared to the 1990s. The 
trilateral meetings have not been held since 1997, and the focal points in Indonesia 
shifted from the big projects to the upgrading of the economic framework such as the 
inclusion of the Integrated Sourcing Initiative clause into the USA–Singapore FTA and 
the granting of Free Trade Zone status to Batam, Bintan and Karimun. They might be 
considered as part of the IMS-GT projects in a broader sense. However, they did not 
contribute to the ferry transportation significantly judging from the ferry network and 
its statistics.  
 
The Riau Islands–Johor State Routes 
     Compared with the ferry network between Riau Islands and Singapore, the one 
between Riau Islands and Johor State is small. Still, there are more than 30 daily ferry 
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return trips between the two areas. In this network, even though there are many ports 
in the Riau Islands, only one port in each island is used to connect to ports in the Johor 
State: Batam Centre in Batam, Tanjung Pinang in Bintan and Tanjung Balai in 
Karimun. Batam Centre serves five ports: Stulang Laut, Pasir Guadang, Puteri Harbour, 
Tanjung Pengelih and Tanjung Belungkor (see Fig 3.1). Tanjung Pinang serves only 
Stulang Laut. Tanjung Balai serves Kukup and Puteri Harbour due to its proximity to 
Malaysia.  
     The Batam Centre–Stulang Laut route is the busiest among the Riau Islands 
–Johor State routes because of its location. It is near central Johor Bahru, and the 
terminal is located inside the duty free shopping mall. Three companies form a 
consortium to operate a total of fifteen daily return trips (see Table 3.6). As they 
operate in a consortium, they change the operation slots every month to be fair. The 
revenue is also divided equally. It was formed roughly in 2009 when Citra entered the 
market58. The consortium can also be observed operating the Tanjung Pinang–Stulang 
Laut route. Three ferry owners currently operate a total of three daily return trips, and 
also change the operation slots every five or six days. The consortium was formed 







                                                  
58 Interview at PT. Pintas Samudra in October 2013 
59 Brief Interview at PT. Bahtera Empat Wisesa Shipping in Tanjung Pinang in October 2013. As 




Table 3.6: Operators, Agents and Ferry Names and Their Trips in March 2014 
Routes Operators, Agents and Ferry Names 
Number of Daily 
Return Trips 
Batam Centre 
 Stulang Laut 
PT. Pintas Samudra 5 
PT. Bahtera Empat Wisesa Shipping 5 
PT. Citra Adiartha Shipping 5 
B. Centre  Pasir Guang PT. International Golden Shipping (=IGS) 4 
B. Centre  Tg. Belungkor 
and Tg. Pengelih 
PT. Duta Bahari Sakti (Agent) 
Irregular 
PT. Duta Bahari Sentosa (Agent) 
B. Centre  P. Harbour Berlian Ferries Pte Ltd 2 
Tg. Balai  P. Harbour Mercu Tunggal Services (M) Sdn Bhd 2 
Tg. Balai  Kukup 
PT. Lautan Inti Mega 
4-5 
PT. Marinatama Gemanusa 
Penaga Timur (M) Sdn Bhd 4 
Tg. Pinang  St. Laut Indomas, Sentosa, Marina (Ferry Name) 3 
Source: Author’s fieldwork 
 
     The number of ferry trips from Batam Centre to the other four ports is less than 
five. Pasir Gudang is a terminal located inside the Pasir Gudang Industrial Area which 
is to the east of Johor Bahru. IGS, incorporated from an agent in approximately 2010, 
is an operator. Puteri Harbour is situated near Nusajaya, the newly developed area. It is 
to the southwest of Johor Bahru, and opened in May 2013 as one of the Iskandar 
projects (see section 2.1.3). Mercu Tunggal Services operates the route to and from 
Tanjung Balai, while Berlian Ferries operates to and from Batam Centre. Tanjung 
Pengelih (Pengelih) is located at Pengerang, the southeast tip of Johor Peninsula, while 
Tanjung Belungkor is located north of Pengelih. For these destinations, non-scheduled 
ferries are currently operated.  
     In the route between Tanjung Balai and Kukup, there are a total of nearly ten 
daily return trips. Though Kukup is a fishing village located at the southwest tip of 
Johor State, it takes only one hour to reach Tanjung Balai. Thus, there are a few 
operators: one ferry group and one operator. The former consists of two operators and 
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conducts a joint operation formed in 200260, while the latter started the Kukup– 
Tanjung Balai route in 2008. 
Considering the current situation, Fig 3.8.c was drawn. When compared with the 
2001 situation (see Fig 3.8.b), the network in 2014 between Riau Islands and Johor 
State has not changed significantly. In Batam, the function of Batu Ampar was 
relocated to Batam Centre. In Johor, Puteri Harbour opened as one of the Iskandar 
projects and the irregular trip between Batam Centre and Tanjung Pengelih started. It is 
speculated that Pengelih initially opened to connect to Singapore like other ports in 
Johor State, and the route to and from Batam opened subsequently. However, a few 
routes such as the Pasir Gudang–Tanjung Pinang route were abolished and the number 
of ferry trips in a few routes such as the Kukup–Tanjung Balai decreased at the same 
time. Thus, it is fair to say that the network and the number of ferry trips almost 
remained the same from 2001 to 2014.  
 
Fig 3.8.c: The Network between the Riau Islands and Johor State in 2014 
 
Source: Fig 3.8 (p.49) 
 
                                                  




     Figures 3.6 and 3.7 were drawn to illustrate the Riau Islands–Singapore routes. 
The periods in each figure were selected to understand the general trend in each decade. 
Therefore, they exactly indicate neither the peak nor the bottom periods. Before the 
IMS-GT started, the international ferry network in Riau Islands was almost static, and 
the Singapore–Tanjung Pinang route attracted the most passengers. In 1980, the 
number of daily return ferry trips was estimated to be less than ten even for this route. 
However, this trend and pattern has changed since the late 1980s when Batam was 
highlighted due to the rise of tourism. Thereafter, the introduction of the IMS-GT 
program accelerated the expansion. In 1993, for example, the number of trips in the 
Singapore–Sekupang route increased to more than 50. Following the traffic increase, 
the function of Finger Pier in Singapore was transferred to World Trade Centre in 1992 
and Tanah Merah opened as a second port in 1995. In the Riau Islands, new ports such 
as Bandar Bentan Terani, Nongsapura and Teluk Senimba opened for resort tourists in 
the mid-1990s. Consequently, the network in 2001 shows an expansion and an increase 
in the number of ferry trips.  
The 2000s period saw adverse business environments such as the September 11, 
2011 attacks and the outbreak of SARS in 2003. In addition, the IMS-GT has lost its 
momentum compared to the 1990s. Penguin finally sold its ferry business to SIF in 
2011. Consequently, the network barely remained the same, and the number of ferry 
trips decreased significantly from 160 in 2001 to 125 (maximum) in 2014. Several 
operators also stopped their operations. On the other hand, port facilities were 
upgraded throughout the 2000s in Batam. The function of Batu Ampar was relocated to 
Batam Centre. Harbour Bay opened and Sekupang completed its terminal renovation.  
Fig 3.8 illustrates the Riau Islands–Johor State routes. Similar to the Riau 
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Islands–Singapore routes, there are three figures (1993, 2001 and 2014). In 1993, the 
route was limited to only between Stulang Laut and Batu Ampar. Thereafter, new ports 
such as Kukup, Tanjung Belungkor and Pasir Gudang opened and new routes were 
established. Some of them initially opened to attract residents and tourists from 
Singapore. The ferry operators started the routes to and from Riau Islands thereafter. 
As a result, the network in 2001 shows an expansion and an increase in the number of 
ferry trips compared to the one in 1993. It appears that the peak period of the network 
was approximately the beginning of the 2000s, not exactly 2001, based on newspaper 
articles, interviews and statistics. Since the 2000s, new ports opened and new routes 
were established, while a few routes were abolished or the number of ferry trips for 
certain routes decreased. Consequently, it is estimated that the network and the number 
of ferry trips in 2014 remained almost the same compared to 2001.  
Compared with the Riau Islands–Singapore routes (Figures 3.6 and 3.7), the 
network in the Riau Islands–Johor State routes (Fig 3.8) is smaller and had expanded 
later because several ports in Johor only opened in the mid-1990s. In addition, there 
are no ferry routes to resort areas in Bintan and Batam from Johor State because these 
areas are developed mainly for Singaporeans and tourists to Singapore. With regard to 
ferry operations, several ferry operators form a consortium for the Riau Islands–Johor 
State routes. They allocate operation slots to each member and departure time for each 
operator changes at regular intervals. In the Riau Islands–Singapore routes, on the 
other hand, there used to be a code-sharing ferry operation, but it is currently not 






Chapter IV:  
Explaining the Picture: What Accounts for the Changing  
International Ferry Networks in the Riau Islands? 
 
The preceding chapter presents the changing trends and patterns of the 
international ferry network in the Riau Islands. The current chapter explains these 
changes from various perspectives. Section 4.1 discusses the first perspective in terms 
of the role of each government (Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) and the 
international regulations in the ferry transportation. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present the 
second perspective in terms of the impacts of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore 
Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), and the external factors that affected the ferry operation 
business. Section 4.4 discusses the third perspective through the case studies of three 
private operators to illustrate their trajectories since their establishment. I have chosen 
Bintan Resort Ferries because of its unique ownership; Indo Falcon because of its 
2-year history as a medium-size operator; and Batam Fast because of its 30-year 
experience as a big operator. 
 
4.1 The Role of Government and International Regulations  
     Based on my fieldwork, unlike domestic operations, international ferry 
operations entail various procedures. In order to operate an international route, an 
operator needs to apply for an operating license in the destination country and obtain 
route permission from the harbor master in the destination port at the same time. An 
operator can choose only ports permitted in the agreement between the governments. 
They need to abide by the stricter regulations in the countries concerned and 
international regulations. They also need to set up a company or appoint an agent in 
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the destination country. 
     Therefore, this section discusses the procedure involved in ferry operations in 
Singapore because it has the most stringent regulations among the three countries 
based on my fieldwork. This section also discusses the port administration in each 
country because its government’s position towards ferry transportation is frequently 
reflected in it. Finally, it investigates international regulations as these have become 
increasingly important in international ferry operation.  
 
4.1.1 The Singapore Government 
     In Singapore, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), a statutory 
board of the Ministry of Transport (MOT), is in charge of port and shipping. A 
company must obtain a license from MPA in order to operate ferry services to and 
from Singapore. Before seeking MPA’s approval, it must seek the terminal operator’s 
written support for the proposed frequency of services. An operator can submit its 
statutory declaration through the MPA’s web-based system. It must also ensure that its 
ferries entering Singapore ports comply with the requirements of the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter XI-2 and the International 
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Ferry operators pay port dues to MPA, 
but MPA had previously given a port dues concession to them during the SARS 
outbreak in 2003 because of a harsh business climate61.  
     The government also regulates the ticket sales system for ferries departing from 
Singapore, and this regulation has changed over the years. At the beginning of the 
1990s, local legislation prohibited shipping lines from selling tickets directly to 
passengers. Consequently, tickets for each particular company’s vessels were sold by at 
                                                  
61 MPA, 2005, Application Form for Regional Ferry Operators’ License ,Jan 3, 2005 (Digital 
Source), and MPA’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
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least one other company acting as an agent, some of which are independent and some 
of which are subsidiaries of the operating company (Fast Ferry International, Sep 
1993: 27). This legislation does not currently exist, and each operator sells tickets 
directly to the individual passenger62. 
     In Singapore, there are two ferry terminals that serve the routes to and from the 
Riau Islands: Harbour Front and Tanah Merah. They are administered by the Singapore 
Cruise Center Pte Ltd (SCCPL). Their previous administrator was Port of Singapore 
Authority (PSA), an ex-statutory board. In 1996, PSA’s regulatory functions were 
handed over to MPA. Subsequently, PSA was corporatized in 1997 to manage and 
operate its terminals and related businesses63. In 2003, the Singapore Cruise Center 
was divested from PSA Corporation Ltd and became an independent company, the 
aforementioned SCCPL.  
Until 1992, the international ferry terminal in Singapore was located at Finger 
Pier. The facility was mainly for cargo-handling, but the beginning of the 1990s saw an 
increase in the number of passengers. Consequently, six berths were built at World 
Trade Centre (renamed Harbour Front in 2003 after the renovation of the shopping 
mall in the same building64) to serve international ferry destinations together with the 
terminal for cruise passengers65. The other terminal in Tanah Merah opened in 1995. In 
1993 and 1994, international ferry traffic was growing at an average of 22% annually. 
In order to cater to this growth, PSA constructed a new ferry terminal at Tanah Merah66. 
Thus, ferry operators that leave for Bintan Island, Nongsa in Batam, and Malaysia, 
were relocated from World Trade Centre to Tanah Merah. As was expected, the number 
                                                  
62 On the other hand, a passenger can buy a ticket from both an operator and an agent in the Riau 
Islands and Johor State. 
63 PSA’s website (accessed in February 2014). 
64 District Guide Singapore’s website (accessed in February 2014). 
65 SCCPL’s website (accessed in February 2014).  
66 The Business Times, “New Ferry Terminal Opens Tomorrow”, Aug 25, 1995 (Digital Source). 
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of passengers from these two terminals to Indonesia and Malaysia grew steadily 
throughout the 1990s: 0.96 million in 1989 to 5.18 million in 199967.  
As a prime mover of the IMS-GT, the Singapore government, more precisely 
PSA, predicted a future increase in the number of passengers and built two ferry 
terminals in advance. Its strategy paid off, and the two terminals have catered to an 
increase in the number of passengers since the 1990s.  
 
4.1.2. The Indonesian Government 
In Indonesia, the Ministry of Transportation (=Kementerian Perhubungan, 
MOT) is in charge of the ferry transportation and within the ministry is the Directorate 
General of Sea Transportation (=Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Laut, DGST). 
DGST issues licenses to ports and ferry operators (see section 5.2.1 for details).  
In the Riau Islands, there are ten ports that serve international routes (see Fig 
3.1). The port operators are mostly developers of the area and a state-owned enterprise 
(see Table 4.1). For example, the area in Harbour Bay was developed by a group with 
more than twenty years of experience in property development business in Batam68. Its 
affiliated company currently operates the terminal69. Bandar Benten Terani, Nongsa, 
Waterfront and Bintan Lagoon ports have opened since the mid-1990s to attract resort 
tourists from Singapore and are also operated by their respective developers. The ports 
in Tanjung Pinang and Karimun are operated by Indonesia Port Corporation I (=PT. 




                                                  
67 PSA, Annual Report 1998, p.33 
68 BatamWeb.net website (accessed in July 2014) 
69 The Jakarta Post, “Protests Greet Batam’s New Port”, Nov 6, 2006 (Digital Source).  
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Table 4.1: Ports in the Riau Islands and Their Operating Companies 
Island Port Operating Company 
Batam 
Batam Centre PT. Synergy Tharada 
Harbour Bay PT. Citra Tritunas 
Nongsapura PT. Nongsa Terminal Bahari 
Sekupang PT. Indodharma Corpora 
Teluk Senimba PT. Senimba Bay Resort 
Bintan 
Tanjung Pinang PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I 
Bandar Bendan Terani PT. Bintan Resort Cakrawala 
Lobam PT. Bintan Inti Industrial Estate 
Bintan Lagoon Mozaic Hotels and Resorts Pte Ltd 
Karimun Tanjung Balai PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I 
Sources: Each company’s website (accessed in February 2014), Author’s fieldwork,  
The Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition,  
“PUTUSAN: Perkara Nomor 32/KPPU-L/2009”, Jakarta: KPPU (Digital 
Source, accessed in April 2014), and The Jakarta Post (Nov 6, 2006) 
 
Two port operators in Batam constructed the terminals under the BOT 
(Build–Operate–Transfer) scheme. BIDA (=Batam Industrial Development Authority, 
now known as Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority or BIFZA) is heavily involved in 
upgrading the port terminals since the 2000s. For example, Batam Centre is managed 
by PT. Synergy Tharada which built the terminal with BIDA’s cooperation. Under the 
BOT scheme, they previously built and managed Batu Ampar that was relocated to 
Batam Centre in 200370. In Sekupang, BIDA changed the terminal management system 
in 2004 when it handed its management rights over to PT. Indodharma Corpora under 
the BOT scheme. PT. Indodharma Corpora then started renovating the terminal and 
completed it in 2008. 
In the Riau Islands, ports for resort tourists have opened since the 1990s and are 
operated by their developers. The unique feature of Batam is the BIFZA’s role. A 
development organization like BIFZA does not exist in the other regions. BIDA, 
BIFZA’s predecessor, has upgraded the port terminals since the 2000s. This type of 
                                                  
70 Synergy Group’s website (accessed in February 2014). It states “pengelolaan” (= management) 
of the Batam Centre Terminal.  
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remarkable upgrading is not seen at the ports in Tanjung Balai and Tanjung Pinang 
apparently because their operating company (PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I) does not put 
much emphasis on them. 
 
4.1.3 The Malaysian Government 
In Malaysia, the Ministry of Transport is in charge of the ferry transportation. 
Within the ministry are the Marine Department Malaysia (= Jabatan Laut Malaysia, 
MDM) and the Johor Port Authority (= Lembaga Pelabuhan Johor, JPA). MDM issues 
licenses to ferry operators and has the authority to stop their ferry operations71. JPA is 
one of five port authorities in Malaysia.  
 
Table 4.2: Ports in the Johor State and Their Operating Companies 
 Owner Operator 
Kukup Johor Kingdom Penaga Timur Sdn Bhd 
Stulang Laut Kelana Megah Sdn Bhd Berjaya Waterfront Sdn Bhd 
Pasir Gudang Johor Port Authority Pasir Gudang Passenger Terminal 
Sdn Bhd 
Tanjung Pengelih Maritime Department 
Malaysia 
The contractor of Maritime 
Department Malaysia 
Puteri Harbour UEM Sunrise Bhd Ridaa Associates Sdn Bhd 
Tanjung Belungkor Johor Port Authority Syarikat Marin Island Venture 
Capital Sdn Bhd 
Sources: New Straits Times, “New Ferry Service Set to Grow”, Jul 26, 2013,  
(Digital Source), Author’s fieldwork, 
Marine Department Malaysia’s website, Johor Port Bhd’s website,  
and Johor Port Authority’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
 
In the Johor State, MDM and JPA administer a total of six international ports 
which serve the Riau Islands (see Fig 3.1). MDM administers Kukup, Stulang Laut, 
Tanjung Pengelih and Puteri Harbour, while JPA administers Pasir Gudang and 
Tanjung Belungkor. These ports are owned and operated by various organizations and 
                                                  
71 For example, MDM stopped Indonesian-registered ferries from entering Malaysia because some 
of them did not meet safety standards (The Straits Times: Jul 20, 2001). 
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companies (see Table 4.2). The owners include the Johor Kingdom and the 
administrators, while most of the operators are private companies related to each port. 
Since the 1990s, the administrators have opened ports in the Johor State one 
after another to connect with Singapore72. The routes to and from the Riau Islands 
opened thereafter. They are dispersed along the coastal line of the Johor State. There 
are a total of maximum of twenty daily return trips from each port. In addition, road 
transportation plays an important role between the Johor State and Singapore. Thus, 
the bulk of ferry passenger volume is not concentrated in a particular port like 
Singapore or Batam, and the authorities apparently do not put much emphasis on 
upgrading its port terminals. 
 
4.1.4 International Regulations 
     Besides local rules, the IMO (International Maritime Organization) regulations 
play an important role in the ferry operation. Three such regulations are investigated 
here: the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code and voyage data recorders (VDRs). The last is studied as 
an example of the government’s flexibility with regards to the international regulation. 
     First, the IMO adopted the International Management Code for the Safe 
Operation of Ships and for the Pollution Operation (the ISM Code) in 1993. It is based 
on resolution A.647 (16) in the wake of a number of very serious accidents which 
occurred during the late 1980s. The objective was to ensure safety at sea, the 
prevention of human injury or loss of life, and the avoidance of damage to the marine 
environment and property73. The ISM Code has been amended several times since. 
                                                  
72 For example, Tanjung Belungkor, which opened in 1993, was constructed by the Malaysian 
government as a third gateway project which links Singapore and the Johor State by roll-on roll-off 
(ro-ro) ship [Johor Port Authority’s website (accessed in February 2014)]. 
73 IMO’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
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According to the Penguin Boat International Annual Report (1997), all vessels 
operating in international waters must have ISM certification from July 1998. 
Therefore, Penguin, for instance, undertook the necessary training for its crews and 
supervisors in 1997. 
     Second, the ISPS code is a comprehensive set of measures to enhance the 
security of ships and port facilities, developed in response to perceived threats to ships 
and port facilities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. New provisions 
in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) were laid out in 
1974: detailed security-related requirements for governments, port authorities and 
shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of 
guidelines on how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section 
(Part B)74. These went into effect as a treaty in 2004. International ports need to be 
certified with this ISPS code and a ship that is compliant should have an International 
Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). Subsequently, international ports in the Riau Islands, 
Singapore and the Johor State were certified with the ISPS code one after another.  
Third, there were cases where individual governments imposed less strict 
regulations compared to international ones. For example, IMO regulations required all 
passenger ships to be fitted with a VDR not later than the first survey on or after July 
2002. However, as international passenger ferries had previously experienced practical 
difficulties in installing VDR, MPA in Singapore had granted them interim exemptions 
from the installation of VDR under its own regulations. Subsequently, such exemptions 
were rescinded, and they were required to install a simplified voyage data recorder 
(S-VDR) by the first scheduled dry-docking not later than 1 Aug 201075.   
In short, international ferry operators need to observe the laws and regulations in 
                                                  
74 IMO’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
75 IMO’s website (accessed in February 2014) 
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the countries concerned as well as international regulations. The requirements from the 
authorities have gradually expanded due to security and safety reasons, especially 
since the 9/11/2001 attacks, and these have apparently added to the management 
expenses of the ferry operators76.  
 
4.2 The Impact of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) 
     The IMS-GT program has increased the number of foreign visitors and 
Indonesians who cross the borders. The purposes of their visits are manifold: business, 
holiday, family reunion and so on. In this section, the impacts of the IMS-GT on both 
foreign and Indonesian visitors are discussed in the light of ferry transportation. 
Statistics were also gathered and discussed here in order to shed more light on the 
situation above.  
 
4.2.1 Foreign Passengers 
     The IMS-GT brought about significant impact directly and indirectly to the Riau 
Islands. In this section, four flagship projects (as well as related ones) of the IMS-GT 
are discussed as a direct impact to attract business and holiday travelers, while tourism 
for sex and gambling are investigated as an indirect one.  
     The four flagship projects were Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Bintan Beach 
International Resort (BBIR), Bintan Industrial Estate (BIE) and Karimun Marine and 
Industrial Complex (KMIC). BIP is one of the industrial estates in Batam, and 
regarded as a symbol of the Growth Triangle program. BIP as well as other estates 
have attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) and created employment in Batam. 
Commuters and business travelers visit these industrial estates by ferry. Although it is 
                                                  




difficult to measure the ratio of foreign visitors for business compared to the total 
visitors number, it is fair to say that they are one of the biggest groups traveling to 
Batam and have significantly contributed to an increase in the number of ferry trips 
between Singapore and Batam, judging from Batam’s economy with foreign 
manufacturing companies at the center and a population with more than one million in 
the island (see section 2.1.3 for detail). However, industrial estates in Batam currently 
face competition with other estates in other areas in Indonesia and other countries such 
as China and Vietnam. For instance, 6,000 jobs were lost between 2005 and 2010 due 
to the closure of factories77. In addition, the upgrading of the economic framework in 
the Riau Islands since the 2000s to attract FDI did not contribute significantly to job 
creation. As a result, demand to visit these industrial estates is not as strong as before.  
     Compared to BIP and other similar industrial estates, BIE and KMIC are smaller. 
BIE created a new route between itself and Singapore for business travelers, but the 
ferries run only on weekdays and the port is for their exclusive use. Judging from a 
small number of tenants in KMIC stated by Peachey, Perry and Grundy-Warr (1998: 
43-44), it is estimated that KMIC only contributed slightly to an increase in the sea 








                                                  
77 Wulandari, 2012: 24. Although the reasons for factory closures were not stated, increasing 
wages was pointed out as one reason in the media [see, for example, Jakarta Post, “Increasing 
Wages Driving Investors out of Batam”, Jul 15, 2014, (Digital Source)] 
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Fig 4.1: Number of Foreign Visitors to Bintan and Karimun 
 
Source: See Fig 1.2 
 
Table 4.3: Nationality of Foreign Tourists to the Riau Islands, 2011 [Thousands] 
 Batam Tg. Pinang Bintan Resort Tg. Balai 
Singapore 695 (60) 72 (68) 108 (32) 39 (37) 
Malaysia 154 (13) 13 (12) * 61 (59) 
South Korea 48 (4) 
* 
26 (8) 
4 (4) * 
The Philippines 35 (3) 
* 
India 27 (2) 
China 22 (2) 2 (2) 30 (9) 
Japan 
215 (16) * 20 (18) * 
24 (7) 
Others 149 (44) 
Total 1,161 (100) 106 (100) 337 (100) 104 (100) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses refer to percentages of the total. 
* Included as Others 
Source: Kepulauan Riau in Figures (2012) 
 
 
      BBIR and other resort areas created new ferry routes for resort tourists. A stable 
number of tourists traveled using the Singapore–BBIR route annually (see Bintan 
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Resort in Fig 4.1)78. Beginning in 1994, passenger numbers reached its peak in 2001, 
totaling 347,000. Although it experienced a decline in the mid-2000s, it recovered with 
330,000 in 2011. BBIR became the second busiest port for foreign visitors to the Riau 
Islands after Batam Centre. The characteristic of this route was that the ratio of 
Singaporeans was less compared to the others. For instance, it formed only 32% of 
total passengers in 2011, followed by the Chinese, South Koreans and Japanese (see 
Bintan Resort in Table 4.3). It is a holiday destination not only for Singaporeans but 
also for other nationalities. Despite a few negative effects since its beginning79, there is 
still a stable number of passengers using this route.  
The resort areas in Batam, i.e. Nongsa and Waterfront, are smaller compared to 
BBIR. However, they also created new ferry routes from Singapore in the 1990s and 
the number of foreign visitors on these routes formed more than 10% of the total to 
Batam in 2012. Although some visitors to Nongsa head for the neighboring industrial 
estate, most of them enter Nongsa for a holiday. In 2000, 196,000 foreigners entered 
Indonesia through these ports: 66,000 in Nongsa and 131,000 in Waterfront. However, 
these numbers decreased to 121,000 in 2012: 78,000 in Nongsa and 43,000 in 
Waterfront (Batam Port Corporation). The direct trip to Waterfront was abolished and 
consequently the number of ferry trips in Nongsa increased in 2014 compared to 2001 
(see Fig 3.7).  
     The IMS-GT has unintentionally brought out other types of travelers to the Riau 
Islands: tourists for sex and gambling. As the traveling time to Tanjung Balai has 
shortened from more than four hours in 1980 to one and half hours, the island has 
become more accessible from Singapore. Based on statistics, Chan (1996: 24, 27, 35) 
                                                  
78 This number also includes passengers to Lobam, an industrial estate. However, most of the 
passengers enter through BBIR. 
79 For example, tourists were worried about social unrest and stayed away during the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997-98 (Lyons and Ford, 2007: 242). Bunnel, Muzaini and Sidaway (2006) 
reported a large demonstration at the entrance of the area in 2000.   
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argued that sex tourism there started in 199380. Subsequently, other business ventures 
sprung up to cater to these weekend visitors: supermarkets, jackpot houses, gambling 
dens, karaoke lounges and discotheques. Although much has been mentioned in the 
literature about capital-intensive industries on Karimun, it was the establishment of 
brothels and the commercial sex industry that was more commonly cited as the 
‘beginning’ of its development. Most respondents located this beginning to between 
1996 and 199781. It is estimated that the shortening of the traveling time due to 
introduction of a high-speed craft accelerated an increase in the number of visitors to 
Tanjung Balai.  
In addition, Ford and Lyons (2008) in their study of sex tourism in the Riau 
Islands argued that the foreigner-dependent sector of the sex industry experienced a 
massive expansion after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, when the purchasing 
power of Singaporean and Malaysian sex tourists increased as the Indonesian Rupiah 
depreciated by more than five times. Around the year 2000, Tanjung Balai experienced 
a sex industry-led construction boom, with some 50 new hotels being built. The 
industry began to decline in 2003 as a result of various factors such as a downturn in 
the Singaporean economy in 2002 and the SARS epidemic of 2003. There was an even 
more dramatic downturn in the sex industry in the second half of 2005 when gambling 
was made illegal by the Indonesian government. The sex industry, which had been 
closely tied to gambling, was badly affected82.  
     It is suggested that there is a link between the factors discussed above and the 
                                                  
80 In 1992, Singaporeans made up 84.93% of total tourists (6,179 out of 7,275) to Tanjung Balai in 
Karimun Island, and 90% were male visitors. The purpose of visiting Karimun for pleasure (99%) 
surpassed other purposes such as business and social visitations. 
81 Ho, Shu Ping, 2002, Tanjong Balai Karimun: A Case Study of an Indonesian Town in Transition, 
Unpublished Honors Thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, pp.26, 46. 
According to her observation, the ferries (of between 100 to 200 seats) were usually filled to 
capacity with men in around 2000.  
82 Ford, Michele and Lenore Lyons, 2008, “Making the best of what you’ve got”, in Michele Ford 
and Lyn Parker (eds.), Women and Work in Indonesia, London: Routledge, pp.178-179. 
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number of foreign tourists to Tanjung Balai. It was increasing up to 1999 when it 
reached 275,000. However, it experienced a decline since, totaling 107,000 in 2012, 
which is approximately 40% compared to that in 1999. Foreign tourists’ visits 
increased even during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 but began to decline at the 
beginning of the 2000s. Since the government’s decision to make gambling illegal in 
2005, it declined even further. Thus, Fig 3.7 shows a decreasing number of ferry trips 
between Singapore and Tanjung Balai from 2001 to 2014. There were more than ten 
return trips in 2001, but it decreased to less than five in 2014. As for the nationality of 
the tourists, most of them were Singaporeans or Malaysians. Until around 2000, the 
largest number of visitors, more than two thirds, was Singaporeans, followed by 
Malaysians. Subsequently, this ratio began to change83. The ratio of Malaysians 
increased and reached approximately 60% in 2011 (see Tanjung Balai in Table 4.3). It 
is also suggested that the number of foreign visitors declined as that of Singaporeans 
declined.  
     The stories similar to the one in Tanjung Balai were also found in Tanjung 
Pinang and Batam. In Tanjung Pinang, there has been a sharp rise in working-class 
tourism since the introduction of the IMS-GT. Some of the visitors came to see their 
families, to buy cheap goods or to visit places of which they had fond memories from 
their trips to the islands in their youth. However, most working-class men came in 
search of sex, gambling, cheap alcohol and drugs. In 2005, one respondent in Tanjung 
Pinang observed: 
 “Many Singaporeans came here in the 1990s … The hotels were full … 
People from other parts of Indonesia flooded here because they thought they’d 
be lots of opportunities. There were so many Singaporeans at that time!” 
 
However, Tanjung Pinang’s “honeymoon” period with Singaporean tourists did not last. 
                                                  
83 Karimun in Figures (various years) and Kepulauan Riau in Figures (various years) 
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The town’s reliance on the tourism industry further entrenched its marginal position 
within the IMS-GT and reinforced its inability to control the pace and direction of its 
future economic and social development84.  
     Like the trend in Tanjung Balai, it is also suggested that there is a link between 
the factors discussed and the number of foreign tourists. The number of foreign tourists 
visiting Tanjung Pinang kept increasing until 2001 when it reached approximately 
210,000 (see Fig 4.1). The number was observed to be in an increasing trend 
throughout the 1990s. However, it has declined since, totaling 104,000 in 2012, which 
is roughly half the number during the peak period. Consequently, the number of ferry 
trips between Singapore and Tanjung Pinang decreased between 2001 and 2014 (see 
Fig 3.7). There were more than ten daily return trips in 2001, but it decreased to less 
than ten in 2014. As the number of tourists with so-called “special” purposes declined, 
the overall number of tourists decreased. Ford and Lyons (2006) claimed that this city 
was marginalized from the IMS-GT development, and the decrease in the number of 
ferry trips bears support for their argument. As for the nationalities of the passengers, 
the largest number of passengers, more than two thirds, were Singaporeans. This was 
followed by Malaysians85 (see Tanjung Pinang in Table 4.3). As the number of 
Singaporeans declined, the number of overall foreign tourists declined accordingly.  
     As for Batam, The Straits Times reported that around 600 Singaporean men 
visited the island every Saturday in 200486. This worked out to around 31,200 
[multiply 600 by 52 (weeks)] men who visited Batam annually at that time. This 
number itself is large, but it forms only a small percent of the total number as more 
                                                  
84 Ford, Michele and Lenore Lyons, 2006, “The Borders within: Mobility and Enclosure in the 
Riau Islands”, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.47, No.2, pp.266-267. 
85 This trend lasts for over the last twenty years [Kepulauan Riau in Figures (various years) and 
Tanjung Pianng in Figures (various years)].  
86 The Straits Times, “It’s Saturday- 600 S’pore Men Hit Batam for Sex”, Mar 22, 2004 (Digital 
Source). Although Ford and Lyons (2008) found it difficult to verify this number, their interviews 
with sex workers and NGO workers in Tanjung Balai supported the findings of this survey. 
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than a million foreigners visit Batam annually. Compared to Tanjung Balai and 
Tanjung Pinang, the proportion they formed of the total visitors was smaller. 
     Thus, it is crucial to point out that a decline in the “night” business in Tanjung 
Balai and Tanjung Pinang led to a decrease in the number of foreign visitors. In 2001, 
there were more than ten daily return trips in the Singapore–Tanjung Pinang route and 
the Singapore–Tanjung Balai route, but they decreased to less than ten in 2014 (see Fig 
3.7). In addition, based on my fieldwork, the Singapore–Tanjung Batu route was 
abolished due to the similar reason of declining passengers.  
 
4.2.2 Indonesian Passengers 
     Indonesian passengers come from other parts of Indonesia and are residents in 
the Riau Islands. For Indonesians from other areas, the Riau Islands are a transit point. 
Although statistics do not disaggregate Indonesian tourists by place of residence, it is 
common knowledge that many Indonesians leaving through Batam in particular come 
from elsewhere in the archipelago, as it is far cheaper to take an internal flight to 
Batam and make the ferry crossing to Singapore, or less commonly, to Malaysia, than 
to fly directly from Jakarta or other major Indonesian cities. In addition, all 
Indonesians pay less exit tax (or fiskal) if they leave by land or sea. Batam’s status as a 
transit point for Indonesian tourists leaving for Singapore has had a significant impact 
on its economy (Lyons and Ford, 2007: 245-246). The exit tax system was phased out 
thereafter and completely abolished on 1st Jan 2011. However, Batam still functions as 
a transit place. Moreover, according to one interviewee, Indonesians play an important 
role in the ferry business yearly as official gatherings or meetings in Indonesia are 
frequently held in Batam. Thereafter, some attendees visit Singapore for leisure87.  
                                                  
87 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013 
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     The situation investigated also applies to the Riau Islands–Johor State routes. 
For example, New Straits Times reported two Indonesian passengers who entered 
Batam from Malaysia as a transit point for homecoming: one headed for Padang in 
Sumatra Island via Batam and the other left for Surabaya in Java Island, also via 
Batam. Both of them entered Batam by ferry and headed for their destinations by plane. 
Most Indonesians travel to Batam Island for their connecting flights or ferries to other 
parts of Indonesia88. In addition, according to the operators and the agents, the number 
of Indonesian passengers exceeds Malaysian passengers. They named Indonesian 
workers (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia) first when I asked them who is the biggest group 
transiting through this port. Moreover, most of the passengers to Tanjung Pengelih and 
Tanjung Belungkor land at these ports just to enter Malaysia, but leave Malaysia via 
other points89.  
     Riau Islanders continued to enter Singapore on tourist passes and worked as 
temporary workers as Lyons and Ford (2007: 251-253, 256) pointed out. Indonesians 
are recruited as cleaners and domestic helpers during key cultural and religious 
festivals such as Chinese New Year and Idul Fitri, and as seamstresses and handymen. 
These periods also attract significant numbers of hawkers and traders who sell goods 
in markets Singapore. Indonesians women from the islands also enter Singapore on 
tourist passes to work temporarily in the local sex industry. There are also groups of 
migrant workers who move across the border on a daily and weekly basis to work 
illegally in Singapore and Malaysia.  
                                                  
88 New Straits Times, “JOHOR BAHRU: The Balik Kampung Rush Has Started at the Stulang Laut 
Ferry Terminal Here, the Biggest Ferry Terminal in the south Serving Batam Island and Bintan 
Island in Indonesia”, Jul 28, 2013 (Digital Source).  
89 According to the staff at Tanjung Pengelih Port, most of the passengers to these areas were 
Indonesian workers, and their final destinations were not neighboring areas near the ports, but other 
cities in Malaysia (Interview in December 2013). In addition, the statistics shed more light on the 
situation. The number of passengers (42,176) from Riau Islands to Tanjung Belungkor exceeded 




     In addition, the number of Riau Islanders who visit Singapore for pleasure 
increases every year. For example, according to one of the interviewees, travel to 
Singapore for pleasure became more and more affordable for Riau Islanders as their 
purchasing power increased annually90. During my fieldwork in Batam and Bintan, I 
also met several people who have visited Singapore for leisure. The role that 
Indonesian passengers play in the ferry transportation has become bigger.  
     To shed more light on the above situation, the statistics of the Singapore Tourism 
Board and Batam are reviewed. The compilation of statistics on the number of 
Indonesians who entered Singapore via sea started in 1994. At that time, 0.37 million 
Indonesians entered Singapore via sea (see Fig 4.2). The number increased until 2006 
when it reached 0.94 million. Despite a dip in 2009, it recovered to 0.83 million in 
201291. The number of Indonesian passengers increased steadily. Fig 4.3 shows the 
number of Indonesians who left for Singapore and Malaysia from Batam between 2000 
and 2012. The point is that there were more passengers who left Batam than those who 
came to Batam. The former exceeds the latter within the range of 60,000 to 220,000 
people annually between 2000 and 2012. It is proposed that some of returning 
Indonesian passengers did not go through Batam. This finding supports the view that 






                                                  
90 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013 
91 According to Lyons and Ford (2007), this figure also includes some Indonesian foreign domestic 




Fig 4.2: Number of Indonesians who Entered Singapore by Sea 
 
Source: Singapore Tourism Board, Annual Tourism Statistics (various years) 
 
 
Fig: 4.3: Number of Indonesians who Went Overseas by Sea 
 
Source: Batam Port Corporation (Author’s collection) 
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4.3 The Role of General and Specific External Factors 
     The IMS-GT brought about an impact on the ferry transportation over a long 
time. However, it was occasionally affected by both general and specific external 
factors as discussed below.  
During my fieldwork, I interviewed ferry operators regarding general factors 
that affected their business. These included the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the 
Reformasi (= political changes in Indonesia in 1998), the formation of the Riau Islands 
Province (2002), the SARS outbreak (2003) and the formation of Free Trade Zone 
(FTZ) in Batam, Bintan, and Karimun Island (2009). According to them, the effects of 
economic-related events were significant. Two of them answered that events such as 
the Reformasi, the formation of the Riau Islands Province and FTZ did not affect the 
number of the passengers substantially. One reason is that the Reformasi happened in 
Jakarta, far away from Batam. The other reason is that political events such as the 
Reformasi did not affect their business because they operated ferries on the sea, not on 
land. Instead, other events such as the Asian Financial Crisis and SARS affected their 
business significantly. Operators’ annual reports confirmed this view because one 
operator experienced a 17% decrease in the total passenger volume in 1998 due to the 
Asian Financial Crisis. In 2003, another operator experienced a 15% drop in passenger 
volume due to the SARS outbreak92. Unexpectedly, the haze problem and increases in 
the fuel price also affected their business. The haze caused many cancellations. The 
fuel price has remained high since 1997 and it forms more than half to three quarters of 
the operators’ expenditure93. In comparison, the effects of political-related events were 
relatively small: none of them stated the formation of the Riau Islands Province and 
                                                  
92 Sembawang Marine & Logistics Ltd, Annual Report 1998, p.21 and Penguin Boat International 
Ltd, Annual Report 2003, p11. 
93 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013, at Batam Fast Pte Ltd and 
Berlian Ferries Pte Ltd in August 2013. 
91 
 
FTZ as contributory factors. Rather, the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, SARS, 
increases in the fuel price and the haze were more significant.  
     Considering these replies, increases in the fuel price, especially since the late 
1990s, need to be investigated as a specific factor affecting the ferry industry. Although 
ferry companies operating in the region around Singapore are exempted from paying 
fuel tax to each government of the GT94, the increases in the fuel price were 
highlighted in their annual reports. Penguin Annual Report stated a sharp annual 
increase in the fuel price three times since the late 1990s: (1) more than 55% in 1999, 
(2) not less than 45% in 2001 and (3) 40% in 2004. As a result, operators took various 
countermeasures such as collaboration with several operators through Code Share 
Agreements95 and the introduction of a fuel surcharge for ferries departing from 
Singapore in August 200596. Thus, one may speculate a decrease in the number of ferry 
trips due to an increase in the fuel price.  
     In addition, competition in the ferry industry needs to be discussed as the other 
specific factor. It exists in every industry, and the ferry operations in the Riau Islands 
are no exception. The 1990s was an expansion era. Although a few operators stopped 
their operations, others expanded their activities at that time. However, this business 
environment began to change since the late 1990s. Competition was highlighted in 
operators’ annual reports. For example, SML Annual Report 1997 pointed out keen fare 
competition as one of the reasons of dampened profitability in its Riau Islands services. 
Penguin Annual Report 2002 to 2006 reported intensifying competition and the 
ensuing erosion of ticket prices. They even implied the possibility of the 
self-elimination of weaker competitors. As expected, a few operators left the market, 
                                                  
94 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013. The reason is that they cross 
the border.  
95 Penguin Boat International Ltd, Annual Report 2000, 2002 and 2004 




and code-sharing operations started in a few routes to deal with competition97. Under 
these circumstances, three more operators entered the market since the 2010s, and 
existing operators face keen competition again. On the other hand, some operators 
formed a consortium for mutual benefit in the Riau Islands–Johor State routes. They 
change time slots regularly and split the revenue equally.  
     The points discussed so far were also observed in official statistics. In Batam, 
the number of foreign tourist arrivals generally was increasing until 2004 when it 
reached 1.52 million (see Fig 4.4). The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 should have 
affected the number of tourists, but it kept increasing mainly due to the opening of the 
Waterfront resort area in the late 1990s and an increase in Singaporeans’ purchasing 
power brought by the depreciation of the Indonesian Rupiah. Therefore, it is estimated 
that these factors reversed a decline in the total number of passengers. The reason the 
number increased during the SARS outbreak in 2003 is not clear. Since 2004, it has 











                                                  
97 Code-sharing operations do not currently exist.  
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Fig 4.4: Number of Foreign Visitors to Batam by Nationality 
 
Source: Batam in Figures (various years) 
 
     Visitors’ nationalities vary but the majority is Singaporeans. They consistently 
form 50-70% of total foreign visitors since the 1990s. The second biggest group is 
Malaysians who have steadily formed approximately 10% every year. In 2011, the 
ratio of Singaporeans was about 60% of the total number of foreign visitors followed 
by Malaysians, South Koreans, Filipinos and Indians (see Batam in Table 4.3). 
However, it is crucial to point out that the number of Singaporeans visiting Batam 
shows a downward trend compared to the number of overall foreign visitors (see Fig 
4.4). Although the latter is recovering to the level in 2000, the former still shows a sign 
of stagnation. It is suggested that Singaporean’s interests in Batam have decreased. 
Instead, the passenger number of other nationalities such as Malaysians showed an 





4.4 Case Studies 
In this section, three international ferry companies are studied for insights into 
the sea transportation in light of the IMS-GT. Firstly, Bintan Resort Ferries Pte Ltd is 
researched because of its unique ownership. A government-linked corporation in 
Singapore and an Indonesian conglomerate jointly own the company. Secondly, Indo 
Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd is discussed to trace its trajectory for more than 20 
years as a medium-scale operator in the region. Finally, Batam Fast Ferry Pte Ltd is 
investigated for its development during nearly 30 years as a big ferry operator.  
 
4.4.1 Bintan Resort Ferries Pte Ltd 
     Bintan Resort Ferries Pte Ltd (BRF) began its operation in 1994. Thus far, its 
business environment has been favorable as a whole. BRF was set up as a joint venture 
by PT. Bintan Resort Corporation, Jurong Marine Services Pte Ltd and Kvaerner 
Fjellstrand (S) Pte Ltd98. BRF launched its service for the opening of the Bintan Beach 
International Resort (BBIR). BRF operated two daily return trips at the beginning99, 
and it has gradually increased the number of trips since. As of 2014, it operates 5 to 7 
daily return trips between Tanah Merah and Bandar Bentan Terani (BBT), and 1 to 2 
trip(s) on weekdays between Tanah Merah and Lobam100.  
     BRF’s shareholders have changed since beginning operations, but BRF is 
fundamentally backed by large companies in Singapore and Indonesia. Before its 
restructuring exercise in 2006, BRF was owned by SCI Group (30%) and PT. Bintan 
Resort Cakrawala (70%). Temasek, an investment company in Singapore, was the 
                                                  
98 The Business Times, “Second Ferry Joins Bintan Resort Service”, May 18, 1995 (Digital Source). 
The last company is a Norwegian ferry manufacturer which supplied the first two ferries.  
99 The Business Times, “More Ferries to Bintan”, Jun 10, 1995 (Digital Source).  
100 Singatac Engineering Pte Ltd, 2011, Singatac Offshore Centre @ Bintan, p.4 (accessed in April 




ultimate holding company of the former and the Salim Group, an Indonesian 
conglomerate, had a strong relationship with the latter. After the restructuring exercise, 
approximately 88% shares of BRF were owned by Gallant Venture Ltd, an investment 
holding company. Their key shareholders include the Salim Group and Sembcorp 
Industries Ltd, a government-linked corporation in Singapore101. Gallant Venture 
regards this ferry business as its resort operations business, one of its four business 
pillars102. It seems that BRF is an outcome of the IMS-GT considering its shareholders.  
     The Tanah Merah–BBT route is operated by only BRF right from the start, but 
Mozaic Hotels and Resorts Pte Ltd established a new route in a neighboring port in 
2012. A competitor appeared for the first time in eighteen years. However, as BRF’s 
related company owns and operates the BBT terminal, other existing operators 
apparently find it difficult to enter into BRF’s route. As a result, they set a relatively 
high fare compared to the others, especially during the weekends103. It is suggested 
that BRF’s ferry operation business is relatively still stable. 
      
4.4.2 Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd 
     Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd (Indo Falcon) was established in 1990 as 
a shipping agent to an Indonesian company with one ferry. Its management had 
predicted a tremendous growth in the area and expected high margins from the ferry 
business. Besides ferry operation and chartering, their business includes a shipping and 
                                                  
101 Gallant Venture Ltd, 2006, IPO Prospectus: Prospectus Dated 28 April 2006, pp.58, 63, 64 
(Digital Source).  
102 Gallant Venture Ltd, Annual Report 2011, p.17. BRF is currently a subsidiary of Gallant 
Venture which holds more than 90% of BRF’s shares.  
103 I compared the BRF fare (TMFT–Bintan route) with the SINDO one (TMFT–Tanjung Pinang 
route) in March 2014 by checking each operator’s website. The former (S$82 for a return trip for an 
adult during weekdays) was higher than the latter (Around S$48 for an adult everyday) even 
though SINDO operates a longer route. 
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a travel agent104. Indo Falcon is one of the oldest ferry operators in this area. As of 
March 2014, they ply the Harbour Front–Tanjung Balai, Tanah Merah–Nongsa and 
Tanah Merah–Tanjung Pinang routes.  
     In the 1990s, there was a capital relationship between Indo Falcon and Penguin 
Boat International Limited (Penguin). In 1993, Heng Kheng Seng, the founder of 
Penguin, took a 25% stake in Indo Falcon as an individual. Penguin also chartered its 
ferry to Indo Falcon in the same year. In 1997, Penguin acquired Heng’s entire stake in 
Indo Falcon105, although they apparently sold the stake thereafter.  
    Under the implementation of the IMS-GT, Indo Falcon has changed its operating 
routes after taking into account competition with other operators. As a medium-scale 
operator, they chose routes from Singapore, which were less competitive. In the early 
1990s, they operated the routes to and from Sekupang and Tanjung Pinang. In the late 
1990s, they added the routes to and from Tanjung Batu and Waterfront, while they 
terminated the route to and from Sekupang. In the 2000s, they added the route to and 
from Tanjung Balai, while they terminated the routes to and from Tanjung Batu and 
Waterfront (although irregular trips still remain). The reasons were low passenger 
loads and fierce competition from other operators106. Despite several such adverse 
circumstances, Indo Falcon grew steadily over these twenty years. 
 
4.4.3 Batam Fast Ferry Pte Ltd 
     Batam Fast Ferry Pte Ltd (Batam Fast), one of the biggest operators in the area, 
started its operation between Singapore and Batam in 1985 with two ferries, before the 
IMS-GT program started. As mentioned before, Batam was a transition point from 
other Indonesian islands such as Sumatra, Kalimantan and neighboring small islands. 
                                                  
104 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013 
105 Penguin Boat International Ltd, Prospectus dated 6 October 1997, p.24. 
106 Interview at Indo Falcon Shipping & Travel Pte Ltd in July 2013 
97 
 
Passengers from these islands entered Singapore via Batam. Batam Fast was 
established for the convenience of those passengers107. It is estimated that PT. Bintan 
Baruna Sakti was established first and Seaflyte Ferry Service Pte Ltd (Seaflyte) was 
established later. Subsequently, Seaflyte, the operating title for Sakti, was restructured 
as Batam Fast in 2006 (Fast Ferry International, Sep 1993: 29 and Mar 2007: 32). 
Batam’s status as a transit point, discussed in section 4.2, has already started in the 
1980s.  
     Batam Fast’s activity has kept pace with the overall ferry network in the Riau 
Islands. Its activities continuously increased until 1997 when they introduced four 
ferries. Subsequently, it remained relatively constant until 2001. Since the 2000s, the 
number of its ferry trips decreased slightly from 38 daily return trips in 2001 to 31-34 
trips in 2014108. They operate four routes with thirteen ferries as of March 2014: the 
Harbour Front (HF)–Batam Centre route, the HF–Sekupang route, the HF–Harbour 
Bay route and the Tanah Merah–Nongsa route. They used to operate routes to other 
ports such as Tanjung Pinang, Tanjung Balai and Lobam, but they stopped these 
operations in the 2000s. Within the Riau Islands, their operating routes currently focus 
only on Batam. They expanded and adjusted their operation network in accordance 
with the development of the IMS-GT program. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
For international routes, the ferry operators need to observe not only the laws 
and the regulations in the countries concerned but also international regulations. 
Among the three countries, the laws and the regulations in Singapore are the most 
stringent. International regulations have become increasingly important for ferry 
                                                  
107 Interview at Batam Fast Pte Ltd in August 2013 




operators to abide by because requirements from the authorities have gradually 
expanded due to security and safety reasons, especially since the September 11, 2011 
attacks.  
As for ferry ports, the Singapore government constructed two terminals during 
the 1990s to cater to the increasing number of passengers, and this strategy succeeded. 
In the Riau Islands, ports for resort tourists opened in the 1990s and they are operated 
by their respective developers. The unique point in Batam is the role of Batam 
Indonesia Free Zone Authority (BIFZA) as it is actively involved in upgrading the port 
facilities in Batam. In the Johor State, administrators opened ports one after another to 
connect to Singapore. Unlike Singapore and Batam, the Johor authority does not put 
much emphasis apparently on upgrading its port terminals.  
     The introduction of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle 
(IMS-GT) accelerated the expansion of the ferry network. As a direct impact factor, the 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) as well as other industrial estates in Batam 
significantly contributed to an increase in the number of ferry trips between Singapore 
and Batam. The resort project in Bintan was one of the IMS-GT flagship projects, and 
it created a new route. As an indirect impact factor, ports such as Tanjung Balai and 
Tanjung Pinang flourished due to the “night” business since the mid-1990s. However, 
the Riau Islands became less vibrant in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. The number 
of foreign tourists to Batam reached its peak in 2004, but decreased thereafter. In 2012, 
Batam, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai recovered 80%, 50% and 40% respectively 
of foreign passengers compared to their peak periods, while the Bintan resort attracted 
a stable number of visitors. 
The number of Indonesian passengers has increased steadily. Not only Riau 
Islanders, but also Indonesians from other parts of Indonesia cross the borders for 
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business and pleasure. The Riau Islands has become increasingly essential as a transit 
point for them and the role that Indonesian passengers play in the ferry transportation 
has become bigger in comparison to foreign passengers.  
     External factors have occasionally affected the ferry transportation in the Riau 
Islands. Since the late 1990s, general factors such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
SARS outbreak in 2003 occurred one after another. In addition, specific factors such as 
sharp increases in fuel prices since the late 1990s and severe competition among the 
ferry companies made a few operators leave the market. Consequently, operators 
implemented various countermeasures such as introducing fuel surcharges and 
decreasing the number of trips. Increases in fuel prices were especially crucial in 
accelerating the decrease in the number of ferry trips.  
     Finally, three operators are investigated as case studies. Despite competitor’s 
appearance in 2012, the business environment of Bintan Resort Ferries has been 
favorable as a whole due to the stable support of big corporations. Batam Fast has 
expanded and adjusted its operation network in accordance with the development of 
the IMS-GT program, while Indo Falcon has changed its operating routes in 












DOMESTIC FERRY TRANSPORTATION IN THE RIAU ISLANDS: 
TRENDS, PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS 
 
     This chapter examines the domestic ferry transportation in the Riau Islands, 
especially Batam, Bintan and Karimun Islands. Section 5.1 presents the changing 
trends and patterns of the domestic ferry network in the Riau Islands, divided into 
three periods: the 1990s, the 2000s and the year 2013. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss 
these changes from various perspectives. Section 5.2.1 introduces the first perspective 
in terms of the role of the Indonesian government. Section 5.2.2 presents the second 
perspective in terms of the impact of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth 
Triangle (IMS-GT), and the role of external factors. Section 5.3 discusses the third 
perspective through the case studies of two state-owned enterprises to illustrate their 
roles in the Riau Islands. These are PT. Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia (PELNI) and PT. 













Fig 5.1: Domestic Ports in Batam (3), Bintan (3), Karimun (1) and Kundur (1) Islands 
 






5.1 Domestic Ferry Transportation in the Riau Islands: Trends and Patterns 
5.1.1 Introduction 
     This section focuses on domestic routes and ports. In Batam, Bintan and 
Karimun, there are seven domestic passenger ports: three in Batam, three in Bintan and 
one in Karimun (see Fig 5.1). In addition, Tanjung Batu (Ku1) in Kundur Island is an 
intersection of the sea routes in the Riau Islands. In Batam, there are three domestic 
passenger ports: Telaga Punggur (Ba1), Sekupang (Ba2) and Harbour Bay (Ba3). 
Telaga Punggur, the eastern gateway into and out of Batam, includes a domestic 
terminal (see Fig 5.2) and the PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry (ASDP) terminal. Sekupang, 
the western gateway into and out of Batam, includes a domestic terminal (see Fig 5.3), 
an interisland port and a big berth used by PT. PELNI. In Bintan, there are three 
domestic ports: Tanjung Pinang/Sri Bintan Pura (Bi1), Tanjung Uban (Bi2, the 
speedboat109 terminal and the ASDP terminal) and Kijang (Bi3, for the PELNI’s 
exclusive use). In Karimun, the Tanjung Balai port (Ka1) has two separate terminals: a 
domestic and an interisland terminal (Sri Tanjung Gelam, see Fig 5.4). Its interisland 
terminal is in the vicinity of the domestic terminal.  
Fig 5.2: Telaga Punggur Port (Domestic) 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
                                                  
109 A speedboat (SB) is a passenger boat which has the engines outside its hull, while a ferry refers 
to a passenger speed ship which has engines inside its hull (interview at Batam Port Office in 
October 2013).  
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Fig 5.3: Sekupang Port (Domestic) 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
Fig 5.4: Tanjung Balai Port (Interisland) 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
For domestic routes, there are several long- and middle-distance operators and 
many short-distance operators. In this research, long- and middle-distance routes are 
defined as fixed routes with fixed prices and timetables. Long-distance routes refer to 
those that connect the Riau Islands with distant islands such as Sumatra, Anambas and 
Lingga Islands. Middle-distance routes are routes to neighboring islands such as from 
Batam to Bintan, Karimun and Kundur. A short-distance route is defined as a fixed 
route with a fixed price but without a timetable. For this, operators primarily use a 
small boat with motors. This research does not discuss this category. 
104 
 
In the literature, state-owned enterprises are frequently discussed [see, for 
example, Rutz and Coull (1996) and Centre of Policy Analysis (2011)]. However, it is 
also recognized that private operators play a big role in the Riau Islands, and as such, 
their operations and contributions are discussed in this chapter. As for the ownership of 
domestic operators, two enterprises are state-owned and headquartered in Jakarta. One 
is PT. PELNI which operates long-distance routes to connect the Riau Islands with 
distant islands such as Java and Sumatra. The other is PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry 
which operates the routes between Batam and the neighboring islands. Other operators 
are under private management. They operate ferries and speedboats (see Figures 5.5 





Fig 5.5: A Ferry 
 












Fig 5.6: A Speedboat 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
     Using these ferries and speedboats, in 2010, 0.6 million passengers entered 
Tanjung Pinang, and in 2011, 1.41 million passengers entered Batam, 0.5 million to 
Tanjung Balai, and 0.19 million to Tanjung Batu (see Fig 5.1). Besides being the nexus 
for international routes, Batam is also the hub of domestic routes in the Riau Islands. 
In Batam, Telaga Punggor (with 0.73 million passengers) and Sekupang (with 0.63 
million passengers) are its two major ports (Kepulauan Riau in Figures, 2011, and 
Batam in Figures, 2012).  
     Based on information and interviews during my fieldwork, Figures 5.7 and 5.8 
were drawn to indicate the changing trends and patterns of the domestic ferry networks 
in the Riau Islands and Tanjung Balai respectively. Only major routes are included in 
the figures. The periods in each figure were selected to understand the general trend in 
each decade. Therefore, they exactly indicate neither the peak nor bottom periods. The 
next three sections (5.1.2 to 5.1.4) discuss the changing trends and patterns in the 
domestic network in the three periods of the 1990s, the 2000s, and the year 2013. A 
summary is provided in section 5.1.5.  
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Fig 5.7: Changes of the Domestic Ferry Network in the Riau Islands 
 





Fig 5.8: Changes of the Interisland Ferry Network around Tanjung Balai 
 









5.1.2 The 1990s     
     In the beginning of the 1990s, the ferry network in the Riau Islands was small 
(see Fig 5.7.a), using Kabil as the eastern and Sekupang as the western gateways 
respectively. From Kabil, the route was limited only to Tanjung Pinang, while there 
were a few routes from Sekupang.  
 
Fig 5.7.a: The Network in the Riau Islands at the Beginning of the 1990s 
 
Source: Fig 5.7 (p.106) 
 
     In Kabil, three groups of ferry operators were established in the 1990s. The first 
group is PT. Pelnas Baruna Jaya (Baruna, see Table 5.1). Its owner had the foresight 
that Batam would develop further and established the company in 1990. At that time, it 
plied roughly ten daily round trips between Kabil and Tanjung Pinang by speedboat. 
Subsequently, the function of Kabil was relocated to Telaga Punggur as the number of 
passengers increased in the mid-1990s. Besides this factor, the water in Kabil was 
shallow and only speedboats could call there. At that time, Baruna started to purchase 
ferries to replace speedboats. After the Telaga Punggur port opened, PT. Liba Marindo, 
the second group, started its ferry business. In the late 1990s, Baruna increased its 
number of trips from hourly to half-hourly departures. The economic crisis in 1997 did 
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not affect this route significantly because the ticket price remained reasonably 
affordable for passengers110. 
     The third group consists of operators which ply between Kabil and Tanjung 
Uban in Bintan Island. They started their operations before the Telaga Punggur port 
opened111, which was before the mid-1990s.  
 
Table 5.1: Ferry Operators in Telaga Punggur 
Route Operator 
Telaga Punggur–Tanjung Pinang PT. Liba Marindo (i), PT. Marinatama Gemanusa,  
PT. Pelnas Baruna Jaya,  
Telaga Punggur–Tanjung Uban  
(by ro-ro ferry) 
PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry 
Telaga Punggur–Tanjung Uban 
(by speedboat) 
PT. Anugrah Jala Chandra, PT. Batam Putra Tempatan,  
PT. Cahaya Mulya, PT. Cakrawala Darat Daya,  
PT. Flora Perkasa, PT. Putra Abadi, PT. Surya Indah Abadi 
(i) Ex-operator                      Source: Author’s fieldwork 
      
     Sekupang has two trunk routes. One leads to the north to various destinations 
such as Dumai and Pekanbaru in Sumatra Island via Tanjung Balai and several ports. 
This northern route connects the Riau Islands Province to the northern area in the Riau 
Province. The other route leads to the south to various destinations such as Sungai 
Guntung in Sumatra Island via Tanjung Batu/Moro and several ports. This southern 
route connects the Riau Islands Province to the Jambi Province as well as the southern 
area in Riau Province.  
One of the operators in the northern route is PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari, 
headquartered in Dumai (see Table 5.2). It started its ferry business in 1992. At that 
time, it plied the route between Batam and Dumai via several ports with one ferry. One 
of the purposes in establishing the company was to connect the Riau islands with the 
Riau mainland in Sumatra by ferry for the public. As it takes several hours to travel 
                                                  
110 Interview at PT. Baruna Jaya in September 2013 
111 Interview at PT. Baruna Jaya in September 2013 
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along this route, ferry trips were scheduled every two days. It purchased one more 
ferry in 1993, and increased the number of its ferries throughout the 1990s112. Overall, 
the company had a good business environment in the 1990s due to the positive 
progress of the IMS-GT projects. 
 
Table 5.2: Ferry Operators in Sekupang 
Route Operator and speedboat 
Sekupang–Tanjung Balai–Northern Riau PT. Arena (i), PT. Golden Mutiara Line (i),  
PT. Intran Wijaya (i), PT. Pelnas Baruna Jaya,  
PT. Miko Natalia, PT. Pelnas Batam Bahari Sejahtera,  
Sekupang–Tanjung Batu–Southern Riau and 
Jambi 
PT. Fajar Marindo Raya (i),  
PT. Marinatama Gamanusa, PT. Seatech Win 
Sekupang–Moro–Southern Riau and Jambi PT. Prima Rahmat Abadi, SB. Tenggiri (ii),  
SB. Kurnia (ii), SB. Indra Jaya (ii) 
(i): Ex-operator, (ii): The name of a speedboat            Source: Author’s fieldwork 
 
      One of the operators of the southern route is PT. Marinatama Gemanusa 
(Marina). It was founded in 1991 and is headquartered in Batam. At that time, it plied 
the route between Sekupang and Sungai Guntung in Sumatra Island via Tanjung Batu. 
In 1993, the route was extended from Sungai Guntung to Kuala Tungkal. In addition, 
Marina has operated four daily return trips between Sekupang and Tanjung Batu by 
speedboat since 1998113. 
     The 1990s also saw a succession of new private ferry companies following the 
development of the IMS-GT 114 . It is hypothesized that they established these 




                                                  
112 Interview at PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari in November 2013 
113 Interview at PT. Marinatama Gemanusa in September 2013 
114 For example, PT. Arena, PT. Pelnas Batam Bahari Sejahtera and PT. Intran Wijaya were 
established during this period. 
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5.1.3 The 2000s 
Batam 
     Due to the implementation of the IMS-GT projects, several ferry operators were 
established and the number of ferry passengers in the Riau Islands increased in the 
1990s. Consequently, the beginning of the 2000s saw an expansion of the network 
compared to the 1990s (see Fig 5.7.b). The function of Kabil was relocated to Telaga 
Punggur in the mid-1990s. In several trunk routes departing from Telaga Punggur and 
Sekupang, it is estimated that more than ten daily trips were operated due to the 
establishment of new operators and an increase in the number of trips. Feeder routes 
were also established along the trunk routes. Thus, the number of ferry trips in Telaga 
Punggur reached more than 30 and Sekupang became a busy port. However, the 
operators in these two ports faced a different business environment in the 2000s.  
 
Fig 5.7.b: The Network in the Riau Islands at the Beginning of 2000s 
 
Source: Fig 5.7 (p.106) 
 
     In Telaga Punggur, the formation of the Riau Islands Province in 2002 was a big 
event for the operators. The Riau Islands Regency under the Riau Province became an 
independent province known as the Riau Islands Province. An interviewee at Baruna 
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suggested that some official employment was created due to this formation. As a result, 
several public officers in Tanjung Pinang started to settle down in Batam because of its 
convenient location, and continued to commute to Bintan by ferry. Ferries during peak 
periods have become crowded, and Baruna has increased the number of ferries since 
then115. 
     In Sekupang, the business environment began to deteriorate since the 2000s. PT. 
Arena and PT. Intran Wijaya left the market in the mid-2000s, and PT. Miko Natalia, 
established as an agent in roughly 1996, took over the latter’s operation116. In addition, 
other companies apparently stopped their operations 117 . According to one ferry 
operator, there used to be eight ferry operators with a total of thirteen ships serving 
domestic routes. Three of them with a total of six ferries shut down in mid-2006 (The 
Jakarta Post: Jan 17, 2007).  
 
Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai 
Outside Batam, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai are also hubs of the domestic 
ferry networks in the Riau Islands118. In Tanjung Balai, there are two domestic 
terminals: a domestic and an interisland terminal. The routes from the interisland 
terminal are discussed here as they function as crucial connecting routes to the 
neighboring islands.  
In Tanjung Pinang, the beginning of the 2000s apparently saw the start of the 
development of a domestic ferry network (see Fig 5.7.b). The destinations, except for 
Batam, were limited to a few places such as Singkep Island. New routes had been 
                                                  
115 Interview at PT. Baruna Jaya in September 2013 
116 Interview at PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari in November 2013 
117 They include PT. Fajar Marindo Raya and PT. Golden Mutiara Line, judging from The Jakarta 
Post (“Tough Times for Batam Ferry Operators as Costs Increase”, Jan 17, 2007, Digital Source) 
and observation during my fieldwork. 
118 As the route between Tanjung Pinang and Telaga Punggur is discussed in the Batam section, the 
other routes from Tanjung Pinang are investigated here. 
113 
 
established since. On the one hand, several ferry operators have started to serve the 
ports with more arrivals and departures mainly since the 2000s: to Dabo in Singkep 
and Daik in Lingga Island (which operated for more than ten years), to Dumai via 
several ports (three years), and to Anambas Islands (more than fifteen years). These 
routes, except the one to Anambas Islands, are operating on a daily basis. On the other 
hand, several speedboat operators have started to serve the ports with fewer arrivals 
and departures: to Tanjung Batu via several ports (operating for approximately ten 
years), Selat Beliah in Kundur via several ports (three to five years) and Lobam in 
Bintan (two years). All these routes are served daily119. The speedboat operations are 
apparently a new trend.  
     In Tanjung Balai, the network of the interisland routes was small at the 
beginning of the 2000s (see Fig 5.8.a). Although there were already five destinations, 
the number of daily ferry trips in each route was less than ten. Operators serve these 
routes by speedboat and small ferry (see Fig 5.9). Among them, two trunk routes are 
investigated: Tanjung Balai–Selat Beliah and Tanjung Balai–Tanjung Berlian.  
 
 
Fig 5.8.a: The Interisland Network around Tanjung Balai at the Beginning of the 2000s  
 
Source: Fig 5.8 (p.107) 
 
                                                  
119 A brief Interview with a ticket booth staff in Tanjung Pinang in October 2013 
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Fig 5.9: A Small Ferry 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
     The route to Selat Beliah apparently existed since the 1990s. According to the 
employees from one operator PT. Lompo Batteng (Lompo, see Table 5.3), they started 
their business in 2002. Before that, only one operator plied the route daily. Lompo 
operated roughly nine daily return trips due to a good financial condition. Subsequently, 
several operators entered the market one after another. The fourth operator, PT. Lautan 
Inti Mega, joined this market in 2005. In the late 2000s, PT. Terra Joan Jaya started its 
operation by speedboat. Two other ferry operators have also entered this market 
since120. Based on my interviews, Lompo’s employees recalled that the number of 
passengers in this route increased significantly at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Subsequently, it increased at a more gradual pace. 
     The route to Tanjung Berlian has existed since the 1990s. One employee from 
PT. Ratu Indah Permai stated that it started operating this route in 1996 with a daily 
return trip. Before that, a cargo ship was the sole operator. They purchased two 
speedboats in the mid-2000s, increasing the number of daily trips to three. Around 
2010, a new operator started its speedboat service with two trips121. Based on my 
                                                  
120 Interview at PT. Lompo Batteng in October 2013 




interview, one employee recalled that the number of trips in this route had also 
increased in the 2000s. 
 
Table 5.3: Operators and Agents in the Interisland Terminal, Tanjung Balai 
Destination Operator, Agent 
Selat Beliah PT. Lompo Batteng, PT. Lautan Inti Mega, PT. Terra Joan Jaya 
Tanjung Berlian PT. Latu Indah Permai 
Buru PT. Duta Bahari Sentosa 
Tanjung Batu PT. Pulau Muda Bahtera, PT. Sinar Romindo Indah, PT. Tirta Bahari 
Moro PT. Duta Bahari Sentosa, PT. Awang Pass 
Tanjung Samak PT. Awang Pass, PT. Pulau Muda Bahtera 
Source: Author’s fieldwork 
 
5.1.4 The Year 2013 
Batam 
     As of 2013, three groups of operators in Telaga Punggur have remained the same 
since the 1990s. What changed in recent years was that PT. Marinatama Gemanusa 
(Marina) bought out PT. Liba Marindo’s business in 2011122. Thus, PT. Pelnas Baruna 
Jaya (Baruna) and Marina are currently the two big operators in Telaga Punggur, 
plying the route to Tanjung Pinang every 30 minutes during the day. As a result, 
passengers can board a ferry every fifteen minutes. These two companies also recently 
established new routes. Marina started new routes to Bintan resort (two daily return 
trips, but already abolished) and Singkep Island (daily) in 2012, while Baruna started a 
daily service to Singkep in 2013. 
     In addition, one group plies the route between Telaga Punggur and Tanjung 
Uban in Bintan in fifteen minutes by speedboat. They currently operate ferries every 
30 minutes during the day. The main feature of this route is that several speedboat 
operators form a consortium and they operate by turns (see Table 5.1 for the operators). 
                                                  




The number of ferry trips in this route has remained almost the same since the 
1990s123. 
In Sekupang, the structure of the two trunk routes (the northern and southern 
routes) also has remained the same since the 2000s. One of the operators of the 
northern route is PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari (Dumai Express Group). As of 2013, 
Dumai Express operates three long-distance routes daily: the Dumai–Sekupang, 
Dumai–Tanjung Pinang, and Pekanbaru–Sekupang routes. Each route includes several 
port calls and a bus trip is included in the last one. In 2010, it extended the destination 
from Batam to Tanjung Pinang. It also operates a middle-distance route between 
Batam and Tanjung Balai twice a day. 
     There are two additional ferry operators for the northern route. One is PT. Miko 
Natalia (Miko) which began replacing speedboats with ferries since mid-2000s124, and 
currently operate the routes between Tanjung Balai and Sekupang (four or five daily 
return trips), and between Tanjung Balai and Tanjung Batu (daily). The other is PT. 
Pelnas Batam Bahari Sejahtera (Batam Jet) headquartered in Batam. It started ferry 
operations for the Batam–Dumai route in 1996, and currently operates the same route 
daily with four ferries. According to one employee, Batam Jet and Miko started a joint 
operation between Batam and Selat Panjang in the Riau Province in 2010. Each 
company operates its ferry every two days, offering a daily service to passengers125.  
The second group includes PT. Marinatama Gemanusa (Marina) and PT. Seatech 
Win (Seatech). Their destinations are Sumatra Island via Tanjung Batu and several 
ports. Marina currently has 20 ferries and their routes cover three areas. One of them is 
Sekupang where they operate two southern routes by speedboat with approximately 70 
seats: the Sekupang–Tanjung Batu and Sekupang–Kuala Tungkal routes via several 
                                                  
123 A brief interview with a ticket booth staff in Telaga Punggur in November 2013 
124 Interview at the PT. Miko Natalia ferry counter in October 2013 
125 A brief Interview at PT. Pelnas Batam Bahari Sejahtera in October 2013 
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ports. Seatech is also a speedboat operator for the southern route, headquartered in 
Batam. In 2008, they started operating between Sekupang and Tanjung Batu with two 
daily return trips. 
     In addition, there are speedboat operators that serve the southern route. They call 
at Moro instead of Tanjung Batu on their way to Sumatra Island. One of the operators 
is PT. Prima Rahmat Abadi. Others just own a speedboat and consign ticketing service 
to agents. These operators currently serve a total of four daily return trips. Speedboats 
replaced wooden ships (pompong) and shortened travelling time. “More than 20 years” 
have passed since the first such operations126. 
Besides these two ports, the Harbour Bay domestic port opened next to its 
international port in 2012. PT. Ocean Baruna Jaya is currently the only operator, and 
plies the route between Harbour Bay and Tanjung Balai with six daily return trips by 
ferry. There used to be a few operators at the beginning, but they moved to Sekupang 
after several months. 
     As a result of the change in business environment since the 2000s, operators in 
the two ports in Batam have experienced quite different results (see Fig 5.7.c). On the 
one hand, in Telaga Punggur, the network expanded and the number of ferry trips to 
Tanjung Pinang increased to more than 30. It remains the busiest port in Batam. On the 
other hand, in Sekupang, the network has remained almost the same, but the number of 
trips decreased especially for the trunk routes to Tanjung Balai and Tanjung Batu. 
However, a sign of recovery was seen with a slight increase in the number of trips and 
the establishment of an operator since the 2010s. Besides, a new domestic port opened 
in Harbour Bay. 
 
 
                                                  




Fig 5.7.c: The Network in the Riau Islands in 2013 
 
Source: Fig 5.7 (p.106) 
 
Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai 
     Due to the increasing number of ferry trips, Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai 
began to function as hubs of their neighboring islands. Since the 2000s, the operators 
in both ports have had a favorable business environment. In Tanjung Pinang, the 
network especially within Riau Islands Province has expanded compared with the 
2000s (see Fig 5.7.c). The number of ferry trips to Batam increased, and speedboat 
operators opened new feeder routes. Ford and Lyons (2006) claimed that the city was 
marginalized from the IMS-GT development, but it has instead strengthened its 
position at least in the domestic ferry network since the 2000s.   
In Tanjung Balai, Sri Tanjung Gelam Port plays an important role as the 
interisland transportation hub. It connects Karimun and the neighboring small islands. 
More than one thousand passengers currently use this terminal daily127, reaching more 
than 0.35 million annually. In 2013, ferry operators serve the following six destinations 
with more than one daily return trip: Selat Beliah, Tanjung Berlian, Buru, Moro, 
                                                  




Tanjung Samak, and Tanjung Batu (see Fig 5.8.b). When compared with the beginning 
of the 2000s (Fig 5.8.a), the number of ferry trips to Selat Beliah and Buru increased 
from less than 10 to more than 30 and 11, respectively. In addition, a new destination 
was added128. Three major destinations are discussed briefly here: Selat Beliah, 
Tanjung Berlian and Buru129. The route to Selat Beliah in Kundur Island is a trunk 
route from Tanjung Balai. Several companies operate approximately a total of 30 daily 
return trips to this port, being the busiest route from Tanjung Balai. The port in Selat 
Beliah is 20 minutes away by speedboat and 30 minutes away by ferry with roughly 40 
seats.  
 
Fig 5.8.b: The Interisland Network around Tanjung Balai in 2013 
 
Source: Fig 5.8 (p.107) 
 
The routes to Tanjung Berlian in Kundur Island and Buru can also be considered 
as trunk routes. Two companies operate a total of eight daily return trips to Tanjung 
Berlian. The trip takes roughly 30 to 40 minutes by speedboat. A speedboat stops by a 
few quays along the way. The route to Buru was established approximately fifteen 
years ago130. There are eleven daily return trips served by five ferries. The number of 
                                                  
128 The number of calls at Tanjung Batu shows more than eleven because it includes ferries to and 
from other destinations. 
129 Ferry operations to the other destinations such as Moro and Tanjung Samak started in the 2000s, 
but this section does not discuss them further because of their small number of trips. 
130 Interview with captain of Karomah III in March 2014 
120 
 
trips and ships in this route has remained almost the same since 2005. 
 
5.1.5 Summary 
When comparing the three periods in Fig 5.7, the network in Batam was small 
and the number of daily ferry trips was less than ten in each route in the beginning of 
the 1990s. Subsequently, the network expanded as a whole due to the implementation 
of the IMS-GT program, especially from Batam to Bintan, Karimun, Kundur and 
Sumatra Island. For trunk routes, the number of trips increased to more than ten. 
Various feeder routes were also established. The business environment in each port has 
changed since the beginning of the 2000s. On the one hand, the number of trips 
increased to more than 30 in Telaga Punggur and Tanjung Pinang. Tanjung Pinang has 
strengthened its position as a hub. On the other hand, the network almost remained the 
same but the number of trips decreased in Sekupang. In particular, the long-distance 
routes to Sumatra Island were heavily affected. Since the 2010s, however, this adverse 
business environment in Sekupang apparently recovered to some extent because of the 
establishment of a new operator and a slight increase in the number of trips.  
     In Tanjung Balai, when comparing the two figures in Fig 5.8, the network has 
expanded and the number of trips increased since the 2000s, especially in the route to 
Selat Beliah and Buru. From Tanjung Balai, passengers can access Singapore and 
Malaysia as well as other Indonesian islands directly. Therefore, Tanjung Balai is 
becoming the hub of the interisland, domestic and international routes even though the 
number of the IMS-GT projects in Karimun is limited. 
 
5.2 The Changing Domestic Ferry Networks in the Riau Islands: Determinants 
5.2.1 The Role of the Indonesian Government  
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     This section reviews the role of the Indonesian government in the domestic ferry 
transportation by discussing the competency of the authorities of the ferry 
transportation, port administration and related laws and regulations. 
In Indonesia, the Ministry of Transportation (= Kementerian Perhubungan) is in 
charge of sea transportation and within the ministry are the Directorate General of Sea 
Transportation (= Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Laut, DGST) and the Directorate 
General of Land Transportation (= Direktorat Jenderal Perhubungan Darat, DGLT). 
DGST issues licenses to ports and ferry operators. DGLT also plays an important role 
because it administers PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry, a state-owned enterprise. In addition, 
the provincial and local governments as well as related organizations oversee certain 
aspects of the ferry transportation. The central, provincial and local governments assert 
different levels of authority. For instance, if the gross tonnage of a speedboat is less 
than 35, an operating company needs to register it in the provincial capital. A ferry or a 
speedboat which does not fall into this category needs to be registered with the central 
government in Jakarta131. 
     The administration of the domestic passenger ports in Indonesia is discussed as 
follows. Five kinds of organizations are involved in port administration in the Riau 
Islands: (1) Indonesia Port Corporation I (=PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I or Pelindo I), 
(2) the Indonesian government, (3) Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority (BIFZA), (4) 
the local government, and (5) the operator. The public ports in Indonesia are classified 
into commercial and non-commercial ports. Firstly, commercial ports are administered 
by Pelindo I-IV, while non-commercial ports are administered by the central 
government (Department of Transportation, 2007: 38). For example, international and 
domestic ports in Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai are administered by Pelindo I, 
                                                  
131 Interview at Batam Port Office in October 2013 
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headquartered in Medan. The domestic port in Tanjung Batu is administered by the 
Ministry of Transportation, i.e. the Indonesian government. Secondly, domestic ports 
in Batam are administered by BIFZA directly. An organization like BIFZA does not 
exist in other areas in Indonesia. However, BIFZA’s involvement in the port facility is 
passive, unlike for international ports. BIFZA relocated the function of Kabil to Telaga 
Punggur in the 1990s, but there is no active involvement thereafter. BIFZA also 
upgraded the international terminals since the 2000s, but there was no upgrading for 
the domestic ports. Thirdly, the local governments administer the ports for speedboats 
and small ships. For example, the interisland port in Batam for short-distance routes is 
administered by Batam Municipal Government. Finally, a ferry operator can 
administer a port in Indonesia. For example, PT. ASDP directly administers its own 
ports in the Riau Islands.  
     As for related Indonesian laws, Dick (2008) investigated there are three kinds of 
regulations on shipping: Law (Undang-Undang), Government Regulation (Peraturan 
Pemerintah or PP) and Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden). The main one is 
Law No.17 in 2008 on Shipping. He discussed the difference between it and PP No.82 
in 1999. Within them, three points are related to the ferry transportation in the Riau 
Islands. Firstly, the new law maintains an awkward double classification of maritime 
sectors. Article 6 divides water transport into three categories: (1) sea transport, (2) 
inland waterways (sungai dan danau), and (3) ferries (penyeberangan) connecting 
roads or railways between adjacent islands. In this research, operators are classified 
into ferries (PT. ASDP) or sea transport (all operators except ASDP). Thus, two 
different departments inside the ministry regulate the ferry transportation. Article 7 
then sub-divides sea transport into four categories: (1) international shipping, (2) 
domestic shipping, (3) non-commercial carriers or ancillary shipping (khusus) and (4) 
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people’s shipping (rakyat), the latter using prahu or ‘traditional’ vessels with less than 
34 gross tonnage. Thus, operators in this chapter are classified into domestic or 
people’s shipping.  
Secondly, in recognition of regional autonomy since 2001, the authority for 
issuing licenses for people’s shipping and ferries has been delegated where appropriate 
to provincial and local governments 132 . Therefore, it is suggested that local 
governments in the Riau Islands expanded their authorities for sea transportation. An 
increase in the number of speedboat operators, as discussed in section 5.1, is 
apparently due to this delegation. Thirdly, the possibility of Pelindo’s restructuring is 
pointed out based on Article 344. Pelindo is a monopolistic and bureaucratic obstacle 
to the development of a more efficient port system in Indonesia (Dick, 2008: 392). It 
seems that Pelindo I does not put much emphasis on improving the port facilities in 
Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai. Thus, there is a possibility of the ports being 
upgraded if a new organization is established. 
In addition to these laws and regulations, the government involves itself with the 
ferry operation in other different approaches. It has active involvement in matters such 
as fares setting and operation times. For example, the ferry ticket price is strictly 
controlled by the government because of a subsidy (see section 5.2.2 for detail). In 
Batam, the operators cannot decide on a new fare by themselves. A meeting attended 
by all of them is held before its announcement. Thus, they basically cannot set a 
different fare with others pertaining to the same route133. In addition, ferry operations 
at night are limited to domestic routes except in an emergency, while operators can ply 
the Singapore-Riau Islands routes late into the night. According to the harbor master in 
Sekupang, this is due to the difference in technology and numerous small islands in the 
                                                  
132 Author’s fieldwork and Dick, Howard, 2008, “The 2008 Shipping Law: Deregulation or 
Re-regulation?”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol.44, No.3, pp.390, 392. 
133 Interview at Batam Port Office in October 2013 
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Riau Islands without a lighthouse. In some cases, the involvement is relatively weak. 
For example, issuing ticket is done electronically for international routes, while 
conducted manually for domestic routes except a few cases. Issuing a ticket manually 
has its advantages, but overcapacity (the number of tickets sold exceeds the number of 
seats) is occasionally pointed out in the media for safety reasons134. Judging from these 
media articles, the governments’ involvement in the case of domestic routes ticketing 
is relatively passive.  
 
5.2.2 The Roles of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT) 
and External Factors 
     This section analyzes the impact of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth 
Triangle (IMS-GT) and the role of external factors on the domestic ferry industry 
substantiated with collected data and other information during my fieldwork. The 
IMS-GT increased the number of passengers to the Riau Islands. Although the 
statistics do not disaggregate passengers’ nationalities, most of them are Indonesians 
based on my fieldwork observation. Unlike for international routes, the Indonesians’ 
purposes for travelling using the domestic routes are more practical: business, 
commute, homecoming and so on. At the outset, the IMS-GT has contributed to the 
increase in the number of passengers while external factors have both positive and 
negative impacts. 
     As discussed in section 2.2, the four flagship projects of the IMS-GT were 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Bintan Beach International Resort (BBIR), Bintan 
Industrial Estate (BIE) and Karimun Marine and Industrial Complex (KMIC). BIP is 
one of the industrial estates in Batam, and regarded as a symbol of joint development 
                                                  
134 For example, see Haluan Kepri, “Miko Natalia Kelebihan Penumpang”, Mar 13, 2012 (Digital 
Source). When I took ferries during my fieldwork, I have faced this situation several times. 
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between Singapore and Indonesia. BIP as well as other industrial parks attracted much 
foreign direct investment (FDI), increasing the population in Batam and the ferry 
traffic between Batam and other islands since the 1990s. As most residents are from 
other regions such as Java and Sumatra Island and only BIP created employment for 
more than 60,000 workers, it is fair to say that the projects contributed substantially in 
increasing the number of ferry passengers135. However, they face competition from 
other industrial estates in other areas in Indonesia and other countries. In addition, the 
annual minimum wage in Batam increases rapidly. Thus, some investors have shut 
down their factories and moved to other areas 136 . Although the manufacturing 
industries still play a big role in Batam’s economy, their impact on the ferry industries 
is not as strong as before. Rather, one of the indirect impacts of the IMS-GT is that 
Batam has become an island with a million population now137. Thus, it is proposed that 
the indirect impacts of the GT are bigger than its direct impacts.  
The last three projects (BBIR, BIE and KMIC) apparently have had a less direct 
impact on the domestic ferry network compared to the international one. There is a 
route between Telaga Punggur in Batam and Tanjung Uban near BIE, and there was a 
route between Telaga Punggur and BBIR. However, it is estimated that the passenger 
volume to BIE is relatively small because the route is operated every 30 minute by 
speedboat with 30 seats and BIE, with more than 13,000 workers, is much smaller 
                                                  
135 Most of these residents migrated to Batam from other regions using sea routes. Batam is an 
island abundant with migrant workers. For residents in Batam from neighboring islands, a ferry is 
the only means of transportation. For some residents in Batam from distant islands such as Java and 
Sumatra, a ferry and a ship are still an important means of transportation. During the long holiday, 
they are packed with people returning home. 
136 See, for example, Jakarta Post, “Increasing Wages Driving Investors out of Batam”, Jul 15, 
2014, (Digital Source) 
137 This density has made Batam a regional center, created jobs to meet the island’s demand and 
deepened economic and social connections with neighboring islands. On the one hand, residents in 
neighboring islands such as Bintan and Karimun come to Batam for various reasons such as 
business and shopping. Batam offers a wide variety of goods and opportunities for business. On the 
other hand, as discussed in section 5.1.3 (p.109), the formation of the Riau Islands Province 
contributed to an increase in commuters from Batam to Bintan. 
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compared to BIP. The Telaga Punggur–BBIR route was already abolished in a short 
time apparently because BBIR’s main target is foreign tourists. Thus, it is fair to say 
that BBIR and BIE contributed to the ferry transportation between Batam and Tanjung 
Uban to some extent. The scale of KMIC is even smaller compared to BIE judging 
from its small number of tenants. Even though the ferry network around Karimun and 
Tanjung Pinang has expanded over the years, the IMS-GT did not directly contribute at 
least to the ferry transportation in these areas.  
In addition to the impact of the IMS-GT, the role of external factors was crucial. 
During fieldwork, I interviewed ferry operators regarding general external factors that 
affected their business. These included the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), the 
Reformasi (= political changes in 1998), the SARS outbreak (2003), the formation of 
the Riau Islands Province (2002) and the formation of Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in 
Batam, Bintan, and Karimun Island (2009). Two interviewees in Sekupang stated that 
the effect of the Asian Financial Crisis was significant. One informant stated that it 
affected their business such as the Sekupang–Sumatra routes greatly. As a result, some 
residents in Batam did not return home during the homecoming season to save money. 
However, SARS and the formation of the Riau Islands Province did not affect their 
businesses significantly. According to another informant, a few operators went 
bankrupt due to the Asian Financial Crisis. On the other hand, according to one 
informant in Telaga Punggur, the Asian Financial Crisis did not affect the number of 
passengers between Batam and Tanjung Pinang significantly. Instead, the formation of 
the Riau Islands Province had a big impact138. The interviewees in Sekupang stated the 
negative effect of the Asian Financial Crisis, while the interviewee in Telaga Punggur 
stated the positive effect of the formation of the Riau Islands Province.  
                                                  
138 Interview at PT. Baruna Jaya and PT. Marinatama Gemanusa in September 2013, and Interview 
at PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari in November 2013 
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Fig 5.10: Changes of Minyak Solar Price (Rupiah per Liter, The price on 1st January each year) 
 
Source: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Indonesia’s website (accessed in April 2014) 
 
 
     In addition to the above-mentioned external factors, two specific factors 
affecting the ferry industry are discussed: increases in the fuel price and competition 
with airline companies. Firstly, compared to the international routes, the oil price 
system is different for the vessels plying the domestic routes. According to one 
informant, diesel fuel for ferries is subsidized by the government. Due to this subsidy, 
a ferry ticket price is strictly controlled by the government. The price changes rather 
infrequently, only once every three to five years139. Fig 5.10 shows the change in 
subsidized diesel fuel (= Minyak Solar) from 1990 to 2009. The rate of increase was 
small in the 1990s: less than three times in a decade. However, prices increased 
significantly in the 2000s: approximately nine times from Rp 550/L in 2000 to Rp 
4,800/L in 2009. Consequently, the price of a ferry ticket increased accordingly. For 
example, a one-way trip between Batam and Tanjung Pinang cost Rp 25,000 before 
October 2005 and it reached Rp 55,000 in 2013. It is estimated that the increase of 
fares due to an increase in the fuel price has a big impact for passengers. Some might 
                                                  
139 Interview at PT. Baruna Jaya in September 2013 
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choose a different means of transportation if there is an alternative.  
     Therefore, it is essential here to discuss competition with airline companies, 
especially for the long-distance routes. The airport in Batam opened before the 1980s. 
Airline companies connect Batam with Indonesian main cities such as Jakarta, Medan 
and Pekanbaru. The airport in Bintan is connected to main cities such as Jakarta, but 
the number of flights there is less compared to Batam. The airport in Karimun is only 
for regional transportation. Therefore, PT. PELNI competes with airline companies in 
the Batam–Jakarta, the Batam–Medan, and the Bintan–Jakarta route, while ferry 
operators compete with them in the Batam–Pekanbaru and Batam–Jambi routes.  
     The competition with airline companies has become intense since the mid-2000s. 
The Jakarta Post reported on the plight of ferry operators. A six-hour ferry trip from 
Batam to Riau Province cost Rp 250,000, while a budget airline may charge between 
Rp 220,000 and Rp 350,000 for the 30-minutes trip. According to one operator, it was 
natural that people choose the faster and cheaper method of transportation. 
Consequently, operators understood that they needed to survive by holding on to the 
shorter routes. A ferry operator in Sekupang, plying between Batam and Kuala Tungkal 
stated a similar business environment 140 . During my fieldwork, informants also 
commented that the emergence of budget airlines affected both the Batam–Pekanbaru 
and Batam–Kuala Tungkal routes141. The impact of competition with airline companies 
is significant for ferry operators plying between Batam and Sumatra Island. A joint 
operation between two operators, explained in section 5.1.3, and focusing on 
middle-distance routes might be a countermeasure to the competition. 
                                                  
140 The Jakarta Post: Jan 17, 2007. According to this operator, most passengers moved to budget 
airlines. It takes five hours from Batam to Kuala Tungkal in Jambi province (Sumatra Island) by 
ferry, plus two hours by bus at the cost of Rp 250,000. Airlines charged between Rp 250,000 and 
Rp 400,000 for the 40-minutes flight. Consequently, the respondent felt that they did not have 
many passengers, and this route may have to be terminated soon.  
141 Interview at PT. Pelnas Lestari Indomabahari in November 2013 and at PT. Marinatama 
Gemanusa in September 2013 
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Fig 5.11: Number of Arriving Passengers to the Batam Domestic Ferry Terminal 
 
Source: Batam in Figures (various years) 
 
Fig 5.12: Number of Arriving Passengers to the 
Sekupang and Telaga Punggur Domestic Ferry Terminals 
 
Source: Batam Port Corporation (Author’s collection) 
 
     In order to shed more light on the discussion in this section, statistics are now 
reviewed. In the 1990s, the number of domestic passengers to and from Batam kept 
increasing as a whole due to the implementation of the IMS-GT projects. The number 
of arriving passengers increased from 0.34 million in 1990 to 1.46 million in 2000: 
1.03 million via Sekupang and 0.44 million via Telaga Punggur as entry points (see Fig 
5.11). Although the breakdown of the number of passengers in each port before 2000 is 
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not available, it is estimated that both Sekupang and Telaga Punggur experienced an 
increase judging from interviews conducted during the fieldwork. However, the 
number of arriving passengers has fluctuated since the 2000s. It dipped from 1.46 
million in 2000 to 1.03 million in 2006, but increased to 1.51 million in 2012. As for 
the breakdown of passengers for the two terminals (see Fig 5.12), Sekupang suffered a 
decline in the mid-2000s from 1.02 million in 2000 to 0.47 million in 2006, but 
recovered to 0.67 million in 2012. It is crucial to point out that a decrease in the 
number of passengers in Sekupang since the 2000s was in accordance with a fuel price 
increase in the same period. Thus, as long-distance ferry operators depart from 
Sekupang, it is estimated that the number of passengers declined due to a sharp 
increase in the fuel price and competition with airline companies. Telaga Punggur 
experienced a steady increase throughout the 2000s from 0.44 million in 2000 to 0.75 
million in 2012. The reason could be due to a traffic increase caused by the formation 
of the Riau Islands Province. The impact of an increase in the fuel price is not 
negligible, but there is no alternative for travelers but ferry transportation for this route. 
In short, the number of passengers arriving via Sekupang was more than two times that 
of Telaga Punggur in 2000, but the statistics were reversed in 2012.  
 
5.3 The Case Studies 
This section discusses the two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for additional 
insights on Indonesian sea transportation: PT. PELNI and PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry. 
PELNI operates ships, not ferries in a strict sense, but it is discussed here for a better 
overall understanding of the sea transportation in the Riau Islands. Both are SOEs but 
with different emphases: PELNI is a long-distance ship operator with cargo capacity, 




PT. Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia (PELNI) 
     One SOE with branches in the Riau Islands is PT. Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia 
(PELNI), a long-distance ship operator. As they operate long-distance vessels, they can 
carry more than one thousand passengers with cargo at a time (see Fig 5.13 for a photo 
of a PELNI ship). In the Riau Islands, Tanjung Pinang was previously prominent in the 
system of PELNI sea routes. Subsequently, Kijang in Bintan Island was selected as a 
site to build a new port for the development of a new port town independent from 
Tanjung Pinang. For this reason, two vessels were bought by PELNI and put into 
service in 1987. One of the new routes included Kijang, to connect Jakarta to a port of 
call close to Singapore142. They apparently added Sekupang and Tanjung Balai as ports 
of call thereafter. PELNI’s motivation to choose Bintan as a port of call was its 
proximity to Singapore. PELNI gave attention to the importance of the Riau Islands 
not only as a destination but also as a transit point to Singapore before the beginning of 
the IMS-GT.  
     As of March 2014, PELNI ships call at three points in the Riau Islands: Kijang, 
Sekupang in Batam and Tanjung Balai in Karimun. They currently operate three routes 
in the Riau Islands (see Fig 5.14). One is a weekly route from Jakarta to Medan via 
Sekupang and Tanjung Balai. Another is a fortnightly route from Jakarta to Surabaya 
with several port calls along the way such as Kijang, Natuna and Kalimantan Island. 
The other is also a fortnightly route from Jakarta to Kijang.  
 
 
                                                  
142 Rutz, Werner O A and James R Coull, 1996, “Inter-island Passenger Shipping in Indonesia: 
Development of the System, Present Characteristics and Future Requirements”, Journal of 
Transport Geography, Vol.4, No.4, pp.278, 281. However, Kijang is just a port facility, not a port 
town yet in my impression. 
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Fig 5.13: A PELNI Ship 
 
Source: Author’s collection 
 
 
Fig 5.14: PELNI Routes in the Riau Islands in 2014 
 
Sources: Google Map, PELNI’s website (accessed in April 2014) 
 
 
The number of PELNI passengers showed a downward trend throughout the 
2000s. In 2001, the total number of the passengers reached 7.43 million, but it declined 
to 3.69 million in 2006. Then it recovered reaching 4.52 million in 2011. In the Riau 
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Islands, the number of its arriving passengers was recorded at roughly 107,000 in 
Batam, 89,000 in Kijang and 25,000 in Tanjung Balai in 2008. Batam received the 
most number of passengers among these three ports. However, its number of arriving 
passengers decreased annually in tandem with the decrease in the total number of 
passengers143.  
 
Table 5.4: Comparison between Sea and Air Trips in the Jakarta–Batam Route  
(As of March, 2014) 
 Sea Air 
Time 29 hours 2 hours 
Frequency 1 return trip/week Approximately 10 daily return trips 
Price Rp 258,000–994,000 Rp 454,000 
Sources: Lion Air’s website (a promotion price without tax in a weekday, accessed in March 2014),  
       PELNI’s website (accessed in March 2014) and author’s fieldwork 
 
 
Table 5.5: Comparison between Sea and Air Trips in the Medan–Batam route  
(As of March, 2014) 
 Sea Air 
Time 23 hours 1.5 hours 
Frequency 1 return trip/week Approximately 5 daily return trips 
Price Rp 181,000–683,000 Rp 411,000 
Sources: Lion Air’s website (a promotion price without tax in a weekday, accessed in March 2014), 
       PELNI’s website (accessed in March 2014) and author’s fieldwork 
 
The decrease in the passenger number is due to competition with airline 
companies (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Even though PT. PELNI offers reasonable fares for 
several kinds of seats, one can easily see that airline companies are recently taking the 
lead in the Batam–Jakarta and Batam–Medan routes. The air routes are much faster 
and airline companies operate several daily trips in total. Thus, the sea routes, apart 
from the freight traffic, have apparently become transportation for travelers who have 
                                                  
143 Data Distribusi Angkutan Penumpang Dalam Negeri (2011), Kepulauan Riau in Figures 
(various years), Bintan in Figures (various years) and Karimun in Figures (various years). The 
number of arriving passengers in Batam decreased from 107,000 in 2008 to 79,000 in 2011; in 
Kijang from 136,000 in 2001 to 73,000 in 2011; and in Tanjung Balai from 41,000 in 2002 to 
25,000 in 2008. 
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extra time, for those who have much baggage, and for others who have less budget for 
their travel expenses.  
 
PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry 
     The other SOE is PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry (ASDP). Unlike PELNI, this 
company operates roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) shipping lines. ASDP is different from other 
operators because they carry passengers and their vehicles. It was established in 1973 
and has more than 3,300 employees144. ASDP has a fleet of 115 ferries that serve 151 
shipping lines throughout the Indonesian archipelago (see Fig 5.15 for a photo of an 
ASDP ro-ro ferry). Its commercial ferry network consists of 38 lines served by 65 
ferries, while its pioneer one consists of 113 lines served by 50 ferries145. It also 
manages 34 ferry ports all across Indonesia (Centre, 2011: 67).  
 
Fig 5.15: An ASDP Ro-ro Ferry 
 




                                                  
144 ASDP’s website (accessed in November 2013) 
145 Pioneer services are essentially attempts to provide low-cost and efficient services to remote 
and inaccessible areas in Indonesia. The services operate through a complex system of subsidies 
(Hoyle et al., 1998: 56). 
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     Its branch in Batam opened with an exclusive port in Telaga Punggur in 1993. 
ASDP chose Tanjung Uban in Bintan as a destination port because it is the shortest 
route from Telaga Punggur to Bintan. There are currently three destinations from 
Telaga Punggur: Tanjung Uban (7 daily return trips), Tanjung Balai (bi-weekly) and 
Dabo in Singkep Island (weekly). ASDP has operated the route to Tanjung Uban since 
its branch’s opening, while the others are new: Tanjung Balai in 2010 and Dabo in 
2013146. In the route between Telaga Punggur and Tanjung Uban, speedboat operators 
are its competitors because they ply the same route in fifteen minutes compared to one 
hour by ASDP, although ASDP has a comparative advantage in being able to carry 
vehicles. A potential competitor for this route might be a bridge that connects Batam 
and Bintan which is still under planning. 
     In 1993, ASDP operated one ferry with two daily return trips. They increased the 
number of ferries and trips in the recent five years to expand its network. An 
interviewee stated that it became very convenient for passengers to purchase a 
motorcycle due to the introduction of credit facilities and because passengers could 
ride their motorcycles onto the ship. Thus, the number of ASDP passengers showed an 
upward trend with an increase in the number of passengers who bring their vehicles 
onto the ferries. According to its statistics, ASDP’s regional ridership in 2007 reached 
41,000 passengers, and it increased more than five times to 209,000 by 2012. They 
have plans of establishing a new quay in Telaga Punggur and a new route147. ASDP 
opened a branch in Batam because they saw the potential of the island due to the 
IMS-GT. As was expected, the ASDP’s network around Batam has grown since its 
establishment, especially in recent years. 
                                                  
146 The route to Tanjung Uban is a commercial service, while routes to the others are pioneer 
service. Interview at PT. ASDP Batam branch in September 2013 






     In the 1990s, the domestic ferry network in Batam had expanded following the 
development of the IMS-GT (see Fig 5.7). As more employment was created, more 
people headed for the Riau Islands for job opportunities across Indonesia. This has led 
to an increase of population in Batam and its neighboring islands. This process has 
stimulated the expansion of the ferry network. The function of Kabil, an eastern 
gateway to and from Batam, was relocated to Telaga Punggur in response to the 
increasing number of passengers. Sekupang, a western gateway to and from Batam, 
also benefited from the growth. In the trunk routes from Batam, the number of trips 
increased to more than ten and various feeder routes were also established.  
However, this favorable business environment has changed since the 2000s. The 
ferry network has expanded in some ports, but the expansion did not occur in others. 
On one hand, Telaga Punggur attracted more passengers because of the formation of 
Riau Islands Province, and it became the busiest port in Batam. In Tanjung Pinang, 
several new routes opened to connect to other regions in the Riau Islands. Tanjung 
Balai also has begun to function as the hub of interisland, domestic and international 
routes, especially since the 2000s. On the other hand, the network almost remained the 
same but the number of trips decreased in Sekupang. In particular, the long-distance 
routes to Sumatra Island were heavily affected. In addition, a new operator was 
established to connect between a new port in Batam and Tanjung Balai. The important 
point here is that private operators, not state-owned enterprises, played a critical role in 
the expansion of the ferry network. 
     In Indonesia, the central, provincial and local governments as well as related 
organizations have asserted different levels of authority regarding ferry transportation. 
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Due to regional autonomy, the authorities in some areas were delegated to local 
governments by virtue of Law No.17 in 2008. In addition, the government has, both 
actively and passively, been involved in ferry operations depending on the cases. A 
unique feature of Indonesia is the complexity of its port administration system because 
there are several administrators. Batam Indonesia Free Zone Authority (BIFZA), a 
development organization, relocated the function of Kabil to Telaga Punggur in the 
1990s, but it has no active involvement thereafter. This type of behavior also applies to 
the case of Pelindo I.  
The IMS-GT has certainly increased the number of passengers over time. 
However, the increase in the number of passengers due to the IMS-GT was affected by 
some external factors both positively and negatively. The impact of industrial estates in 
Batam on the ferry industries is not strong compared to before because of competition 
with other industrial estates in other regions. Although Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung 
Balai are relatively marginalized from the benefit of the IMS-GT, they play a big role 
in the domestic ferry network. In addition, increases in fuel prices and the emergence 
of budget airlines negatively affected the ferry operators in Sekupang, while the 
formation of the Riau Islands Province positively affected them in Telaga Punggur.  
Two state-owned enterprises were discussed as case studies, and they showed 
contrasting business results: PELNI suffered from a decline in the number of 
passengers due to competition with airline companies, while ASDP increased its 










6.1 Verifying Hypotheses 
     In this research, two hypotheses were examined.  
(i) For international ferry routes, the network and the number of ferry trips had 
expanded until around 2000 following the success of the Growth Triangle (GT) project. 
However, subsequently, the ferry operators have more or less maintained their 
networks by adjusting the number of ferry trips with a slightly declining trend due to 
the fluctuating number of visitors to the Riau Islands, albeit this decline has occurred 
with a corresponding increase in Batam’s regional GDP, population and investment.  
(ii) For domestic ferry routes, both the network and the number of ferry trips of 
the long- and middle-distance operators expanded since the beginning of the GT 
projects due to an increase in Batam’s regional GDP, populations in Batam and Bintan, 
and investment. 
     My hypothesis for international ferry routes was almost correct. Even before the 
start of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), formerly 
known as the Singapore–Johor–Riau Growth Triangle (SIJORI), there was an increase 
in the number of trips between the Riau Islands and Singapore since the late 1980s. 
Subsequently, the 1990s saw a significant expansion of the network and an increase in 
the number of trips. In order to cater to this growth, port facilities in Singapore were 
upgraded. With the implementation of the IMS-GT program, new ports for the resort 
areas and the industrial estates in the Riau Islands opened one after another. The 
network between the Riau Islands and Johor State has expanded since the mid-1990s. 
Some ports in Johor opened to connect to Singapore. The ferry operators started the 
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routes to and from the Riau Islands thereafter.  
However, this favorable business environment has changed since the beginning 
of the 2000s. For the Riau Islands–Singapore routes, the network barely remained the 
same and the number of ferry trips has decreased when comparing the 2001 with the 
2014 situation. Several routes were abolished while a few ports opened in the Riau 
Islands. The port facilities in Batam were also upgraded in the 2000s. For the Riau 
Islands–Johor State routes, the network and the number of ferry trips have remained 
almost the same when comparing the 2001 with the 2014 situation. New ports opened 
and new routes were established, while a few other routes were abolished.  
     For domestic routes, my hypothesis was slightly optimistic. An expansion of the 
network and an increase in the number of ferry trips held true in the 1990s similar to 
the international routes. In the trunk routes from Kabil/Telaga Punggur and Sekupang, 
the number of daily return trips increased to more than ten, and various feeder routes 
were established. However, the business environment has differed in each port since 
around the 2000s. On the one hand, the network in Sekupang almost remained the 
same, but the number of trips decreased. In particular, the long-distance routes to 
Sumatra Island were heavily affected. Consequently, operators apparently began to put 
more emphasis on middle-distance routes. On the other hand, Telaga Punggur attracted 
more passengers because of the formation of the Riau Islands Province, and the 
number of its arriving passengers exceeded the number of arriving passengers to 
Sekupang. Tanjung Pinang, being the hub as a provincial city in the Riau Islands 
Province, saw several new routes connected with other regions in the Riau Islands. 
Tanjung Balai has also begun to function as the hub of the interisland, domestic, and 
international routes, especially since the 2000s.  
     As for the reasons for these trends and patterns, the 1990s saw significant 
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expansion of the network for both international and domestic routes due to the 
implementation of the IMS-GT programs. Both of them benefited from this impact. 
For the international routes, more foreigners visited the Riau Islands for various 
purposes such as business and pleasure, while the number of Indonesian passengers 
from both the Riau Islands and other regions across Indonesia increased. For domestic 
routes, as more employment was created, more people from across Indonesia headed 
for the Riau Islands for job opportunities. This led to an increase in the population in 
Batam and the neighboring islands. This process stimulated the expansion of the ferry 
transport network.  
However, this business environment has changed since around the 2000s. The 
increase in the number of passengers due to the IMS-GT was affected both positively 
and negatively by several external factors. Compared to the 1990s, the framework of 
the IMS-GT has cooled down now. The impact of the industrial estates in Batam on the 
ferry industries is not strong currently compared to before because of the competition 
with other industrial estates in other regions and a sharp increase in wages, while the 
resort areas in the Riau Islands have continued to attract tourists from Singapore. 
General factors such as the Asian Financial Crisis and the SARS outbreak in 2003 
dealt a blow to the ferry transportation. For example, one of the international operators 
suffered a double-digit decline in its passenger volume due to the Asian Financial 
Crisis. As for specific factors, sharp increases in the fuel price since the late 1990s 
have affected ferry operations. Besides these factors, a few operators of international 
routes left the market due to severe competition in the ferry industry. As for domestic 
routes, the formation of the Riau Islands Province was a favorable wind to the 
operators in Telaga Punggur. In addition, the impact of competition with airline 
companies was significant for the ferry operators plying between Batam and Sumatra 
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Island. However, the number of international and domestic passengers has shown signs 
of recovery since the 2010s.  
     Based on my findings, there were a few contributions to the literature dealing 
with both the IMS-GT and the sea transportation in Indonesia. My humble research 
showed a different perspective of the IMS-GT in the Riau Islands relating to ferry 
transportation. Firstly, it is often argued that the Riau Islands–Johor State links are 
weak in terms of investment and trade linkages. However, there is at least a constant 
flow of people considering the existing ferry network between the Riau Islands and the 
Johor State. Although this network is smaller compared to the Riau Islands–Singapore 
routes, there are still more than 30 daily return trips. Indonesians from other parts of 
Indonesia use Batam as a transit point to Malaysia. The number of Indonesians who 
enter Singapore by sea has shown an increasing trend, while the number of Malaysians 
who enter Indonesia via Batam has increased over the years. Complementarity 
between the two areas surely exists. Secondly, the IMS-GT projects in the Riau Islands 
are concentrated in Batam and the northern area in Bintan. Thus, Ford and Lyons 
(2006) argued that Tanjung Pinang and Tanjung Balai are marginalized from the 
development of the IMS-GT. The number of foreign tourists and international ferry 
trips to these two ports are certainly on a declining trend. Nonetheless, they function at 
least as hubs of the domestic sea transportation, especially since the 2000s. Thirdly, 
one of the concepts related to the IMS-GT is geographical proximity. The development 
of the ferry network played a significant role to support the GT, leading to economic 
development of this area. However, fuel prices have experienced sharp increases since 
the late 1990s. Thus, fuel charges were introduced for international routes and the fare 
increased rapidly for domestic routes in the 2000s. There is a possibility that the fuel 
price will be a hindrance to the increase in the number of passengers if it remains high.  
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     The literature on sea transportation in Indonesia primarily focuses on national 
matters while this research investigated sea transport for a particular region. As the 
impact of the IMS-GT was significant, the Riau Islands has transformed into a hub for 
ferry transportation in a short period. This research showed the process of a rapid 
expansion of the ferry network in one region facilitated by government-led projects. In 
addition, state-owned enterprises such as PT. PELNI and PT. ASDP Indonesia Ferry 
are the main research subjects in existing literature. It was only natural that they were 
researched because of their large-scale operations. In the Riau Islands, they certainly 
play a role, but the role private operators play is much bigger. In consideration of the 
impact of the IMS-GT, ferry operators headquartered in the Sumatra Island and the 
Riau Islands predicted future growth in the area and have invested in the ferry industry 
since the 1990s. Although they faced various general and specific adverse factors, they 
continued to play the dominant role in the Riau Islands. 
 
6.2 Looking Forward 
     Since the beginning of the IMS-GT program, in the Riau Islands, the Indonesian 
and Singaporean governments have cooperated closely with government-linked 
corporations in Singapore and a conglomerate in Indonesia. In the Johor State, the 
Malaysian government is involved heavily in the recent Iskandar Project. These 
organizations are the prime movers of regional development. In order to stimulate the 
regional economies, big projects are essential and these have been successful in the 
region. However, there seems to be fewer big projects in the Riau Islands for the future. 
For example, only three projects are listed in the BIFZA’s website as of April 2014: the 
Batam–Bintan Bridge, the Batam Monorail and the toll road. Their completion periods 
are not stated. In addition, “The Master Plan for the Expansion and Acceleration of 
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Indonesia’s Economic Development, 2011−2025 (MP3EI)” stipulated only two or 
three projects for the Riau Islands such as the development of the terminal at the 
airport in Bintan, out of the hundreds of development projects in across Indonesia148.  
     Therefore, the outlook for big projects in the Riau Islands seems uncertain. Take 
for example, the Batam–Bintan Bridge project. As Harry Azhar Azis commented in 
RSIS Riau Roundtable 2010, five billion rupiah is needed for the bridge project and a 
highway from Batam to Singapore would cost double the amount. But the problem is 
how the construction work can be done and by whom. It may be the Indonesian 
government, the Singaporean government, the local government, or the private 
sector149. The Balerang bridge project in the southern Batam was certainly successful, 
but it was constructed by the central government during the era under Suharto and by 
Batam Industrial Development Authority under the Habibie regime, before the 
decentralization of political power. Both organizations cooperated closely and this 
functioned well at that time. However, that era is over and the decentralization of 
political power has started. The connection between the two organizations seems to be 
weaker and the Riau Islands provincial government is now the new player. It seems 
that big projects in Batam will not proceed smoothly as before. Consequently, a 
reduction on the dependence on big projects for growth is unavoidable in order to 
make the Riau Islands attractive for business and tourism.  
     Instead, steady efforts need to be made over time. One way is to increase the 
number of Indonesian visitors to the Riau Islands. Compared to the number of 
Singaporeans, this number has shown a recovery trend. As Batam has become a site for 
official gatherings and meetings, some participants travel to Singapore thereafter. If 
                                                  
148 Kumar and Sidiqque, 2013, p.57. BIFZA’s three projects are not included in this MP3EI. 
149 Harry, Azhar Azis, RSIS Riau Roundtable 2010 on “The Bridge between the Riau Archipelago 
and Singapore: The Implementation of the FTZs and Investment Opportunities”, Indonesian 
Programme, Nanyang Technological University, Mar 16, 2010, p.4 (Digital Source). 
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Batam can attract additional visitors from across Indonesia, it will become a more 
significant place in Indonesia. An increase in the number of ferry passengers can also 
be expected. In addition, an effort to increase the number of foreign visitors needs to 
be made. Although the number of Singaporean tourists has shown a decreasing trend, 
the islands could become popular to tourists visiting Singapore when they can see 
advantages in visiting Batam. By utilizing the ferry network, the Riau Islands can 
function as a hub for distant and neighboring islands in Indonesia and neighboring 
countries. Moreover, ferry operators are also cooperating in order to increase the 
number of tourists to Batam. For example, cycling events are occasionally held in 
Batam to attract tourists from Singapore. Ferry operators are usually considered to be 
just providing a means of transportation, but some of them are actively involved in 
these events to bring in more visitors150.  
The Jakarta Post reported that a number of pilot projects for the ASEAN 
Connectivity will be implemented in Batam. One of them is the opening of roll on-roll 
off (ro-ro) ferries linking Batam with Malaysia and Singapore. The feasibility study for 
the project would soon be carried out with operations slated for 2015151. The Riau 
Islands is a unique area with a complicated ferry network, and its geographical 
characteristics have sustained the ferry industries. Thus, it seems that Batam is an ideal 
place for this project. The international and domestic ferry networks in the Riau 
Islands have developed substantially throughout the last 20 years or more. It has begun 
to function as a hub of the ferry transportation and has thus facilitated an extensive 
ferry network with other islands in Indonesia and to neighboring ports of Singapore 
and Malaysia. While facing various kinds of challenges, the current operators have 
overcome most of them with tremendous efforts. The ferry operators’ trajectories up to 
                                                  
150 Batam Fast’s and Berlian Ferries’ websites (accessed in April 2014) 




now have set an example for other operators in other regions. Finally, I sincerely hope 
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